

THE ROLE OF THE LEVANT IN THE HISTORY OF CIVILISATION

Systematics Vol. 7 no. 2 September 1969

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This article is a short outline of a large section of a comprehensive work now under preparation, a work in which the whole of history is treated in terms of macro sociological theory. The Levant is conceived as one — in the past the most crucial one — of the five civilizational areas of the world and the civilizations as one — albeit the fundamental one — of the systems of societal structure.

INTRODUCTION

The Levant in this study denotes that part of the old world which is situated between India and Europe, a vast area of south-west Asia and north and north-east Africa which nowadays forms the core of the Islamic world (including heterodox Christian enclaves); or, to put it more plainly, that part of it which is inhabited by Semitic, Hammitic, Iranian and Turkish ethnic groups.

For the purposes of this work, the old description 'Levant' is felt to be more appropriate than the current Middle or Near East. It can be used to denote all the territories which in historical development formed a part of civilizational areas which eventually became united to form, as stated, the core of the Islamic world.

The area so designated is now in an advanced state of civilizational reconstruction and its territorial re-groupings anticipate the new frontiers of future civilizational areas. The most obvious examples of these re- groupings are Soviet Armenia and the newly formed state of Israel, though there have also been similar changes in the Turkish-speaking territories of Caucasia, Central Asia (Soviet and Chinese) and to a certain extent in the Turkish Republic itself. Yet, despite all this, there still remains a vestigial, though clearly visible, civilizational unity based on such common denominators as religion (though largely modified under the influence of a worldly Europeanism), cultural tradition preserved in a common script* and common forms of artistic expression, and many residual elements of day-to-day living. The bonds formed by such common factors are only gradually being loosened under European influence to be replaced largely by more narrow, national loyalties.

*This, however, has been abandoned by two important groups in the Islamic world, the Turkish nations and the Indonesians.

These changes have only become macro sociologically relevant in the course of the twentieth century. Up to now, the whole area of Islam, including Muslim outposts in India, the Malayan area and Black Africa, formed one unit by dint of a single ideation and evaluation base made up of a faith in one revealed religion, the tenets of which were held to be the norms of human behaviour and the supreme criterion of truth.

So far the manner of thinking and evaluating in the Levant has been very close to that of Christian Europe, which has also been moulded by a revealed religion claiming to be the supreme criterion of truth and righteousness. By embracing Christianity, Europe came more in line with the Levant, while the Levant for its part achieved through Islam a spiritual integration which had the same historical roots as Christianity. Before the rise of Christianity and Islam, these common historical roots had been drawn together in Judaism, the reconstruction of which forms a substantial element of the religious messages of both Jesus Christ and Muhammad.

Whereas in Judaism, however, the Levantine religious tradition is most fully embodied in the national framework whereby one God is the supreme Lord of his chosen ethnic group-, both the Christian and the Islamic message is of one, universal God, with Christianity - in addition - incorporating in its doctrinal and ritual framework many elements of non-Levantine, distinctly European tradition.

Despite the fact that Christianity is, through the person of its originator, more closely connected with Judaism, its younger cousin Islam approximates more closely to the content of the Judaic heritage.

The fundamental article of Islamic teaching is a devoted faith in one God who cannot be depicted. However, unlike the Jewish Yahveh, the Islamic Allah shows a merciful charity and offers salvation to

man exclusive of any particular ethnic affiliation. Apart from unwavering faith. Islam demands upright behaviour and the observation of a comparatively simple ritual. It admits, however, that other religions, in so far as they abide in principle by monotheism and were revealed through holy scripture, can bring salvation and can therefore be tolerated.

On the other hand, Christianity, which unlike Islam stressed the mercy of God and adopted a comparatively simple ritual, claimed - within the universality of its message - exclusive power of salvation. Moreover, Christian monotheism was so elastic that it expanded the concept to that of three persons contained in its one God, the incarnation of one of these persons forming an historically unique juncture between the transcendent and temporal world in order to secure man's final and eternal salvation.

In the Levant, the concept of the godly incarnation was a characteristic mark of Egyptian religious tradition. Among Levantine civilizations, Egypt was unique in regarding its rulers as direct incarnations of their gods*. Christianity, however, combined this idea with that of a single God and — what is more important — upgraded it so that it stood on a higher ethical plane. According to Christian doctrine, the incarnation of God was not for the purpose of ruling an earthly kingdom, but for the benefit of man. Thus the personal, individual fate of men becomes of fundamental concern to the religion.

*Mesopotamian examples of this, i.e. Naram-Sin of the Akkadian dynasty and Shulgi and his successors in the third dynasty of Ur (and also of Isin), are exceptions.

This last idea means that Christianity, in fact, lacks one characteristic common to all Levantine religions, theocentrism. On this point Christianity is more in line with the European (in those days Romano - Hellenic) scale of values which, in contrast to that of -other civilizational areas of the world, is based on anthropocentrism. This leaning towards Europe, also evident in other theological concepts and organizational forms, points to the fact that the sub-sequent development of Christianity is much more closely connected with that of civilization in Europe than in its native Levant.

If, after approximately five centuries of Islamo-Christian co-existence, the Levantine nations preferred to embrace the legacy of Muhammad, it was probably because its framework more readily lent itself to the assertion of the basic mentality of this area. Islam literally means 'surrender', in the sense of surrender to God; thus its basic tenet claims adherence to the theocentric concept characteristic of the whole of Levantine religious tradition.

The original outlook of Islam was strictly monotheistic and aniconic. This was entirely in line with Judaic tradition and corresponded well to the religious approach of the Arabs whose military prowess brought Islam to the fore throughout the Levant. In the course of time, as the Muslim empire began to allow converts of other nations to take a leading part in its administration and to affect its religious development, its strict monotheism and aniconism was moderated. The personal cult of Muhammad, and later even of the saints was allowed, as was to some extent their pictorial representation. This met all the religious needs of non-Arabic, especially Iranian and Iranianized nations. In addition to this, individual and collective forms of mystic ecstasy (Sufism) developing

the originally strict fideistic religion to answer the needs of a deeper irrationality and emotion, made late Islam more acceptable not only to the primitive nations of the Asian and African steppes, but also to the spiritually demanding Indian world whose emotional and rather ideocentric religious approach had been an unsurmountable obstacle to Muslim missionary activity.

In Late Islam there developed a polarity between the written book, fixing once and for all the religious revelation — be it in holy scripture (the Qu'ran) or in written tradition (the Hadiths) — and mystic spontaneity. This polarity, however, was bridged by a common fundamental faith and ritual, the simplicity of which contributed more to unity than an imposed organization could have done.

Right from the beginning of Islam, humanly natural and inevitable deviations from the standard accepted by the majority gave rise to variations in doctrine and forms of cult. The most obvious variation of this kind was the Shi'ite minority's idea of continual prophetic activity (derived, however, from the original message and teaching on the same lines) as opposed to the adherence of the

Sunni majority to the one, original prophetic message embodied in the holy scripture and tradition. This has ever been one of the main sources of internal friction in Islam. All the same, the outside observer cannot be misled into thinking of any Muslim community as belonging to a civilization other than Islam.

Common, only slightly varied forms of the religious cult were fixed so firmly, through their millennial tradition, that they became a deep rooted constant of everyday Muslim life, forming an outer, but effective framework for the ideational integration of the Levantine area. Not only private family life but the forms of social contact and the content and form of artistic expression were also moulded by the ideas and values of Islam.

This kind of unity prevailed particularly in the territories settled by Arabic or Arabicized (Berberic), Iranian and Turkish ethnic groups. In the Muslim areas of India, Malaya, Indonesia and particularly of China, the outward appearance of everyday life was variously coloured by the influences of the civilizations to which these areas belonged before the penetration of Islam. Yet these variations did not go so far as to alter the fundamental unity of the ideational and evaluation base as revealed in the Islamic faith.

With the exception of the Persian-Arabic polarity in pictorial expression, the Arabic/Iranian /Turkish area itself exhibited up until the last century such a uniformity in its way of life that, to the European mind, it is indivisibly linked with an image of the Middle (Near) East or, more accurately, the Levant. The geographical designation has thus taken on sociological connotations.

Another factor characterizing this area is reflected in the very name 'Levant'. Derived from the Latin 'levare' (to rise), it not only denotes the east, but is reminiscent of the fact that the area is the cradle of the oldest civilizations, a fact which also helps to explain the particular complexity and variety of the civilizational development in this area. Although it can be assumed that civilizations in other parts of the world have independent origins, as for instance in the Far East and Far West (pre-Columbian America), the beginning of civilizational creation in the Levant was between c.500 to 4,000 years ahead of other civilizational areas and is therefore proof that it was in this area that the most favourable conditions for man's creativity existed. It was here that the first combined impulse of human needs and natural environment sparked off human spiritual potential for creative activity in a social context.

Since then millennia have elapsed during which the civilizational integration of the Levant has developed, as a result of this first impulse, along several particular lines, each of which has formed a separate branch of the sequence of civilizations. The civilizational history of this area has therefore been particularly complicated. From different roots, of whose original interconnection we have not yet sufficient proof, several civilizational pedigrees grew and developed their individuality while at the same time influencing each other. Meanwhile, the common civilizational area increased in size.

The word 'Levanta' has thus assumed as much an historical as a geographical meaning. It symbolizes both temporal and spatial dimensions into which we project the dramatic continuum of social life in an endeavour to discover its general tendency, laws, and with the help of the latter, to gain a deeper understanding of it.

The civilizational unity of the Levant is comparatively recent, dating from the beginning of the second millennium A.D. when Islam, in its second or (according to the terminology of this study) late civilizational formation, succeeded in integrating the whole area of the Levant, with the exception of small, negligible enclaves, and in making of it a civilizational unit according to our theory.

Before this time the Levant — unlike other civilizational areas, such as India and the Far East — was characterized by a plurality of both individual civilizations and civilizational pedigrees. The civilizational variety of India and the Far East, as discovered at the beginning of this century, is either the result of ethnic and geographical variation within one and the same mother civilization* or of the penetration of a neighbouring civilization**. The civilizational purity of the Levant, however, is an original and much more fundamental phenomenon, lasting throughout the greater part of its history.

*Hindu and Pali Buddhist in southern Asia, Neo-Sinic and Shinto Buddhist civilizations in the Far East. For more details see in Vol. III and Vol. IV.

**The penetration of Islam into India and the Malayan area, of Tantric Buddhism into Tibet, and of Christianity into the Philippines - cf. Vol. III and Vol. IV.

Almost simultaneously and perhaps independently, two centres of civilizational creation emerged in the Levant — in Lower Mesopotamia and the Nile Delta. The birth of civilizations in both these areas is estimated, according to recent archaeological research, to have taken place sometime between 4,000 and 3,500 B.C., with Mesopotamia perhaps slightly ahead*.

*In this work we are keeping to what has been called short chronology, resulting from the most recent research and bringing events of ancient times some hundred years closer to our time than were the original estimates. For further information on the temporal and causal relation between the origins of civilization in Mesopotamia and Egypt see: H. Frankfort, *The Birth of Civilization in the Near East*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1954; — and on chronology:

S. N. Kramer, *From the Tablets of Sumer*, Czech translation, Prague 1961;

R. Coulborn, *The Origin of Civilized Societies*, Princeton-Oxford, 1959;

J. Klima, *Spolecnost a kultura staroveké Mezopotamie (Society and culture of Ancient Mesopotamia)*, Prague, 1963;

A. L. Oppenheim, *Ancient Mesopotamia*, Chicago and London, 1964;

A. Scharff and A. Moortgat, *Agypten und Vorderasien im Altertum*, Munich, 1950;

W. Wolf, *Die Welt der Agypter*, Stuttgart, 1954;

F. Lexa, *Verejny život ve staroveké Egypte (Public Life in Ancient Egypt)*, Prague, 1955, Vols. I and II.

At that time human communities living in these two areas were gathering momentum for those achievements which are generally seen as marking the transition from 'barbarism' to 'civilization'. This corresponds roughly to the point at which history begins**. It is now difficult to trace developments of that period with accuracy and to work out the timing or casual chain of events or processes. Present day conclusions on these matters must therefore be taken cum grano salis.

*This statement roughly coincides with A. J. Toynbee's distinction between civilizations and primitive societies (*A Study of History*). Vol. I, p. 147 et seqq.)

**Introductory volume to the whole study. (This article is an outline of Vol. 11)

Leaving aside the primary discoveries of rudimentary agricultural technique veiled in the mists of the pre-historic epoch, the command of the flow of water for irrigation purposes may be singled out as the oldest basic social problem. The world's first civilizations, that is of Lower Mesopotamia and of Egypt, were remarkable (as were the younger civilizations in the Indus and Yellow River valleys) for the successful solution of this very problem*.

*These were the so-called Potamic civilizations which developed on alluvial soil.

The construction and maintenance of irrigation schemes demanded a certain standard of intelligence, organizational ability and a knowledge of counting. There was, of course, no rational search for causal relations in the modern, European manner; instead, progress was made by a combination of empiricism and fantasy with magic playing a major role*. Though by present-day standards it is difficult to understand how, the protagonists of that time were not only men of religion but also led the way in factual knowledge and technology.** In this dual role, they were of paramount importance to the rest of the population and for the future of the society.

*This technique persisted for some considerable time and to this day there are individuals and communities who follow it.

** This idea is put forward by I. M. D'yakonov, *Obshchestvennyy stroi Drevnego I) vurcchiya (The Social System of Ancient Mesopotamia)*, Moscow, 1959, p. 163

Apart from the group formed by these priests-cum-technical experts, by medicine men, sorcerers and magicians, there was a separate group of organizers concerned with matters of war, as such

specialists were needed by the society to ensure its survival. The relationship between these two groups, together with the relationship between tribal communities (proto-states) have from the beginning been the challenges stimulating social, political and, up to a point, economic development. New discoveries, new formulations and new processes effected by these groups in their search for ways of fulfilling human needs form the backbone of cultural and technological progress. Understandably, clashes of interest arose between individuals and groups; from the solutions to these clashes emerged the first concepts of right and wrong and of what the norm of human life should be—in other words, the first concepts of morality, the development of which is the most sensitive indicator of civilizational maturity.

All this was happening while the majority of the population was engaged in the toils of daily life: in the fields with domesticated animals, building settlements, canals, temples or palaces, or in workshops working with stone, clay, wood, copper and tin. Only a small minority of a working population such as this was able — whether through higher productivity, commercial ability or the coercion of their fellows — to improve their living standards, and thus to become the third group in the prosperous section of the population, established as a rule in larger and more imposing settlements. Despite the fact that handicrafts and commerce were, for the most part, still combined with agricultural production, these settlements, where the division of labour originated, were the prototypes of future towns*

*This is a particularly Mesopotamian feature. Oppenheim (op. cit. p. III) discovered that here “alone within the entire ancient Near East spontaneous urbanization took place”. J. Pirenne’s idea of the existence of Ancient Egyptian cities (as early as the pre-unification epoch), developed in his *Histoire de la civilisation de l’Egypte ancienne*, Vol. I (Neuchatel — Paris 1963), is — with the exception of Pharaoh’s seat — refuted by H. Frankfort, op. cit. p. 83.

These are the main premises from which arose the problems of the first civilizations we can discern from fragmentary archaeological evidence. As time goes on and the amount of decipherable written material increases, the picture of social development becomes clearer and the course of the above-mentioned problems can be traced with increased reliability. Although many elements of the social climate escape our retrospective observation, it is nevertheless possible to estimate from the known facts the main changeable social elements and general tendencies of development.

Although social changes occur slowly and continually, they are from time to time accelerated’ by periods of extraordinarily sharp social and ideological contradictions so as to give the observer a qualitatively different picture of social structure and climate. When these changes affect the very pillars of social co-existence, that is to say the manner of thinking and evaluating with its resulting life patterns, it can be said that new civilizations are engendered. The interdependent linking of these makes up, in the context of our macro sociological scheme, the continuous sequence of a civilizational pedigree. In the case of both Mesopotamia and Egypt such a pedigree, lasting for almost four millennia through several successive individual civilizations, can be discerned.

MESOPOTAMIA

Despite commercial and, to some extent, cultural contact between Mesopotamia and Egypt, the civilizational development of each of these countries followed its course more or less independently until approximately the first half of the first millennium B.C. Although identical challenges presented to different races by the physical environment and by human relations produce identical responses, the different character of the people concerned gives these responses a different shape.

At first sight it is remarkable that Hammitic*Egypt achieved a comparatively sound political unity as early as the beginning of the third millennium B.C. whereas Sumerian Mesopotamia continued to contain a plurality of states, its attempts at unification meeting with only temporary success and even then not until the rise of a younger Semitic element (in the twenty-fourth century B.C.).

*On the racial character of the Ancient Egyptians see F. Lexa, *Verejny život ve starovekém Egypte (Public Life in Ancient Egypt)*, Prague 1955, V01. I, p. 14

Unlike Egypt, Mesopotamia had an ethnic composition conspicuous in its variety and changeability, these factors being the main influences in the sequence of its individual civilizations. They constantly transformed, over several secular waves, the social climate of the Euphrates/Tigris area to such an extent that inherited values and ways of thinking were expressed differently by each different combination. The continuity of fundamental values and the changeability of their exponents, their forms of expression and their priorities together form one of the characteristic qualities of a civilizational pedigree which from the beginning of the fourth millennium B.C. to the first century B.C. moulded social life in Mesopotamia and adjacent areas.

The desire to influence the mysterious forces of nature and to escape the tyranny of death inspired the creative forces of the Sumerians and other nations of Mesopotamia to seek a new means of contact with the next world and a new means of artistic representation. Slowly drawing back the veil from the unknown, they found at least a partial fulfilment of those needs which, being essentially transcendental, make man so manifestly different from the rest of living nature. The greatest discoveries of the Mesopotamian civilizations involved many fields of human activity.

The wheel, the plough, the measurement of time, cuneiform and rudimentary knowledge in mathematics and astronomy form the basic contributions of the Sumerians to the common fund of human culture. Further developing the knowledge of the Sumerians, the Akkadians, and all the successive nations of Mesopotamia, especially the Chaldaeans, applied these discoveries in particular to the study of the stars, the knowledge of which, with their supposed influence on the fate of man, became one of the outstanding characteristics of the Mesopotamian genius. Moreover, a longing for immortality and a deeper understanding of human life is revealed in the recently discovered literary heritage of the Sumerians and their successors. The so-called Sumerian Job, and then Gilgamesh, illustrated how attempts were made to satisfy this longing. The Gilgamesh epos is especially enlightening on the subject of Mesopotamian spirituality. Both by the quantity and quality of the literary elaboration of this topic, Gilgamesh can be seen as a symbol of Mesopotamian virtues.* By following the different versions produced over three thousand years from the original dispersed Sumerian poems to the Akkadian version and to that of the Hittites, Hurrians and Assyrians, a clearer picture, not only of the Mesopotamian manner of evaluating, but also of the development of individual Mesopotamian civilizations, can be built up. Under these circumstances, it was thought appropriate to name the whole **civilizational pedigree** of the Mesopotamian area '**Gilgamic**'.

*B. Hrozný sees in Gilgamesh (whose name he translates as "man of fire and the axe") the personification of the Sumerian nation. As a master of metallurgy and woodwork and an outstanding builder, he became a symbol of the human ability to discover and invent and, in this sense, a forerunner of the Hellenic Prometheus. B. Hrozný, *Nejstarsi dejiny Predni Asie, Indie a Kréty*, pt. 58-59 (The Earliest History of Western Asia, India and Crete).

If we leave aside the oldest, most problematical civilization which can be estimated as having flourished in the first half of the fourth millennium B.C. and which, for lack of more complete knowledge, can be termed **Pre-Gilgamic** (archaeologists refer to it as a Proto-Sumerian culture) we can discern in the Gilgamic civilizational pedigree four individual civilizations (three in succession and a fourth collateral) each of which is shaped by a different ethnic structure and can be characterized also by differences in politico-economic structures and consequently in cultural outlook.

The first of these civilizations, the **Paleo-Gilgamic civilization**, is a product of two nations, the Sumerians and the Elamites. The relationship between these nations is not yet clear, but there is little doubt as to their originality and their contemporary mutual influences. According to knowledge so far gleaned, the Sumerians played the leading role. The Elamites, who settled in the river valleys of the Karkha and Karun (in south-west Iran) were, however, not merely imitators.* The longevity of their community, surviving all ethnic transformations in neighbouring Mesopotamia until its absorption by the Iranians at the beginning of the Christian era, bears witness to the biological and social vitality of the people and their cultural self-reliance. The acceptance of the values and life

patterns of neighbouring Mesopotamia is evident especially in the second civilization of the Gilgamic pedigree, but did not mean the complete suppression of Elamite individuality.

*cf. especially G. Cameron, *History of Early Iran*, Chicago 1936; also: M. M. D'yakonov, *Ocherk drevnego Irana (Outline of Ancient Iran)*, Moscow 1961; I. M. D'yakonov, *Istoria Mirdii (History of Media)*, Leningrad 1956.

At the time of the greatest viability of the Paleo-Gilgamic civilization, in the years 3000 to 2350 B.C., when, according to our macrosociological scheme, it went through its foundation, classic and recession phases, those values already mentioned as Mesopotamia's fundamental contribution to the common fund of human culture were already being formed. The Sumerian and the Elamite strove within his limitations to better his lot by the improvement of his environment, by technology as well as by trying to influence the unknown forces of nature through invoking the protection of the relevant gods. The purpose of life was seen in the service of one's god* who was usually both a representative of some natural element and a local god, i.e. the lord of the community by dint of being the greatest land-owner. Sumerian, and probably Elamite, society was politically and religiously divided into a number of city states with a pluralistic power constellation.** The mutual rivalry of these states gave rise to a struggle for leadership and military supremacy. The situation in this respect is to a certain degree comparable with that in Ancient Greece, but with the basic difference that in Sumer, as in the Levant as a whole, the principle of godly sovereignty was more strictly observed. Thus the theocentric orientation which was to be a characteristic of all the other civilizations in the Gilgamic pedigree, and of the Levant as a whole, had already begun to crystallize.

* cf. S. N. Kramer. op. cit., pp. 129 to 138, L. Oppenheim, op. cit., p. 198

** cf. especially I. M. D'yakonov, *Obschestvennyi stroi drevnego Dvureehiya*, Moscow 1954 (The Social System of Ancient Mesopotamia), and, by the same author, *Gosudarstvennyi stroi drevneishego Shumera*, Moscow 1952 (*State organization in Ancient Sumer*); S. M. Kramer, op. cit., pp. 68 to 71; Ghirshman, *L'Iran des origines a l'Islam*, Paris 1951.

The second civilization in the Gilgamic pedigree can be styled **Mezzo -Gilgamic**. Its main exponents were the Semitic nations of the Akkadians and Amorites who settled successively in the Tigris-Euphrates area adopting the Sumerian 'heritage and developing it according to their own propensities and interests. These last were expressed above all in an endeavour to achieve political and religious unity in the whole Gilgamic area. This was reflected, on the spiritual plane, by the attempt to create a common, universal framework out of the Mesopotamian mythology and thus to give some sort of unity to its polymorphous theocentrism.*

*This seems to be one of the motives of the Babylonian mythical epos, *Enuma elish* (cl. .I. Klima, op. cit. p. 188).

The Akkadians succeeded not only in unifying Mesopotamia, but also in extending their boundaries along the upper Euphrates into northern Syria and Asia Minor. From then on these areas, along with the already advanced Elam, underwent a gradual cultural Akkadianization. However, after approximately two centuries (2350 to 2150 B.c.), the Akkadian advance was temporarily interrupted by the invasion of Barbarian Gutaeans penetrating to Mesopotamia from the mountains of western Iran and, for the most part, occupying the northern, predominantly Akkadian territories. The Sumerian south remained untouched. This made conditions favourable to the Sumerian cultural and political resurgence which carried the Akkadian imperial tradition through into the economic field, to form a centralized state economy unprecedented in Mesopotamia. Although the Gutaeans were eventually expelled by military means, political unity was not renewed.

It was not until the new Semitic immigrants, the Amorites (whose settlement in Mesopotamia again favoured a plurality of states) had absorbed the Akkadian cultural heritage* that the unification of the Gilgamic area was again attempted, this time with greater efforts in the cultural field. The

Codex Hammurapi and the mythical epos, Enuma elish, represent the legal and religious aspects of this drive. At the same time from the different poems on Gilgamesh a unified epos was formed, becoming part of a new spiritual advancement from ethical motives.** The city of Babylon meanwhile became the main centre of Gilgamic culture.

* This process coincided with the classic phase of the Mezzo-Gilgamic civilization, 1950 to 1750 B.C.

**cf. L. Matous, *Epos O Gilgamesovi (Gilgamesh Epos)*, Prague 1957, pp. 45 to 52.

The unification was, in fact, more successful on the cultural than on the political plane. The power of the Babylonian dynasty was gradually undermined by external pressure from the Hurrians (subjugating Assyria) and from the Kassites (harassing Elam and Lower Mesopotamia), new nations whose military supremacy was assured by their horsemanship. Later the Hittites, their power based on an exclusive command of iron metallurgy, dealt the final blow to the Babylonian state, thus opening its last stronghold to Kassite dominance in the second half of the sixteenth century B.C. As the Akkadian and Elamite communities eventually submitted to the Kassite invaders' rule, the declining Akkadian culture faded from Elamite life.

These events carried the Mezzo-Gilgamic civilization into its fatal phase which, coinciding with the Hurro-Kassite invasion interlude,* became at the same time the heroic phase of the last successive civilization in the Gilgamic pedigree - the Neo-Gilgamic civilization.

*This period is connected with the introduction of a type of socio-economic formation characterized by the following features:

(a) the fusion and formal contractualization of legal public and private relations;

(b) the divided ownership of land, the allotment of upper ownership being increasingly decided according to the aristocratic hierarchy, and the lower (working) ownership being as a rule assigned to peasant bondsmen;

(c) the production unit is a large estate with a tendency to a closed or barter economy which, however, may be combined with the monetary, market economy of the cities (as was the case in Kassite Mesopotamia).

In fact, the range of possible variations is so great that the common term

feudalism can be misleading. These features will be the subject of a more thorough enquiry in the last volume of this study.

The **Neo-Gilgamic civilisation** was again the fruit of a combined effort, the endeavours of three main ethnic groups, the Assyrians, the Chaldeans and the Elamites. In addition, a new ethnic community, the Khaldi or Urartians took over Gilgamic civilization on the northern fringe of Mesopotamia and formed its fourth national unit in that epoch. From the point of view of power, the most dynamic force in the drive both for political unity in the Gilgamic world and for military, territorial expansion (into Syria and Egypt) was the Assyrian nation. However, after an invasion interlude leading to a repetition of the foundation stage of the Neo-Gilgamic civilization (1100 to 900 B.C.) the Chaldaeans, who took up the Akkado-Amorite cultural heritage and renewed the tradition of Babylon as the cultural centre of the Gilgamic civilization, eventually became the main driving force of cultural development. The Elamites, freed from the preceding phase of Kassite rule and emancipated from Akkadian influence, were living through a cultural and political renaissance while, at the same time, attempting to extend their political power into Mesopotamia proper.

At this point in time, the contest on the internal battlefield of Mesopotamia grew particularly acute. Despite military victories on all fronts,* the Assyrians were unable to enjoy the fruits of their conquests. Continual battles depleted the Assyrian forces while the enforced migration of populations was constantly injecting the Gilgamic area with new ethnic groups, in particular the Aramaeans. Who, in their new homes, were assimilated -though only partially—by the Gilgamic civilization.** A situation arose whereby a hitherto thoroughly integrated area was now filled with foreign enclaves ready for coalition with any foe. The Assyrians were for the time being exhausted by internal struggles between factions (national and pro-Chaldaean) and between privileged estates (the nobility and the city patriciate). *** Moreover, they had weakened the state of Urartu and thus

deprived the Gilgamic civilizational area of the strong frontier protection which it was soon to need against Iranian attacks. Elam suffered at still heavier blow at the hands of the Assyrians with the same effects that the Gilgamic civilization as a whole had suffered. **** If then Babylonia itself, as the guardian of the continuity of Gilgamic civilizations and supported by Elam, preferred coalition with the new and alien power, the Iranian Medes, to co-operation with their Assyrian civilizational comrades, the fate of the Neo-Gilgamic civilization was sealed. The power of Assyria, whose breakdown at the close of the seventh century B.C. involved not only a military collapse but the complete extinction of the whole Assyrian nation, could not be replaced by a renewed Babylonian empire which in itself represented only an archaic relic of its former potential.

* The exceptional military achievements of the Assyrians are critically assessed by A. J. Toynbee in *A Study of History*, Vol. IV, p. 474.

** On the Assyrian inability to assimilate see V. Groh, 'Babel, Assur a Izrael' (Babel, Ashur and Israel) in *Dejiny lidstva (The History of Mankind)*, Prague 1940. p. 425. Assyrian weakness on this point is also revealed by the formal character of their civilizational summation which was achieved by Ashurbanipal's library.

*** Cf I. M. D'yakonov, *Razvitie zemelynych otnoshenii Assirii*, Leningrad 1949 (*The Development of Agricultural Relations in Assyria*).

**** Both these examples corroborate Toynbee's theory of the disastrous effects arising when a civilization deprives itself of strongly defended frontiers (see, in particular, Vol. II, p. 112 et seq. and passim).

The incorporation of Elam and Babylonia into the Persian Achaemenid empire did not bring about an abrupt end to the Neo-Gilgamic civilization. It slowly wasted until the Hellenic invasion interlude (from the end of the fourth to the close of the second century B.C.) drained it of its last life-blood. From the beginning of the Christian era a large part of the former Gilgamic civilizational area became incorporated into the area of the late Mazdaic civilization.*

* See p. 100

This was the end of a civilizational pedigree which had perpetuated a distinct, basic set of values through almost four thousand years with such remarkable success that new, incoming nations, often primitive conquerors, were assimilated and continued to develop the Gilgamic civilizational tradition along the beaten track. Not only '*Graecia capta*' but, above all, Mesopotamia, '*ferum victorem colpit capta*'--several times.

The historical development of Gilgamic Mesopotamia is shown in more detail in the synoptic table (Table No. 1). The characteristics of the individual civilizations of the Gilgamic pedigree are shown in Table No. 4.

The splendour and radiative power of the Gilgamic culture was so strong that it not only assimilated the Barbaric nations who periodically invaded—according to Toynbee's push and pull theory—the fertile land between the rivers Euphrates and Tigris, but also profoundly influenced even the more highly developed Hurrians and Hittites who, at the beginning of the second millennium B.C., settled to the north of the Gilgamic area proper.

The Hittites and Hurrians developed their own particular civilization characterized by a dual but combined inspiration. The population of the countries where the Hittites* and possibly the Hurrians** settled as ruling nations was, it seems, already under the spell of Sumero-Akkadian civilization. But then the creative genius of the Hittites (preceded, by several centuries, by their ethnic cousins, the Luwians) and, about two centuries later, the combined efforts of the Hurrians and their non-Hurrian (Aryan) ruling class brought to life a new political structure which became an effective incentive for the combination of its own creativity with Gilgamic cultural influences.

*Strictly speaking this was a later immigration wave, but the main one, of people who were wrongly called Hittites, after the older, native population. Perhaps the most correct name for this people would be the Nessites (B. Hrozný, op. cit., pp. 108-9). Their arrival on the Central Anatolian Plateau during the

course of the twentieth century B.C. was preceded, possibly by several centuries, by that of their ethnic relatives, the Luwians, who settled to the south of what later became Nessite territory. The Nessite and Luwian linguistic dualism remained a permanent feature of Hittite society.

** It is assumed that the Hurrians were heirs of the previous Subaraean population already known to the Sumerians in the third millennium B.C. of B. Hrozný, op. cit., and J. Hawkes and Sir Leonard Woolley, "Prehistory and the Beginnings of Civilization" (Volume I of the *History of Mankind*), London, 1963. For another opinion see Gotze, *Hethiter, Churriter and Assyrer*, Oslo 1936, p. 32.

Although the archaeological and literary evidence of both Hurrian and Hittite culture reveals that each has certain distinctive features, there are, nevertheless, much stronger arguments in favour of seeing in them a common civilization articulated in two ethnic and political units, Hatti and Mitanni.* Taking into account the complex Sumero-Akkadian influence, the common Hurro-Hittite civilization can—from the point of view of our theory—best be summed up in the description **Para-Gilgamic**. This term expresses both the link with the Gilgamic civilizational pedigree and its own specific character.

*This opinion is shared by the authors of Volume I of the "History of Mankind" written under the direction of Sir Leonard Woolley and summarizing the viewpoint put in the following quotation from E. A. Speiser's "The Hurrian Participation in the Civilizations of Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine" (*Journal of World History*, I, 2, October, 1953, p. 312): "The relations between the Hurrians and the Hittites prove to be unusually intimate, a fact which is abundantly reflected in virtually every phase of the Hittite civilization. Indeed, we are justified in speaking of a Hurro—Hittite symbiosis which for closeness and effect is second only to that blend of Sumarian and Akkadian elements which constitutes the composite culture of Mesopotamia."

In the development of both Hittite and Hurrian history, Sumero-Akkadian influence is evident in the adoption of its imperial tradition and of cuneiform, while the Hurrians, on the one hand, developed their own character in artistic expression and the Hittites, on the other, allowed their own nature to show through in their tendency to appreciate men as individuals.* The most notable contribution of the Hittites was, however, in the field of technology. They developed a knowledge of iron metallurgy and for a time monopolized its use. But this important invention could not for long remain exclusively in their hands and its eventual spread helped to produce a permanent change in the world's appearance. The introduction of iron tools (especially the plough) permitted the spread of agriculture to those territories where the soil was much heavier than on the alluvial plains. This, in turn, meant the spread of human settlement and eventually the transfer of civilizational centres of gravity to new areas—first to Hittite Anatolia, later to further new areas in the Levant and eventually all over the world. **

*See G. Contenau, *La civilisation des Hittites et des Mittanniens*. Paris 1934; J. Hawkes and Sir Leonard Woolley, op. cit.; O. R. Gurney, *The Hittites*, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1952.

** cf. F. M. Heichelheim, *An Ancient Economic History*, Volume I, Leyden, 1958, pp. 194-5 and 200-220.

Similarly it was the Hurrians (or, more accurately, their Aryan ruling aristocracy) who earned a reputation for the first systematization of horsemanship.* The use of the horse, first for drawing and later for riding, not only favoured the rise—apart from the Hurrians—of new nations in the Levant, the Kassites and the Hyksos, but also altered the relationship between ruler and subject. In the horse, the military aristocracy was provided with a new and effective means of maintaining both its power over the rest of the population and its privileged position vis-a-vis its own ruler. So the basis of what was to be called the feudal system began to take root.** A conquering nation, sometimes in its entirety, formed a military nobility, with their position as landlords tightening their hold over their subjects. In this case, these new methods of ruling the country seem to have been shared by the Hurrian ruling class and by the Hittites, as well as by their Kassite contemporaries.

* This can be inferred from the earliest extant written treatise on this theme. B. Hrozný (op. cit. p. 112) finds in the training system described in Hittite by the Mitannian king, Kikkuli, certain similarities with

that of contemporary England; this would imply common origins of horsemanship and also reveals that the coercion of animals has not since undergone any development.

**cf. conclusions drawn by the authors of the compendium *Feudalism in History*, ed. Rushton Coulborn. Princeton, 1956. See also our note on p. 80.

Although both the Hurrians and the Hittites, the latter especially, were so successful in developing new techniques and in bringing a knowledge of them to the forefront of Levantine civilizational tradition, their own Para-Gilgamic civilization remained without direct successors. To that extent, this offshoot of the Gilgamic civilizational pedigree was leading up a blind alley. After a period of rivalry between the two nations, the Hurrian empire, Mitanni, was destroyed by the Hittites who had finally realised its value as a shield against Assyrian imperialism. But it was too late; the fallen Hurrian empire could no longer be resuscitated and fell prey to the Assyrians who, having emancipated themselves from Hurrian domination, had embarked on their own campaign of imperial expansion. Meanwhile, the state of Urartu, which gradually evolved from what was formerly the north-eastern region of Hurrian territory, seemed to draw its culture more from Neo-Gilgamic, Assyrian sources than from the Para-Gilgamic, Hurrian heritage.

The Hittites suffered heavy losses during what Toynbee calls the Post-Minoan Volkerwanderung (around 1200 B.C.) and were only able to hold their ground in their southern territories and in northern Syria which they had conquered during the previous phase of their development. In both these areas they then lived through the recession and fatal phases of their civilization which, like the Hurrian branch, slowly dissolved under the combined influence of the Neo-Gilgamic and Syro-Phoenician civilizations.

The development of the Hurro-Hittite Para-Gilgamic civilization is set out in more detail in Table 2.

PHARONIC EGYPT

Unlike Mesopotamia, Egypt's ethnic structure remained comparatively stable. Apart from pre-historic migrations, which are largely a matter for conjecture, Egypt did not suffer, before the Arab conquest, any less influx of foreigners. The Hyksos,* who invaded Egypt in the eighteenth B.C., were eventually driven out, leaving only slight, localized traces in the Egyptian population. Since the close of the second millennium B.C. there had been large numbers of Libyan and Nubian mercenaries serving in the Egyptian armies and, by the time they gained power in Egypt, they had already absorbed its culture and were therefore thoroughly Egyptianized. They did not, moreover, substantially affect the ethnic structure of the Egyptian population.

* The Hyksos were not accepted into the ethnic structure of Egypt in the same way as most of the nations invading Mesopotamia were accepted there, but were driven out after about a two-hundred yearlong rule and the Egyptians tried to eradicate all trace of them. Toynbee's view—that the Sumeric (in our terminology Gilgamic) cultural tincture which the Hyksos had acquired during their sojourn in Upper Mesopotamia made them unassimilable by, and therefore odious to, their Egyptian subjects—seems to be justified. (A. J. Toynbee. op. cit., Vol. III, p. 390 and Vol. I, p. 139.) A similar explanation also fits the Chinese attitude towards the Mongols, which will be dealt with in the fourth volume of the final work (cf. also A. J. Toynbee, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 139).

Although in the closing stages of the Pharaonic epoch, Egypt was occupied by foreign powers (from the Levant--Assyria in the seventh century B.C. and Persia in the sixth; from Europe—Macedonia in the fourth century B.C. and Rome in the first), none of these instances can be compared with the invasion of foreign ethnic groups into Mesopotamia. In none of these cases was the conquering country interested in mass migration to Egypt, although the Greek settlements did play a major role in changing the social climate of Egypt, thus preparing the ground for the subsequent change in both its spoken language and its form of writing at the beginning of the Christian era.

In Mesopotamia there had always existed a linguistic plurality with Elamite alongside Sumerian in the Paleo-Gilgamic civilization, Sumerian alongside Akkadian in the Mezzo-Gilgamic civilization, and Elamite, Assyrian and Urartian alongside Chaldaean in the Neo-Gilgamic civilization. Egypt, on

the other hand, displayed no such plurality and from the beginning of the first century A.D. maintained throughout all the inevitable refinements and morphological changes, a steady linguistic continuity sustaining an unbroken literary tradition.* Whereas in Mesopotamia the challenges presented by ethnic changes were at the root of all civilizational transformations, in Egypt the changes in individual civilizations derived more from internal dynamics.

* cf. F. Lexa, *Verejny život ve starovekem Egypte (Public Life in Ancient Egypt)*, Prague 1955, Vol. I, p. 14 ct seqq.

Until the Hellenist epoch, Egypt lived its own civilizational life. Its first dynamics arose from challenges originating from conditions similar to those prevailing in Mesopotamia. However, although conditions were similar, the way in which the problems evolved and were solved largely differed.

As said earlier, Egypt very quickly achieved political unity (at the beginning of the third millennium B.C.). From this situation developed a modification—which was to typify Egypt—of the theocentric principle which characterized the whole of the Levant. Territorial unification was maintained by the formation of a strong central government, the supreme leader of which not only became king (Pharaoh) but was held at the same time to be an incarnated god and his own high priest, one person fulfilling two functions (priestly and secular) which long remained separate in Mesopotamia. As H. Frankfort puts it: “The Pharaoh symbolized the community in its temporal and transcendental aspects and, for the Egyptians, civilized life gravitated around the divine king.”* This position, peculiar to the Egyptian Pharaoh, was heightened and sustained At the beginning of the history of unified Egypt by two important features: firstly the prior even exclusive claim of the ruler to eternal life (this found its outward expression in the construction of pyramids, a very costly enterprise both in human and material terms) and secondly by the administrative apparatus needed not only for the government of a unified country but also for the maintenance of economic prosperity, the main precondition to which was the sufficient and timely flooding of the Nile.

* H. Frankfort, *The Birth of Civilization in the Near East*, Bloomington, Indiana, 1954, p. 84.

Although later on, some time during the second half of the third millennium B.C. Pharaoh lost his exclusive claim to eternal life, his office remained the key institution in the society of Egypt for the next two millennia. During this period all political life, a substantial part of economic and even cultural life, revolved round it.* Since the Pharaonate became so crucial to this period of Egyptian history, **Pharaonic** was felt to be an appropriate epithet for the **civilizational pedigree** of Ancient Egypt. The pre-unification period of Egyptian history can then be styled **Pre-Pharaonic civilization**,** and the period corresponding roughly to the old Empire, Early Pharaonic civilization. For more detail see Table No. 3.

* For details see H. Frankfort, *Ancient Egyptian Religion*, New York 1949, esp. p. 42; F. Lexa, op. cit., two volumes; W. Wolf, *Die Welt der Agypter*, Stuttgart 1954; A. Scharff, A. Moortgat, *Agypten und Vorderasien im Altertum*, Munich 1950; Jacques Pirenne, *Histoire de la civilisation de l’Egypte ancienne*, Vol. I, Neuchatel 1961.

** The history and social climate of the Pre-Pharaonic epoch are still matters for conjecture. For a completely different appreciation of it see, e.g., A. Weigall, *History of the Pharaohs*, London 1925, Vol. I, pp. 90-96; and Jacques Pirenne, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 37-90.

However, this concentration of power was not based on arbitrary rule. Pharaoh’s mission was to fulfil the rules of the Maat, a concept of natural order held to be eternally and absolutely valid for all creatures, similar to the Ancient Chinese concept, Ta’o—‘The Way’. Like Tao, the Maat of the Early Pharaonic epoch did not differentiate between moral and natural considerations. Unlike Tao, however, it was represented by a special deity,* satisfying the Egyptian need for this kind of cult. This particular concept of world order, equivalent in its practical results to the idea of universal harmony, has the same psychological roots as the utilitarian morality of ‘gentlemanry’ ** and high aesthetic

standards which together typify Egyptian national psychology in the Pharaonic era. The aesthetic achievements of the Egyptians in art far surpassed not only those of Mesopotamia but also of the majority of subsequent Levantine civilizations. It can also be inferred that the treatment of convicts and slaves was more humane in Egypt than in other parts of the Levant. ***

*cf. H. Frankfort, *The Birth of Civilization in the Near East and Ancient Egyptian Religion*.

** This term was coined by Flinders Petrie, who summarizes the Egyptian ideal as follows: ". . . easy, good natured, quiet gentlemen who made life as agreeable as they could all round." (*Religion and Conscience in Ancient Egypt*, London 189(), pp. 130-31.)

*** F. Lexa, op. cit

Neither did Pharaonic power produce a uniformity of religion, for, although the Pharaonate dominated religious life, there still remained from the pre-unification era, a variety of cults, a situation which eventually paved the way for a spirit of constructive criticism. This set in motion a process of searching which, applied to the longing for immortality, led to the invention of new methods for ensuring eternal life (such as magic formulae written on the inner walls of tombs and coffins), methods which were considerably easier than the building of pyramids and the following of the cults connected with them.*

* On this process see J. Cerny, "Stary Egypt" (Ancient Egypt) in *Dejiny lidstva (History of Mankind)*, Vol. I, p. 227 (Prague 1940).

This, in turn, meant a greater accessibility for a greater number of people to the right to immortality and, together with the breakdown of the central government owing to the rise of independent regions and a redistribution of wealth, heralded a fundamental change in social climate. It was a change far-reaching enough in its effects to constitute a civilizational reconstruction (already the second in Egyptian history, so far as we can tell from existing knowledge). From what we know, through Ipuver's fragmentary description,* it would seem that a great social revolution made this reconstruction particularly dramatic (sometime between 2200 and 2000 B.C.). **

* For two alternative translations of this unique testimony see in F. Lexa, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 8 et seqq.

** This seems to be the most widely accepted dating of these still very enigmatic events which shook the foundations of Egyptian society. However, there was one school of thought which held Ipuver's description to be of the troubled times following the invasion of the Hyksos, in the break between what is called the Middle and New Empire, cf. H. Breasted, *A History of Egypt*, second edition, London 1946, and V. I. Avdiev, *Istoriya Drevnego vostoka (History of the Ancient East)* Moscow 1948

Obviously, the rise of this new civilization (in our terms the Late Pharaonic civilization) saw a substantially weakened Pharaonate. Pharaoh's personal prosperity ceased to be the reason behind all Egyptian endeavour and he no longer held the most privileged position in transcendental matters. The Pyramids were no longer symbols of Pharaonic superiority. On the contrary, the Pharaoh was expected to acknowledge his duties towards his people.* Not only was he expected to ensure the economic prosperity of his country, but his formerly exclusive power had now to be shared with local rulers whose dependence on the Pharaoh assumed forms generally described as feudal.

* cf. E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, third edition, Vol. I, p. 27 et seqq. (Stuttgart—Berlin 1963).

The weakening of Pharaoh's monotheistic power freed creative forces both in the cultural and the economic field, while artistic creation, especially literature, reached a wider audience of landlords and well-to-do town-dwellers. On such fertile soil learned literature began to flourish with such remarkable examples as the Moral Doctrines which constituted a departure from the hitherto commonly held idea of natural order, the Maat. The Moral Doctrines (among which those of Kagemni and Ptahhotep* are the most well-known of that period) were developed on the optimistic theory that man can be taught good behaviour. According to H. Frankfort's interpretation, evil is more an

error than a sin and can be avoided through better understanding.** In this respect man's will is free and, therefore, to the extent that he can enforce this will, his destiny lies in his own hands. This sharply contrasts with man's position in Gilgamesic Mesopotamia whereby belief in predestination led to a sense of personal insecurity.***

* The author became acquainted with ancient Egyptian moralists through the Czech translation and scholarly commentary of F. Lexa, *Obecné mravní nauky .s'taroegypt1.v/<1'* (General Moral Doctrines of Ancient Egypt) Prague 1926, and *Vybor z .s'tarsi literatury egyptské* (Anthology of Early Egyptian Literature), Prague 1947.

**H. Frankfort, *Ancient Egyptian Religion*, pp. 60 and 65.

***cf. S. N. Kramer, *From the Tablets of Sumer*, Czech transl., pi. 138.

The first two centuries of the second millennium B.C. form, as most Egyptologists agree, a classic period from a literary point of view, especially in the case of the novel, and this corresponds to a classic period from the point of view of our theory, i.e. as regards common values and the prevailing manner of thinking. The magico-mythical approach of the Early Pharaonic civilization gave way to more pragmatic attitudes coupled, however, with continuing magical proclivities.* This, the first Late Pharaonic classic phase, reached its height under Amenemhet III (1849 to 1801 B.C.) in whose person the Late Pharaonic ideal of a ruler was embodied. ** Economic and cultural prosperity was at a peak, but then Pharaonic power, which had asserted itself so brilliantly even in its diluted form, began to decline and, with the fall from general prosperity, the civilizational recession phase was entered. Meanwhile the Hyksos (at that time ruling in Syria), attracted by these conditions of 'pull', invaded Egypt and established themselves as the new rulers of the country (approximately 1730 to 1570 B.C.).

* For more detail see F. Lexa, *Vybor ze starsi literatury egyptské* (Anthology of Early Egyptian Literature).

** This is one of those cases where, according to our macrosociological theory, the civilizational 'summation' took the form of a paradigmatic incarnation.

The invasion of the Hyksos had the same effect on the civilizational development of Egypt as had the Mongolian invasion on China in the thirteenth century A.D. Egypt's dormant creative forces were injected with new life, but—except in the field of art—this renewed energy was spent in imitation of past achievements. Following the expulsion of the Hyksos, the Late Pharaonic civilization went through a second classic phase,* rich in appearance, but less affluent in original creation. The most outstanding achievement of this phase was the revival of the Moral Doctrines. As Ani and Amenope seem to be the authors writing in this period,** the beginning of a shift from the previous pragmatic utilitarianism to a religious approach can be seen as a foretaste of further development.

* This is one of two cases where a civilization—according to our theory—returns, after an invasion interlude, to the classic phase of its development. The other case is the Neo-Sinic civilization, returning to a classic phase after the expulsion of the Mongols in the fourteenth century A.D.

** cf. F. Lexa, *Vybor ze starsi literatury egyptské* (Anthology of Early Egyptian Literature), p. 236 et seqq.

Religious attitudes seem to have been based on a henotheistic concept whereby the sun god, Re, represented the fundamental godhead, other gods being local forms of the same substance. The new religious note, while closely associated with popular beliefs, gave the ethical approach greater depth whereby evildoers were to be corrected, but revenge was to be left to the gods. However, this more gentle and sophisticated religious outlook does not seem to have attained a general currency; popular beliefs remained closely connected with magical practices intended to cheat the gods at the Last Judgement by means of memorized formulae or mechanical devices.

Nevertheless, the Egyptian Moral Doctrines proved to be of immense importance in the development of mankind, as they were later to become, through the great scope of their casuistry and by their prudent and dignified expression, an inspiration even beyond the boundaries of Egypt.

It was Judaism in particular which was to pick up the threads of these Egyptian doctrines,* to develop them and, in the fullness of time, to pass them on to the greatest religions of the Levant, Christianity and Islam.

* cf. Paul Humbert, *Recherches sur les sources égyptiennes de la littérature sapientiale d'Israël*, Neuchâtel, 1929, quoted by J. Pirenne, op. cit. Vol. III, p. 222-4.

In the second classic phase of the Late Pharaonic civilization, the dominant factor in the development of its socio-economic structure was the re-establishment of Pharaonic power. In the struggle against the Hyksos, the Egyptians built up a strong military power which was maintained and even enlarged after their liberation, when it was used in the imperial expansion of Pharaonic Egypt. It was an expansion in two main directions, north-eastward to Syria and southward to Nubia. Egypt not only built up her prestige by her conquest of Syria, but also increased her wealth.* The Egyptians began to accustom themselves to new kinds of goods, among them slaves who, from then on, became an important factor in the socio-economic structure which, however, was to be strained by new tensions arising from the uneven distribution of the new riches. Apart from the Pharaoh and high-ranking nobles, the greatest rewards went to the priests for invoking the favour of the gods; the priests were therefore often the greatest beneficiaries of the spoils of war.

*The height of prosperity and, by coincidence, of the second classic phase was reached under Amenhotep III (1405 to 1370 B.C.), another example of paradigmatic incarnation.

Increased wealth for the priesthood meant their increased power. Competition with the military estate caused them to close their ranks and gave rise to their unified organization under the leadership of the Theban Amon's High Priest. Thus the Pharaonate, the institution which integrated Egypt, was split both on a temporal and spiritual level. This division was to be the most prominent feature of the subsequent recession which began about 1400 B.C. Civilizational reconstruction was this time aimed at the revival of the Pharaonate together with radical religious reform. Ikhnaton's universal monotheism was an all-embracing culmination of philosophizing tendencies in Egyptian theology; it did not, however, gain the spontaneous support either of the elite or of the masses and could only be put into practice forcibly.

But the traditional priesthood stood its ground and eventually triumphed over religious reform in the pursuit of which Ikhnaton had neglected the administration and defence of his empire. Consequently, though several attempts were made at the revival of Pharaonic prestige,* Amon's High Priest at Thebes was able to take over temporal rule, but not, however, to stay the now inevitable decline of the empire.

* The most successful of these attempts was that of the general, Haremheb, who restored law and order to a considerable extent, thus bringing into practice some of the time-honoured Egyptian virtues.

The decline was general, permeating through culture and morality with the increasing spread of magic and the cult of animals, factors which emerged as the two most obvious indicators of Egyptian decadence at the end of the second millennium B. C. Trial by ordeal became commonly accepted by the court,* while among the intellectuals there was increasing and bitter scepticism of religion. **

*For a detailed account see E. Seidl, *Einführung in die Ägyptische Rechtsgeschichte*, Hamburg—New York 1951, p. 38.

** For a penetrating description of these changes see W. Wolf, *Die Welt der Ägypter*, pp. 132-133

The only forces able to resuscitate a little the weakened fibres of Egyptian social structure were members of new nations, Libyan mercenaries in the Pharaonic service and Egyptianized Nubians to the south of Egypt, who mounted the Egyptian stage when the Late Pharaonic civilization had

undergone its recession (c. 1400 to 1150 B.C.) and fatal phases (1150 to 950 B.C.) and had completed the full civilizational cycle. However, the reconstruction of civilization in Egypt itself lay in the hands of the native Egyptians, as neither the Libyans (in Egypt from c. 950 to 730 B.C.) nor the Nubians (in Egypt from c. 730 to 661 B.C.) made much progress in this direction.*

* The Libyan and Nubian rule in Egypt after the breakdown of Late Pharaonic civilization can be compared to a certain extent with Germanic rule in Western Europe after the collapse of the Roman Empire. In both cases, ecclesiastical organization formed the backbone of the civilizational framework and its continuity. Even so, the priestly organization at that time in Egypt bore more resemblance to a professional guild than to the Roman Catholic Church when the Whole of the latter's history is taken into account. Both claimed to provide exclusive fulfilment of the transcendental needs of the population in their respective countries. In both cases the invaders took over and respected the established organization, their only imposition on it being the elevation of their own favourites to its important posts. In both cases the main stronghold of conservation, the main support of tradition rested in a country beyond the radius of superimposed rule. Thus, in the first few centuries after the fall of Rome, Christianity flourished in the Byzantine east, and thus, while Egypt declined, a Para-Pharaonic Egyptian civilization was thriving in the Nubian south. But here the parallel ends. Whereas Rome became the centre of a new spiritual drive and the force behind the successful civilizational reconstruction of western Europe, no such potential existed at Thebes. Amon's church was not capable of playing the role of 'chrysalis', in Toynbee's sense of the word (A. J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Vol. VII, p. 392 et seqq.). The Libyans and Nubians had mastered a world whose spirituality was dying out, and their own creative efforts were not equal to its successful revival. All the Nubians were able to achieve was a transplant of the Late Pharaonic civilization, in the form of its last hierocratic stage, to their own native land where the whole cycle of one more Pharaonic civilization was then lived through.

It was only in their own country that the Nubians were able to give a new lease of life to Egyptian civilization, having acquired a thorough knowledge of it as, through the centuries, it gradually spread up the Nile. It was thus that in the last millennium B.C. the **Para-Pharaonic civilization** emerged in Nubia.* At the same time, notably in the period between 730 and 525 B.C. attempts were undertaken in Egypt itself. The Saitic dynasty headed the progressive forces supported mostly by the town-dwellers in the Delta who had been inspired by over-seas contact (especially with the Hellenic area), but their efforts foundered on the prevailing conservatism and the class tensions between the dominant machiocracy (mostly of foreign, Libyan or Greek origin), the growing timocracy of the cities and the xenophobic, narrow-minded priesthood.**

*The development phases of this Nubian Para-Pharaonic civilization may be summed up as follows: heroic (1150-850 B.C.), foundation (850-550 B.C.), classic (550-250 B.C.), recession (250 n.c.-50 A.1.), fatal (50-350 A.D.). The full cycle of the civilization was almost undisturbed in its external development, but once the underlying spirit was completely extinguished, decline was inevitable and the conquering Axumites dealt the final coup de grace. There is still very little known of this Napatian and Merovitic culture, but it seems that the Nubians were not impervious to non-Egyptian influences. In their writing, they were able to rid themselves of the Egyptian model's greatest flaws—ideograms and double consonant signs—by the introduction, inspired perhaps by Hellenic script of an alphabetic script (with the exception of two syllabic letters) which also made use as far as possible, of vowels. For more detail see H. Jensen, *Die Schrift in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, Berlin 1958, p. 71.

** On the conservative, or rather backward-looking, attitude of the Saitic epoch see Breasted, *A History of Egypt*, p. 570 et seqq.

Under such conditions any attempt at imperial expansion, undertaken by the Saitic dynasty in their desperate efforts to emulate former greatness. was quite in vain. It was now the foreign, not the Egyptian armies who were victorious and Egypt was itself subject to successive foreign conquests. The first to impose their rule on Egypt were the Assyrians, but this was short-lived (c. 661 to 645 B.C.) as their armies were exposed on all sides and could not stand up for long against the combined

attacks of their enemies. Persian rule, more enlightened in its principles and methods, lasted for a hundred and twenty years in the first instance (525 to 405 B.C.) and then, after a final period of Pharaonic independence (405 to 343 B.C.), was renewed only to give way in 332 B.C. to Macedonian rule.

As from that time Egypt became part of a Levantine world tenuously united under a veneer of Hellenism, a world whose history is a fascinating story of the first attempt to integrate the whole of the then civilized Levant into one civilization, albeit a civilization not of Levantine but of European, Hellenic origin. In its ambitious aims and in a number of other ways (such as its worldly and liberal outlook, its urbanization and technical advance) the Hellenistic drive set the pattern of the western European advance which, at the close of the fifteenth century A.D., began to follow in the wake of overseas discoveries and launched a similar attempt this time to integrate the whole world in the tenets of a new Euro-Atlantic civilization. The extent to which a parallel can be drawn between the Hellenization of approximately 330 B.C. to A.D. 170 and the Europeanization of A.D. 1500 onwards will be discussed later on.

Finally, under Hellenist influence maintained through Roman rule, the beginning of the Christian era sapped the Pharaonic civilizational pedigree of any remaining life. A chronological plan of its development is given in Table No. 3, and a comparison of its characteristics with those of the Gilgamic pedigree in Table No. 9.

The development of Pharaonic Egypt's history, as seen in our concept of civilization, synchronizes to a certain extent with Jacques Pirenne's Ancient Egyptian socio-economic cycles which are fully explained in his *Histoire de la civilisation de l'Égypte ancienne* (Vols. I to III, Neuchatel-Paris, 1961-62) and can be summed up under the heading of his initial outline of the theme: "Les trois cycles de l'histoire de l'Égypte ancienne" (Brussels 1959). The cycles are based on the assumption that regular changes occur in legal relationships and social institutions. Periods of prevailing individualism, private ownership contractual freedom, equal rights for women and comparatively small differences of legal status among the population, all these alternate with periods of feudal or tribal collectivism of the patriarchal type, limited contractual freedom and rights for women, ownership based on the tenure of public offices, and bond peasants under a feudal hierarchy of landlords. The documentation of this theory can be found in J. Pirenne's *Histoire des institutions et du droit privé de l'ancienne Égypte* (Brussels, 1934).

Pirenne's first two cycles correspond roughly to our Early and Late Pharaonic civilizations. In both these cases, Pirenne's cycle culminates in the transition from centralized to absolute monarchy (to use Pirenne's terms), and this coincides either with the close of our classic phase or with the beginning of our recession phase. Pirenne's third cycle begins approximately at the same time as the Para-Pharaonic civilization and reaches its climax under Roman rule in the first centuries A.D.

However, this coincidence can be taken only as a very limited mutual corroboration, since our concept of civilizations is based on a complex assessment of the social climate, the manner of thinking and evaluating being the most decisive factor. The changes in the legal system studied by Pirenne reveal a great deal about socio-economic formations, but they do not paint a complete picture of civilizational history, which is a much broader idea encompassing the general moral, religious and cultural out-look as well. These aspects do not fit so readily into a pattern of cyclical governments. Our equivalents of Pirenne's cycles are only cyclic in so far as they have been formalised into a recurrent sequence of phases (heroic, foundation, classic, recession, fatal and, in some cases, residual), but this does not imply a recurrence of actual historical content. On the contrary the chaining of individual civilizations reveals a quite distinct central characteristic for every phase. Looked at from this angle, there is no cyclic movement in history, but an unrepeated development. Even if we confine our attention to the socio-economic structure of society, only particular elements are repeated. Thus the alternation of centralized monarchic government and pluralistic rule of the feudal type can be called repetition but each recurrence contains elements which are either intrinsically new, or new because they are differently combined. Instances of this can be seen in the growth and multiplication of privileged estates, the introduction of mass slavery and the increasingly important role played by the priesthood, all during the second half of Pirenne's second cycle. On these grounds, although Pirenne's concept may be justified in the main, the author

of the present study is cautious in his attitude to the general conclusions drawn from the cyclic features of social history.

SYRIA AND IRAN

Mesopotamia and Egypt long remained the only areas of civilizational creation in the Levant. It was not until about a thousand years had passed, during which the Gilgamic and Pharaonic civilizations had developed in their separate ways, that their combined stimulus prompted the rise of another centre of civilizational creativity from which a new civilizational pedigree slowly began to develop. __

This pedigree, lacking a particular characteristic by which it can be defined, has been simply named "Syrian".*

* This concept is not the same as Toynbee's Syriac civilization, which covers a wide range of civilizations identified in this study. Broadly speaking, Toynbee's Syriac civilization covers not only the whole of our Syrian pedigree, consisting of three individual civilizations (Syro-Canaanite, Syro-Phoenician and Judaic) but also both the Mazdaic (Early and Late) and Early Islamic civilizations, as well as the abortive Manichaean civilization.

Although the Gilgamic and Pharaonic civilizations together provided the necessary impulse, it is not clear what form the first stage in the development of the Syrian civilizational pedigree took, merely that as far as it is possible to tell---it was only a rudimentary stage. However, the creative activity which had responded to the challenges then present reveals an individuality which was later to reach its full maturity. Because of this uncertainty, we have called the first stage of the Syrian civilizational pedigree a **Syro-Canaanite quasicivilization**.*

* For a general outline of this civilization see V. Groh, "Dejinny vrchol semitského zivlu" (*The Historical Apogee of the Semitic Ethnic Group*), *Dějiny lidstva (History of Mankind)*, Prague 1940, p. 436.

At the very beginning the northern region of this quasicivilizational area was guided by Akkadian or Hurrian influences, while the south was under the spell of Egyptian civilization. This meant that there were, in fact, two civilizational approaches which, having been adopted by people of the same ethnic background, gradually merged into a single civilizational area, although the original polarity remained present.

This duality was expressed in the development of writing which, some time before the second half of the second millennium B.C., began to evolve from two different sources in two different places within Syria. One form of writing began to develop in the Sinaitic peninsula and in Phoenicia at Jubayl (Byblos) as an improvement on Egyptian hieroglyphs, while the other form developed in Ugarit in northern Syria as an improvement on the Sumerian-Akkadian cuneiform.*

* cf. H. Jensen, op. cit. p. 91 and pp. 242-245.

Although the original invention of writing was the fruit, probably independently, of Sumerian and Egyptian creativity about a thousand years before, credit for the invention of an alphabetic script is due to the Canaanites. This perfection of communication techniques was the decisive step in the formation of the Syro-Canaanite quasicivilization and a pre-condition for its later transformations. (For an outline of this development see Table No. 4.)

Both the **Syro-Phoenician** and the **Judaic civilizations** which began to develop from Canaanite roots during the course of the second millennium B.C., found in writing—whether for commercial or religious use --an adequate means of individual expression.

The Phoenicians, equipped with their perfected form of writing, conveyed their manner of thinking and socio-economic structure overseas as far as Cyprus, Sicily, North Africa and southern Spain, while their inland Semitic neighbours carried their similar script and way of life overland to western and

south-western Arabia. Thus the Syro-Phoenician civilization, perhaps prompted by the Philistine seafarers' example,* developed on an unprecedented scale overseas (cf. Table No. 4).

*This is Toynbee's view, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 102, note 4. Olmstead's opinion that the seafaring bent of the Phoenicians was a continuation of the transdesert travels of their ancestors (A. T. Olmstead, *History of Palestine and Syria*, p. 66) does not exclude this source of inspiration.

Meanwhile, during the first millennium B.C., the Jews produced, in their own variant of Canaanite script, an immensely rich religious literature which their emigrants (voluntary or otherwise) took with them to the various countries of the Levant. The territorial formation of the Judaic civilization also exhibited unparalleled features in that, wherever it was dispersed, its ethnic group was kept intact and its own development followed. This success was countered by the failure of the original Jewish homeland to integrate in the Judaic manner of thinking and evaluating.

Phoenician script formed a basis for the development of Hellenic and Aramaic writing and on these two forms were modelled all the alphabetic scripts of the Old World. The Aramaic alphabet was taken as a model not only in the Levant, but also in India* and the Far East.** Judaic script provided a model not in its form as an alphabet but in its content as Holy Scripture, This, having in due course superseded the original Judaic concept of the living prophetic message, formed the launching ground for both the greatest religions of the Levant, Christianity and Islam, which overflowed the Levantine boundaries and spread far throughout the world.

* cf. Vol. III, chapter 3.

** cf. Vol II, chapters 12 and 16a.

The Judaic Jahwe (who, as his chosen people's lawgiver, guided their destiny through the ages) was the prototype of the exclusive, almighty and aniconic god that became characteristic of Levantine theocentrism which, after two thousand years of incessant struggle against the attractions of polytheism (or polymorphic theocentrism) triumphed—after various syncretization efforts—in Allah.

In Judaism the multifarious religious tradition of the Levant found its combined expression. The age-old Sumero-Akkadian heritage can be seen in the concept of a national god, lawgiver and lord whom man might only approach in devoted worship and obedient subjection to his command, while Egypt's influence is evident in both the moral teaching of the prophets and in the strict monotheism attempted by Ikhnoton's reform.

From the time of Babylonian captivity the Gilgamic heritage gained in strength and even certain principles of early Mazdaism found their way into the concepts of Judaism. In later Judaic literature there also appeared a note of resignation, even of pessimism, characteristic of the prevailing social climate in the wake of the Levantine failure to match the spread of dynamic Hellenism.* However, all these influences were rethought and remoulded, in response to internal impulses and tensions, in such a way that they eventually formed a separate, cohesive and clear-cut concept which was, in its turn, to have a decisive impact on the further development of Levantine thinking and evaluating.** It thus formed a link between the by that time forgotten past of Levantine civilizations and the religions which later were to dominate half the Old World (the Levant and Europe and even parts of India) and still later almost the whole of the New World.

* A comprehensive account of Judaic spiritual development is given by A. Lods, *The Prophets and the Rise of Judaism*, English translation, London 1937; for a penetrating sociological study see Max Weber, *Ancient Judaism*, English translation, New York-London 1952; for a general history see M. A. Beck, *Geschichte Israels*, Stuttgart 1961; and for a view of Judaism as a religion which still lives see A. Neuman, "Judaism" (in *The Great Religions of the Modern World*, Princeton 1946).

** For an appreciation of Mesopotamian and Egyptian influences both in their positive (reception) and negative (rejection) aspects cf. Max Weber, op. cit., p. 219-263.

It was thus that Syria became the focus of the greatest cultural expansion of the Levant. However, before all this could happen, Syria had strong competition to face, not so much of a military nature (in which field Syria did not meet with a great deal of success) but on an ideological level, particularly from a new civilization which emerged during the seventh to sixth centuries B.C. in the Iranian approaches to the Levantine civilizational area. (For the characteristics of Syrian and Iranian civilizations see Table No. 10.)

The exponents of this new civilization were Aryans, relatives of those who had started to settle in India approximately one thousand years previously. After the Aryan settlement in Iran, this ethnic relationship was soon erased by the effects of the particular challenges presented by each country and, by the close of the seventh century, the Aryan branch in Iran had produced a prophet-Zarathustra--whose original concepts and scale of values formed the ideational basis for a new and separate civilization, which we, according to our terminology, have described as **Early Mazdaic**.*

* The author has derived most of his knowledge on this topic from the excellent monograph by R. C. Zaehner, *The Dawn and Twilight of Zoroastrianism*, London 1961. On the general historical development of pre-Islamic Iran see R. Ghirshman, *L'Iran des origines à l'Islam*, Paris 1951.

There were constant clashes between the nomadic and the settled population owing to the basic incompatibility of their ways of life, and Zarathustra (favouring the settled population) seems to have projected this onto the cosmic incompatibility of truth and lie or, in other words, Good and Evil. These values, personified and formed into a doctrine of mythical concepts, became the corner stones of the new, Mazdaic religion. Theocentrism was therefore still present, but in the form of an ethical and mythical polarity.

These events, coinciding with the decline of the Neo-Gilgamic civilization in the sixth century B.C., gave the Iranian nations an opportunity to assert themselves in the political field as well. They concentrated their efforts on developing their military prowess, which eventually enabled them to found an empire on a scale unprecedented in the Levant, but left them with no energy or ability to develop the other activities necessary for the full and successful completion of a civilizational creation. There was thus progress towards a political unification of the whole of the Levant (with the exception of the Syrian lands beyond the sea and desert), but this progress was finally checked after an almost two-hundred-year-long struggle (bringing many, but short-lived successes) against the more advanced and co-ordinated forces of the Hellenic civilization. The Greeks had repeatedly had to retreat before the superior power of the Persians, but once they had embarked on their civilizational reconstruction, they launched a counter-attack of such vigour that the whole of the Persian-ruled Levant was conquered and instilled with Hellenic culture and institutions.

THE STRUGGLE OVER THE LEVANT

The third attempt at the unification of the Levant was made under conditions which differed from those under which either the Assyrians or the Persians had made their attempts. The Hellenic invasion was not limited to a political level, but marched hand in hand with economic reconstruction and cultural re-organization in an attempt to achieve the full integration of the subjugated area. However, too much stress was laid on the superiority of Hellenic anthropocentric values and their predominantly pragmatic spirit coupled with a bent for logical speculation, the few religious elements being merely incidental. The Greeks failed to understand that, if a thorough integration was to be achieved, their culture had to be made acceptable to the mostly peasant Levantine masses. Only the upper strata, and not all of these, were receptive enough to become thoroughly Hellenized; those of Syria, Asia Minor and Bactria, in particular, formed a firm power base behind what was merely a veneer of Hellenism in the Levant.* It was in these areas and in the Egyptian Alexandria that the Levantine branch of Late Hellenic civilization had the strongest appeal.

* A comprehensive account of this period, dealt with in more detail in Vol. II, Chapter 18, is based mainly on a thorough analysis in M. Rostovtzeff's *The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World*, Vols. I-III, Oxford 1953. Certain aspects are elucidated in A. B. Ranovich, *Ellinism i iego istoriclicskaia rol*

(Hellenism and its Historical Role), Moscow 1950 and J. Pirenne. *Histoire de la civilisation de l'Égypte ancienne*, Vol. III.

The attempted Hellenization of the Levant followed a similar course even after the Roman Empire had taken over the states under Hellenic rule. This transfer of power was preceded by the liquidation of Syro-Phoenician positions in the western Mediterranean areas which had been under the rule of the greatest Phoenician city and greatest timocratic slave-owner system of that time-Carthage.*

* For a detailed description of the development of civilization in North Africa cf. C. A. Julien, *Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord*, Paris 1951.

Thus, although Hellenism--unlike either Neo-Gilgamic Assyria or Mazdaic Iran before it--instilled its culture into the conquered territories and, moreover, expanded its integrative ambition to encompass two continents, it was not able to achieve civilizational unity. On the contrary, it sparked off a reaction in the most vital areas (from the point of view of civilizational development) of the Levant--Iran and Judaea.

In Iran the anti-Hellenic reaction led to a successful revival of Mazdaism and, as a result, the area completed, during the first millennium A.D., its full civilizational cycle. The Late Mazdaic civilization emerged at the close of the second century of the Hellenic invasion interlude and reached its apogee in the third century A.D. The literary summation of its spiritual values can be found in the most sophisticated book of Zarathustrian scripture--Denkart, the authorship of which is ascribed to Aturpat, the son of Mahraspand.**

** cf. R. C. Zaehner, op. cit.

At first Judaea fought for political emancipation and--although the rest of Syria remained under the Hellenist Seleucid rule--was successful. However, the Romans then deprived Judaea of its independence and the process whereby Judaic society was being transformed into a diasporic community was now complete (last period in Table No. 5). Nevertheless, Judaea became at that time the scene of a new religious creation which eventually enlarged its missionary field to cover the whole of the Levantine-European world where Helleno-Roman co-operation had striven in vain for civilizational unification.

It was not until Judaism was reshaped by Christ* that it became an impulse for the genuine civilizational reconstruction of the whole Levantine-European area unified politically under the Roman Empire.

*From the standpoint of macrosociological theory, the authenticity of Christ's person is not important as the religious message and its social implications.

The rise of Christianity was the climax of a prolonged search for an inward religious experience offering men an escape from the increasing burdens and frustrations of life, resulting from the erosion of established social patterns and traditional creeds. In contrast with the then prevalent formalized cults and their syncretism, this new religious tendency centred on an emotional approach involving the inducement of an exalted frame of mind often by means of asceticism and feats of physical endurance, all of which were to lead to intimate communication with the godhead and eventually eternal life.

** cf. R. C. Zaehner, op. cit. .

***From the standpoint of our macrosociological theory, the authenticity of Christ's person is not as important as the religious message and its social implications.

Certain aspects of this attitude had long been in existence before this. as for instance the Indian asceticism and self-imposed tests of physical endurance aiming at spiritual concentration, the emotional Egyptian approach to a personal god, and the world-wide practice of esoteric magic.

However, it was not until the first century A.D., under the impact of various, complicated challenges,* that these tendencies merged into an almost uniform attitude throughout all the civilizational areas of the world. The rise of Mahayanic Buddhism in India and its spread over Central Asia to China, the birth of religious Taoism in China, the renaissance of Mazdaism in Iran and the rise of Christianity in the Levant and its spread to Europe, all these are particular instances of a general trend in the first century A.D. Even the many and fundamental differences in the eastern (Indian and Chinese) and western (Levantine and European) religious approach** became secondary to the inwardness, emotion and eventually the 'High Church' practices which permeated religious life in all the areas we have mentioned.

* For details see Vol. II, chapters 11 and 18; Vol. III, chapter 6; Vol. IV, chapters 6 and 7.

** For more detail on these differences see the introductory chapters of Vols. III and IV and chapter 4 of Vol. VII.

Levantine religiosity exhibited a special feature in its faith in a personal god, the creator of the world (or the representative of a particular force of nature), the protector and judge of his people. The plurality of religious traditions in the Levant and the plurality of gods inherent in most of them gave rise to keen competition between particular concepts within the general trend. But, however many adherents were attracted by Mithra* or the various types of intuitive mysticism (gnosis),** Christ's followers were slowly gaining the upper hand by solving a wide range of contemporary problems.

*On the origins of this cult see R. C. Zaehner, *op. cit.*, p. 121 et seq.

** Gnosticism, which became widespread as a spiritual approach especially in the eastern regions of the Roman Empire, influenced many Christian authors; even among the well-known Christian fathers many were not spared criticism for gnostic heresy which represented a dangerous step in the direction of the still more heretical concepts of Manichaeism.

The solutions to most of these problems were, in fact, already inherent in the Gospels according to which Christ was to replace the highly ritualized national religion with one of universal application and based on a simple faith and deeds of love. His claim to be the son of God formed the link between the theocentric concept of the Levant and the anthropocentric tradition of Europe, but, although the concept became a cornerstone of the Christian faith, it was also a stumbling block to the unity of the Christian world, for this idea was not only the basis for the spiritual rapprochement of the already mentioned civilizational areas, but also an important step in the development of their individual religious tendencies (which will be discussed later on). The Christian version of godly incarnation introduced a new idea in that its purpose was ,not to strengthen the claims of earthly rulers or even just to declare God s will, but—through his own suffering—to bring salvation within the reach of all men everywhere. The martyrdom and resurrection of the son of God obviated once and for all the need for bloody sacrifices.

A simple purification and initiation ceremony of baptism and a solemn, dignified and comprehensible ritual, symbolizing the unique events of Christ's passion, opened the door to everyone for easy membership and easy participation. Those repenting their sins could harness the mystery's redeeming power even more securely by the simple (in comparison with contemporary mystic practices) symbolic act of communion. In addition, numerous deeds of mercy on Christ s part served to emphasize the purpose of salvation behind his personal sacrifice and set an example later taken up by the Christian charitable institutions which were to become a highly organized means of spreading the gospel.

The fact that at the beginning Christianity was embraced mainly by the less sophisticated strata of society was no obstacle to its development as a philosophical concept, as Late Hellenic philosophy tended at the time to develop in a similar direction. Neo-Platonic and Neo-Pythagorean philosophies were sympathetic to Christianity to the extent that they too tried to give some consolation to those weighed down by the cares of day to day life, though they did not have the same appeal for the rank and file.*

* It is sometimes debated as to whether these two schools should be classified as philosophical or religious, but their comparatively limited appeal to the masses would suggest that they did not have the necessary, sociological depth of a religion.

Yet whatever the advantage its appeal may have had over that of other trends, Christ's legacy could not have reached its dominant position without compromising at least with their outward forms and doctrinal framework. Religious symbols from Egypt, Syria and Asia Minor, under the doctrinal veil of Late Hellenic philosophical concepts, were absorbed by Christianity's simple creed and gave it the right blend of doctrine and practice which every religion needs for world-wide success. However, these additions, though sociologically necessary, clouded the original religious message with a vast accumulation of peripheral concepts which led to superstition and dogmatic controversy.

Of great importance in practical terms was the fact that the legal order of the Roman Empire provided Christianity with a pattern for its own official organization. The Christian church built itself up on similar lines and by the close of the second century had achieved the power of a state within a state. As the empire declined and eventually broke up in the face of Germanic invasions, the Christian church took over its function as the institutional framework of the new civilizational integration* for which it had prepared the ideation and evaluation base, and the **All-Christian Civilization** thus emerged.

* In this sense, the role of the Christian church in the transformation of civilizations can be compared—as it is by Toynbee—with that of a chrysalis in the transformation of one stage of an insect's life to another. However, all civilizational transformations do not follow this same process, as Toynbee so rightly concludes in the post-war volumes of his *A Study of History* (Vol. VII, pp. 392 to 417). An analytical account of this transition can be found in S. J. Case, *The Social Origins of Christianity*, Chicago 1923, A. D. Ranovieh, *O rannem khristianstve (On Early Christianity)*, Moscow 1925. J. Burckhardt had already revealed some interesting facts on this subject in *Die Zeit Konstantins des Grossen*, first ed., Basle 1853.

Never, either before or since, have conditions been so favourable to the civilizational unification of Europe with the Levant. On the one hand a unified religion, which struck a balance between theocentrism and anthropocentrism while preaching a clear-cut moral code and dogmatic creed under a highly developed organization, on the other hand a unified empire with common laws and a largely common market, together seemed during the fourth century A.D. to promise both a successful civilizational reconstruction and unification.

In reality, the *genius loci* was shown to be proof even against the original and ingenious attempts at synthesis made by Christianity. Although all the countries of the Levant and Europe then under Roman rule adopted the Christian faith with roughly the same sympathy, the differing mental attitude of each people did not allow a unity of religion to develop into a unity of custom in their way of life or a unity of fundamental cultural values. The legacy of Jesus Christ was, indeed, commonly accepted and revered as a revealed truth, forming the framework of civilizational integration, but it was in this very framework that differences were expressed and that dogmatic variations became their cherished symbols.

Differences were manifest not only between the Levant and Europe but also between civilizational areas within each continent. From the earliest days of Christianity a difference was apparent between the practically-minded Latin West and the more emotional Greek East. Whereas in the former '*ordo et disciplina*' were held to be the supreme values, the formulation of the articles of faith and their philosophical application attracted more interest in the latter.

In this respect, the Levantine attitude was similar to that of the Greeks. The Levant had become accustomed to this approach during the period of Hellenic intrusion and now used it to develop its own concepts and to vary them according to local tradition. As it was to be expected under the circumstances, the differences sharpened on the question of God and man as contained in the person of Jesus Christ. The Levantine and European evaluations differed in particular with regard to

the respective roles played by God and man (theocentrism and anthropocentrism). A satisfactory solution to this question was of key importance to the ideational *rapprochement* of both civilizational areas. A compromise solution, proclaiming the indivisible unity of both aspects of Christ's person, was defended by the majority of Greek and Latin clergy, accepted by the ecumenical councils and supported by the state. On the other hand, the majority of the Levantine clergy favoured some of the extreme attitudes. The dyophysite formula, maintaining that the two aspects of Christ's person were two separate entities, attracted adherents in predominantly Semitic areas where the tendency had always been to make a clearer distinction between deity and humanity, and where, during all this christological controversy, the time was ripening —with the development of Syriac, a new literary language—for a remarkable national renaissance.* The monophysite formula whereby God and the man were held to be one person in Jesus Christ, found most favour in Egypt where a millennial tradition of incarnation already existed and where the controversy followed in the wake of a kind of ethnic transformation which was based on the creation of a new language (Coptic).**

*On this topic see P. K. Hitti, *History of Syria, including Lebanon and Palestine*, London 1951.

** On these changes see C. Diehl, "L'Égypte Chrétienne et Byzantine" in the fourth volume of *Histoire de la nation Égyptienne*, ed. G. Hanotaux, Paris 1931.

While Christianity was beginning to divide and a separate Levantine Christian civilization was beginning to appear on the horizon,* the Late Mazdaic civilization of Iran had reached the end of its classic phase and, in a dramatic recession phase in which traditional values were shaken, was looking for a means of reconstruction which would enable it to continue along the traditional lines of its civilizational pedigree. But, neither the prophet, Mani (died or executed A.D. 276)—with his mystic message made up of an ambitious synthesis of Mazdaic, Buddhist, but mainly Christian elements ** nor the revolutionary Mazdak (executed A.D.). 524) - struggling for the levelling out of social differences*** - was able to spark off a response large enough to result in the reconstruction of the weakening Mazdaic civilization.

*cf. O. Klima, *Manis Zeit und Leben*, Prague 1962.

** Although Levantine Christianity was always divided, according to language and / or dogma, into several branches forming separate communities which did not always keep in close touch, we nevertheless speak of a single Levantine Christian civilization since, after two centuries, it was almost wholly encompassed by the Islamic political framework which gave it a common socio-economic structure and a largely common culture.

*** For a comprehensive account of this first revolutionary period in Iran see O. Klima. *Mazdak, Geschichte einer sozialen Bewegung im sassanidischen Persien*, Prague 1957.

Although Manichaeism spread far beyond the Iranian pale, founding communities of devoted converts under ascetic leaders, from the Atlantic coast to the shores of China, it was only among the Iranian Sogdians in Central Asia that it flourished for a while and then, further east among the Turkish Uighurs. that it at least made a serious, though vain, attempt at the ideational integration of a community (**Manichaean civilization**).

Mazdakism, aiming at the levelling out of property and marriage opportunities (the latter by the abolition of harems), although at first successful came up against the vested interests of the Mazdaic priesthood and aristocracy. However, after the suppression of the Mazdakites Khusraw I introduced a number of reforms in Iran and that several attempts were made at a revolution on Mazdakite lines in the Oxus and Jaxartes basins, which is proof of the vigour of the Mazdakite challenge. A tradition of revolution remained a characteristic of Iranian history even after the Mazdaic civilization had died out.

In the contest between Iranian and Syrian religious tendencies, at its height during the struggle between Manichaeism and Christianity the pendulum began to swing in Syria's favour. Not only was Christianity the only integrational force which existed throughout the whole Roman Empire, but its Syrian, dyophysite variant—suppressed at its source by the intolerance of official doctrine--embarked on a far-reaching missionary drive across Mazdaic Iran and the Manichaean strongholds in

Central Asia whence it eventually spread to the south-western shores of India and the capital of the Chinese empire without, however, achieving more than sporadic success. Meanwhile, the monophysite version of Christianity was also gaining ground. It found a strong foothold in Syria, where, under the energetic leadership of Jacob Baradaeus and with Ghassanian support, it developed into an important offshoot, the Jacobite branch. The main direction of monophysite expansion, however, was south to Nubia and Ethiopia where for a thousand years the Semite inhabitants were to form the main support of Coptic Christianity.* In addition, the Armenians, under military and religious pressure on the one hand from orthodox Rome (and later Byzantium) and on the other from Mazdaic Iran, found in moderate monophysitism the spiritual basis for their own national church established as a safeguard of their communal interests and civilizational individuality.** However, throughout the Levant, the official Christian doctrine, supported by the state, retained its hold. Its staunchest adherents were the Greeks who had settled in a large number of cities during the Hellenist expansion from the fourth century B.C. onwards. It was in North Africa—which had been moulded by the Romano-Hellenic civilization, but still showed traces of Syro-Phoenician influence—that the Latin attitude was, both among the church's elders and its popular adherents, most articulately acclaimed. Of the Levantine countries, only in Iran—where Late Mazdaism was enjoying full government support—did Christianity remain a mere minority cult. (For the phasing of Levantine civilizations during the periods of Mazdaism, Hellenism and Christianity see Table Nos. 6 and 7.)

* On the Levantine Christian churches in general see Aziz S. Atiya, *A History of Eastern Christianity*, London 1968; on Central Asia in particular, Jettmar-Haussig-Spruler-Petech, *Geschichte Mittelasiens*, Leiden-Koln 1966; on Syria cf. P. Hitti, op. cit.; and on Ethiopia A. H. M. Jones-E. Monroe, *Hisrorie de l'Abyssinie*, Paris 1.935.

** The role of Armenia's own particular church grew in importance, compensating for the political failures which had resulted from confrontation with over-whelming external forces and from internal dissension among their courageous but undisciplined nobility. (For more detail See J. de Morgan, *Histoire du peuple Arménien*, Paris-Nancy 1919, and R. Grousset, *Histoire de l'Arménie des origines a 1071*, Paris 1947.)

THE ISLAMIC LEVANT

While the civilizational map of the Levant was again beginning to look variegated, a new religion was created in neighbouring western Arabia. During the first millennium B.C. this area's constant contact with Syro-Phoenician outposts in southern Arabia had subjected it to Syro-Phoenician civilizational influence and the same line of contact, during the first millennium A.D., brought the area in touch with Judaic and Christian ideas as the diasporic settlements of their adherents spread. Challenged by these influences and responding to their own religious needs, thinkers of the partially settled and partially nomadic population of the Hijaz developed a kind of simple, monotheistic faith—Hanifiyya.

The independent and prosperous cities of Mecca and Yathrib (later called Medina), where social tensions were beginning to mount up, were ripe for the emergence in the seventh century A.D. of a new theocentric religion revealed by a prophet and developed with its own doctrinal and organizational framework.*

* For the socio-economic background to the rise of Islam see M. Watt, *Islam and the Integration of Society*, London 1961. The development of Islam, as regards the Arabs and including the pre-Islamic stage, is dealt with in P. Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, London 1951. On the origins of Islamic institutions and their socio-economic implications see E. A. Belaiev, *Araby, islami arabskii khalifat v rannee srednevekove (The Arabs, Islam and the Arabic caliphate in the Early Middle Ages)*, Moscow 1967.

Muhammad's religious message is as simple in its creed as it is in its practice.* The first generations of Islam's believers did not encumber it with either philosophical speculation of the Hellenistic type or the kind of mysticism then current in Egypt, Syria or Asia Minor. As previously stated, the uncompromising monotheism and aniconism of Muhammad's teaching sets it on a par

with Judaism which, however, it surpasses in the simplicity of its ritual and the universality of its non-racial appeal.**

* For a closer look at this see M. Watt, *What is Islam?* London and Harlow 1968.

** A well-balanced account of the gist of Islam and its development is given by H. A. R. Gibb, *Mohammedanism, An Historical Survey*, London 1949. The same subject, compared with other religions, is dealt with by N. Smart in *The Religious Experience of Mankind*, New York 1968, chapter 8.

In its original form Islam was most of all attractive to the nation which won for it. by both military and cultural means, its dominant position in the Levant as a whole. The Arabian conquests of A.D. 632 to 715 joined the whole of the Levant to the Arabian peninsula—both the Mediterranean. Christian Levant (including the one-time Syro-Phoenician outpost in Spain) and the Iranian, Mazdaic Levant (including its furthest outposts in Central Asia).

Despite the wide appeal of Islam, for a long time civilizational disunity continued to reign in the Levant. The Early Islamic period is, in this respect, reminiscent of the situation which existed in the Hellenic epoch when—although superficially influenced by their conquerors—the Levantine nations retained their own traditional values and ways of life. Similarly, under the rule of the caliphs—who were at the head of both the state and the community of the faithful (umma)—Mazdaics and Christians of all denominations, although socially restricted, persisted in their beliefs within their own special communities.

Only where Islam completely supplanted the older civilizations (as it did, in the second half of the first millennium, in its native Arabia, Iraq and the Syrian hinterland) did the **Early Islamic civilization** enter its classic phase. The content and intensity of the classic phase were nevertheless enriched and increased by the contributions of other areas. Although the civilizational integration of the Levant was only partial, Islamic dominance was so great that it was not shaken by even the fiercest internal struggles. ranging from tribal and socio-economic issues to those which were purely personal.*

* There were at great number of controversial issues in which the different traditional attitudes of the Levant each found an outlet. Eventually the Sunnite orthodoxy tried to steer a middle course, whereas the old spirit of tribal collectivism was sublimated in the Kharijite doctrine of the charismatic nature of the community of the faithful (umma) and the Iranian dynastic tradition combined with the Judaic prophetic tradition found an outlet in the notion of the personal charisma of the living prophets. Among the more sophisticated a controversy, similar to that which emerged in later Christianity, arose between the idea of predestination and hence the prime importance of faith (the Murjiites) on the one hand, and the concept of free will and hence the prime importance of deeds (the Mutazilites) on the other. It is significant that the latter were also trying to adapt Hellenic philosophy to Islam.

Although the political unity of the Muslim world gradually broke up towards the end of the eighth century,* its civilizational unity was safe-guarded by a common system of law (shari'a) based on the interpretation of the Qu'ran and of Muhammad's sayings as passed on by oral tradition and later preserved in the written form of Hadiths. The four orthodox schools of law (madhahib), founded successively during the classic phase of Early Islam (750 /60' to 910/ 20),** successfully combined the unity of the general framework with the variety of particular details and were thus able to replace the weakened caliphs as the main guardians of universal values and the institutions common to Islamic society. ***

* The first step in this direction was the establishment of the independent Umayyad emirate in Spain; meanwhile, the shift of the centre of gravity from Syria to Iraq (under the Abbasids in the second half of the eighth century A.D.) did not save the caliphate from further decline in the east.

** The end of this classic phase is marked by the following outstanding events: the closing of the Gate of Ijtihad (a free interpretation of the Prophet's words), the public execution of the mystic, al-Hallaj, and the life of al-Ashari (a native of Baghdad, died 935 A.D.) whose works, after about 150 years, earned a reputation as the official interpretation of Sunnite orthodoxy, and—to that extent—can be looked upon as a spiritual summation of Early Islam

*** The Shi'ite heterodoxy, even during the recession phase of Early Islamic civilization, when it enjoyed its greatest political success, was unable to dispense with the support of lawyers; there even emerged a tendency to institutionalize the Shi'ite concept by making it into just another (the fifth) of the orthodox schools of Shari'a. For a penetrating analysis of the integrative function of Islamic law see R. Levy, *The Social Structure of Islam*, Cambridge 1957.

During the first two centuries of the caliphate's rule, the Muslim Arabs developed a high standard of culture. Besides the Levantine heritage, the mathematics of India and the philosophy of Greece (Aristotelian and Platonic alike) also found talented exponents in the Arabic world to carry on the traditions. Of these exponents, Ibn Sina, Al Biruni (eleventh century A.D.)—from the Levantine East—and Ibn Rushd (twelfth century A.D.) and Ibn Khaldun (fourteenth to fifteenth centuries A.D.)—from the Levantine West—were notable among those who developed the Hellenic heritage to the point where it could almost be called enlightenment, but were unable to win over the majority of Muslim intelligentsia to this attitude.

Only after Islam—sufficiently infused with non-Arabic elements (particularly Iranian and Hamitic)—had, in relaxing its original austerity, opened the door to mysticism* and more colourful forms of cult, and after large-scale migrations had brought new ethnic groups (particularly Turkish) to the fore in the Levant, did the long-prepared and often vainly attempted civilization unification of the Levant at last come to pass. The only groups to withstand the Muslim pressure of the new social climate were the Armenian and Lebanese Christians ensconced in their mountains and the small Coptic and Syrian enclaves. A military confrontation with Latin Christendom—which for two centuries (the twelfth and thirteenth centuries A.D.) had endeavoured to take possession of the Syrian coast and the Palestinian holy places cherished by their tradition—stimulated Muslim interest in the thorough ideational integration of their area.

* It was the rise of Sufism which was mainly responsible for the transformation from the Early to the Late Islamic civilization. The at first dangerous tension between Sunnite orthodoxy and the mystic approach of the Sufis was over-come on a doctrinal level by the genius of al Ghazali who, from this point of view, may be seen as the intellectual father of Late Islam. The reconciliation of Sufism and Sunna paved the way for such outstanding authors as al Arabi and al Rumi, whose works became a kind of standard literature second only to the Qu'ran and the Hadiths. (For more detail see H. A. R. Gibb, op. cit.)

The unified **Late Islamic** Levant then set its sights on territorial expansion—in three directions: (1) towards India and Indonesia, (2) inland towards the heart of Africa and (3) through Asia Minor towards south-east Europe.* The only Islamic bridgeheads lost to the Latin Christian counter-attack were those in western Europe (in Sicily and Spain).

* On the spread of Islam all over the world see T. W. Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam*, Lahore 1965. For special features of Islam resulting from its encounter with the spirit of India cf. A. Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment*, Oxford 1964.

So thorough was the Late Islamic integration of the Levant that its spiritual strength remained undaunted even by the devastating Mongolian onslaught in the thirteenth century A.D. After about fifty years, those Mongols who settled in the Levant themselves became Muslims.* Meanwhile Mongolian rule over vast areas of the Eurasian continent gave the Muslim missionaries access to China, and Turkish migrations to the west under Mongolian pressure brought the Late Islamic civilization to the Volga region and to the northern shores of the Black Sea.

*For a detailed account of problems arising from the Mongol invasion and their 'acculturation' in Iran see in I. P. Petrushevskii, *Zemledelie i agrarnye otnosheniya v Irane XIII-XIV veka (Agriculture and Agricultural relations in Iran during the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries)*, Moscow-Leningrad 1960.

During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the orthodox Christian states in south-east Europe fell before the Ottoman advance and the Turko-Iranian rulers of northern India launched vigorous attacks in an attempt to conquer the whole of the Indian subcontinent. In the sixteenth century, the combined military and peaceful expansion of Islam reached its furthest limits. India was unified under Akbar's sceptre; in the Malayan area Islam secured its present-day boundaries; in west Africa it spread among the negro population, Nubia was thoroughly Islamized and Coptic Ethiopia was attacked; and in Europe the Hungarian lowlands were occupied.* However, at the same time two areas flanking the Islamic world, Russia and the Iberian peninsula, were about to stride across their boundaries. The Russian advance to the east and the West European voyages overseas began the process and the epoch which, following the example of Droysen's coinage "Hellenism", can be termed "Europeanism".

* Only in negro Africa has the spread of Islam continued until recent times. The territorial gains in this area, however, were offset by losses in Europe.

The territorial expansion of the Late Islamic civilization was a feature of its recession phase, The age-old contradiction between Judaism's Holy Scripture and its living prophetic message, represented in Islam by the polarity between Sunna and Shi'a came to a head, with grave consequences, at the beginning of the sixteenth century A.D. Iran, after the Safavid revolution, was dominated by an ardent Shi'ite community whose attitude showed signs of hostility towards the Sunnites as well as a streak of nationalism. The chief Muslim powers, the Ottomans in the Mediterranean and the Mughals in India, became more and more attached to Sunna. The Ottomans cruelly suppressed the Shi'ite movements in their territory, forced the Safavids out of Iraq, sheltered the Arab countries from Shi'ite penetration, assumed power over these countries and protected the holy places in Hijaz. The Mughals launched two large-scale attempts at the amalgamation of the different religious communities in their realm, but both the tolerant method, Akbar's syncretism, and the intolerant method, Aurangzeb's suppression campaign, failed. Whatever success the Ottomans and the Mughals may have achieved remained limited to the fields of military activity and state administration, while the civilization they represented was gradually losing its attraction and elan.

The spread of Europeanism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries caught the Late Islamic civilization in a period of its history when it was particularly sensitive to outside influences. The traditional European anthropocentrism, finding in a developing technology a highly effective means of supporting its titanic aspirations, became a temptation which no civilization, however far advanced its manner of thinking and evaluating, could resist. The renewed European anthropocentrism, which --following its fusion with Levantine theocentric concepts during the Christian era - now took human reason, instead of godly revelation, as the supreme criterion of truth gained a hold on the already weakened fibres of contemporary Levantine civilization.

Gradually all the Islamic nations, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, were inveigled with the tenets of Europeanism. During the second quarter of the twentieth century it seemed almost inevitable that the whole Islamic area would become part of a new civilization which, since the middle of the eighteenth century, had been in its foundation phase on the Atlantic shores of both Europe and America. The third quarter of this century has shown, however, that an acceptance of this version of Europeanism, or indeed of any Europeanism at all, is not the only choice. The Islamic tradition still lives and the possibility that Europeanism, like Hellenism two thousand years ago, may remain as a superficial veneer cannot be discounted . *

* On the position of Islam in the modern World see E. J. Rosenthal, *Islam in the Modern National State*, Cambridge 1965.

There can, however, be little doubt that the appearance of the new Levantine civilizational integration will show a strong European likeness, especially in its orientation towards pragmatism and in its technocentric tendencies, the practical application of which have presented to man unprecedented opportunities for the satisfaction of his material needs. The extent of this influence--

particularly as to whether it will be a question of adapting the positivist or Marxist manner of thinking and evaluating, or of responding the challenge of contemporary Europe with a surge of indigenous creativity--is still hard to guess. The question can be put more explicitly: Will the Islamic nations join with the Europeans and the Europeanized nations in their search for the spiritual content of the anthropocentrism now preponderant among the rank and file or will they forge their own way?

Various different tendencies are discernible in the Islamic world and there is an obvious endeavour to find echoes in its own tradition of the solutions proposed by Europe. A new interpretation of the scriptures and tradition is being sought while, at the same time, there are efforts to deprive both public and private life of its religious outlook. Even this last approach has reflections in the Arabic past. The positivist or Marxist manner of thinking and evaluating can hardly be fully transplanted in an environment which is unwilling to break with its past, but the question remains, however, as to whether future generations will still feel bound to the old tradition. It also remains to be seen whether at least one of the two European manners of thinking and evaluating will develop to such an extent as to prove universally applicable to the crucial situations of life. On the outcome of this depends the success of a new ideational integration or, in the more technical terms of our study, whether both, one or none of the present European variants will reach the classic phase of its civilizational development.

This question, however, need not necessarily apply to the whole of the Levant. In spite of the thoroughgoing Europeanization of some border areas (especially in the north) and in spite of the formation of the thoroughly Europeanized state of Israel in a very tender spot in the Levant, the main core of Levantine nations seems to be inclined towards an eclectic solution, combining their own traditional concepts with those from abroad, from Western and Eastern Europe alike. For the development of both Islamic civilizations see Table No. 8; for the characteristics of these and other civilizations preceding them in the struggle for Levantine unity see Table No. II.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Dr. Krejci wishes to acknowledge his debt to the University of Lancaster for its generous hospitality and in particular to its Vice-Chancellor, Mr. Charles F. Carter, for his sympathetic understanding and for providing him with all the necessary facilities for the realization of his work in English. He is also indebted to Mrs. Marilyn A. Marshall, Secretary to the Research Unit, who, with an excellent grasp of the subject matter, has much improved his English.

EXPLANATORY NOTE TO THE TABLES

Assuming that a civilization attains its full integrating strength in only one period of its life, this can be styled as its classic period. What precedes is a foundation period, during which the elements of the old civilization may still be alive, but are already in retreat. The beginnings of every civilization are for the most part hidden under the still dominant remains of the old civilization whose integrating force is, however, on the decline as signs of recession from its traditional values and beliefs begin to appear. From the point of view of the old civilization this is the recession period and, from the point of view of the new one, the heroic phase-heroism being understood as a new appreciation of traditional values, a bold but not yet successful attempt to put a new spirit into both the transcendent needs and the human relations of society. The 'heroes' may lose their cause for the time being, but followers inspired by their work succeed in due time in building the institutions prerequisite to the new spiritual integration of the society. These then become founders of a new civilization, and the period of their successful activity is the foundation phase of the civilization in question. This period coincides as a rule with what can be styled the fatal period of the former civilization. Accordingly, particular successive civilizations are chained together by periods of transition which are shorter or longer depending on the circumstances which we will outline briefly later. The (presumably) normal course of development can be sketched as follows:

Individual Successive Civilizations (Pedigree of Civilizations)

Developmental phases of individual civilizations

Civilization I	Civilization II	Civilization III
Heroic phase		
Foundation phase		
CLASSIC PHASE		
Recession Phase	Heroic phase	
Fatal Phase	Foundation phase	
	CLASSIC PHASE	
	Recession Phase	Heroic Phase
	Fatal Phase	Foundation Phase
		CLASSIC PHASE
		Recession phase
		Fatal phase

This scheme, however, is not inflexible. It is possible that the heroic phase of the new civilization may coincide not with the recession phase but only with the fatal phase of the preceding civilization. In such a case one more stage—a residual phase—of the old civilization may be identified. Furthermore, the course that the development of civilizations takes may be altered in several different ways. The foundation period may not be successful and the new civilization may break down before attaining the classic period (example: Early Mazdaic Civilization in the fourth century B.C., all Christian Civilization in the fourth to fifth centuries A.D., Manichaeic Civilization in the ninth century A.D. in Central Asia, etc.) In such a case a new foundation phase on a narrowed territorial and spiritual base may be attempted (Latin-, Orthodox- and Levantine-Christian Civilizations in the Mediterranean) or a foreign Invasion Interlude may occur (e.g. the Late Hellenic Civilization's incursion into the Middle East from the fourth century B.C.); or the frustrated civilization may be absorbed by an alien civilization (as was the Manichaeic Civilization by the Late Islamic Civilization in the tenth century A.D.).

An Invasion Interlude may interrupt the 'normal' development of a civilization in such a way that after its expiration the emancipated civilization has to prolong or to repeat its last phase of development. If this occurs during or at the close of the foundation phase and the conquered civilization is strong enough to absorb the invasion, the foundation phase may be repeated. Such was the case in Gilgamic Mesopotamia following the Gutaeic and Aramaeo-Chaldaeic invasions. If, however, the foundation is not successful and the civilization lapses into the recession phase without going through the classic age (as happened to the Early Mazdaic Civilization), then a virtually new foundation may arise as the response to the foreign challenge (the Late Mazdaic Civilization). If the invasion takes place during the classic phase of the conquered civilization, the outcome is the civilizational absorption of the invaders with possibly prolonged duration of that phase, as in the case of the Mongol invasion of the Late Islamic area in the Middle East in the thirteenth century A.D.

If the invasion is brought about after the classic phase is over - and the recession period is not far advanced—then the outcome may be (in the case of the civilizational forces of the invaders collapsing) a tenacious repetition of the classic phase, as occurred in the Late Pharaonic Civilization after the expulsion of the Hyksos at the beginning of the sixteenth century B.C. A further possibility is that the foundation of a civilization may be continually attempted without achieving the full spiritual integration of the people in the area to which they belong, which integration is, in our opinion, a necessary condition of the classic phase. In such a case the creative effort may result in the formation of a particular community holding together and displaying its own special character in diaspora.

This was the case with the Judaic civilization and some Levantine Christian communities.



The transition of individual civilizations may take different paths. The longer the recession period lasts the more the absorptive strength of the civilization concerned decreases, unless a new, vigorous civilizational formation is ahead. In both periods of civilizational transition, especially in the fatal

phase, different tendencies or propensities can be discerned. Ranged from the least to the most constructive, they may be summed up as follows: propensity to decadence, to conservation, to renaissance, to reception and to reconstruction.

Only if *reconstruction* takes the upper hand, can 'normal' development be safeguarded; then the new civilization slowly replaces the old one, and development continues within the same civilizational pedigree. Of all other tendencies (propensities) only the receptive tendency can bring about a viable solution, i.e. endure more than one or two phases. Renaissance can never bring about a return. It can either strengthen conservation or prepare the ground for a reconstruction. Both conservation and decadence are the signs of lost creativity and of the resultant weakening of social forces. This paves the Way towards the imposition of an alien rule which, in its turn, brings the forces of reception into operation. A prolonged period, in which a combined structure with upper strata moulded by the invading civilization and lower ones continuing to observe the traditional values and forms of life may follow. The most outstanding example of this stage of society is the Levant under an upper layer of Late Hellenic Civilization, following which many centuries elapsed before a reconstruction could be brought about. The original Christianity tried to replace the late Hellenic and its subdued Levantine Civilizations (Para-Pharonic, Neo-Gilgamic, Syro-Phoenician and Judaic) which were lingering in the residual stage of their development. However, this attempt was too ambitious and the All-Christian Civilization broke down in its foundation stage, giving way to a plurality of Christian civilizations (Latin, Orthodox and Levantine) according to the traditional proclivities of people concerned.

As shown, no predestination or preconceived course of development is revealed. There are almost always alternatives. Yet, conspicuous common tendencies can be traced. Every civilization tends to its full self-realization, the outward sign of which is complete command of the inhabited area concerned. In its classic period, every civilization has so far always been invincible on a spiritual plane. After having exhausted all possible combinations yielded by the set of ideas and conceptions making up its ideation and evaluation base (this we may find manifested in intellectual works constituting what we may call civilizational summations), the successful civilization tends to narrow its intellectual outlook; this evokes an intellectual discontent which slowly develops into a recession from the traditional way of thinking and evaluating. A civilizational reconstruction is not an easy and simple process along a given line, and, moreover, territorial changes. make the picture still more varied.


Civilizations of the Levant



Civilizations of the Levant (cont'd)


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800-1100 A.D.



5

1300-1600 A.D.



Late Islamic -----
Levantine Christian

TABLES 1 AND 2

Table 1 **GILGAMETIC MESOPOTAMIA**

PLACE	TIME B.C.	CIVILIZATION	PHASE	MAIN CULTURAL EVENTS	MAIN POLITICAL & ECONOMIC EVENTS
Coastland (south of Lower Mesopotamia)	~3500	Pre-Gilgamic	classic	Culture of Eridu	
Lower Mesopotamia, Karkhab and Karun region	3500-3250	Pre-Gilgamic	recession	} Susa layer A. } Culture of Ubaid.	
ditto	3250-3000	Pre-Gilgamic Paleo-Gilgamic	fatal heroic		
ditto	3000-2750	Paleo-Gilgamic	foundation	Culture of Uruk, Susa B. Sumerian pictographs. Beginnings of Sumerian cuneiform writing. Culture of Jamdat Nasr. Susa C.	
ditto	2750-2550	Paleo-Gilgamic	classic	Early literary period in Sumer. Susa D. Beginnings of Elamite pictographs.	Plurality of city states with a pluralistic power constellation.
ditto plus middle Euphrates and upper Tigris region.	2550-2350	Paleo-Gilgamic Mezzo-Gilgamic	recession heroic	Crystallization of Sumerian mythology. Beginnings of Gilgamesh epics.	Sumerian colonies: Mari and Ashur. Contest for hegemony of Sumer. Beginnings of Akkadian settlements. Urukagina and Lugalzagesi.
ditto plus Antitaurus region and Northern Syria.	2350-2150	Paleo-Gilgamic Mezzo-Gilgamic	fatal foundation I	Spread of Akkadian language using Sumerian cuneiform script. Its spread in Elam and in Antitaurus region	Sargon's unification of Akkad and Sumer. Expansion into Taurus region. Struggle for an imperiate power constellation.
ditto	2150-1950	Gutaeen invasion interlude Mezzo-Gilgamic	foundation II	Temporary decline of Akkad. Sumerian renaissance.	Gutaeen invasion of Akkad. Third dynasty of Ur, re-unification.
ditto minus Antitaurus region	1950-1750	Mezzo-Gilgamic	classic	Sumero-Akkadian literature at its height. Rapid Akkadization of infiltrating Amorites.	Plurality of states with imperiate power constellation. Infiltration of Amorites. Babylonian kingdom founded. Elamite pressure on Sumer.
ditto minus middle Euphrates and Northern Syria.	1750-1550	Mezzo-Gilgamic	recession	Gilgamesh epics combined into one. Summation: Hammurabi's code & Enuma elish	Hammurabi's re-unification. Beginnings of Kassite pressure. Succession of coastal region. Beginnings of Hurrian state Mitanni and its supremacy over Assyria.
ditto	1550-1350	Mezzo-Gilgamic Hurrian-Kassite invasion interlude Neo-Gilgamic	fatal heroic	Hurrian-Kassite dominance. Kassites assimilated; Hurrians remain distinct. Cultural emancipation of Elam. Beginnings of the Elamite cuneiform script.	Hittite invasion and beginnings of Kassite dynasty. Feudal elements increase. Spread of horsemanship. Decline of Babylonian prestige.
ditto plus middle Euphrates region.	1350-1100	Neo-Gilgamic	foundation I	Cultural renaissance. Differentiation: Assyria, Babylonia, Elam.	Political emancipation of Assyria and its increased power. Elamite expansion into Mesopotamia. End of Kassite dynasty in Babylonia. Tiglath-pileser I of Assyria.

ditto minus middle Euphrates region.	1100- 900	Aramaeo-Chaldaeans Neo-Gilgamic	invasion interlude foundation II	Aramaeo-Chaldaeans dominance. Aramaicans remain distinct as a race and so temporarily do the Chaldaeans.	Assyria on the defensive. Chaldaeans rule in Babylonia. Spread of iron metallurgy.
ditto plus Van and Urmiah region.	900- 700	Neo-Gilgamic	classic	Urartian variant of cuneiform script. Assyrian and Urartian writings flourish. Chaldaeans-Babylonian synthesis.	Origins of Urartu. Renewal of Assyrian power. Uprising of Assyrian cities—tax & labour exemptions. Assyro-Chaldaeans antagonism. Tiglath-pileser III's reforms.
ditto minus Van and Urmiah region.	700- 500	Neo-Gilgamic	recession	Assyrian art at its height. Summation: Ashurbanipal's library at Nineveh.	Assyrian conquest of Babylonia and Egypt. Babylonian-Elamite coalition with the Medes. Fall of Assyria, Neo-Babylonian empire. Its conquest by the Persians.
ditto minus upper Tigris region, Karkhab and Karun region.	500- 300	Neo-Gilgamic	fatal	Spread of Aramaic in Mesopotamia. Mathematics and astronomy continue to develop.	Xerxes puts an end to Babylonian autonomy. Alexander of Macedonia's conquest.
ditto (only Lower Mesopotamia)	300- 100	Neo-Gilgamic Late Hellenic - Lovantine-Hellenic branch	residual heroic (approx.)	Hellenization of upper strata of Babylonian Religious syncretism.	Hellenization of the institutions in self-governing cities.

Table 2 **PARAGILGAMETIC CIVILIZATION**

PLACE		TIME B.C.	PHASE	MAIN CULTURAL EVENTS	MAIN POLITICAL & ECONOMIC EVENTS
HITTITE TERRITORY	HURRIAN TERRITORY				
Halys region	Van and Urmiah region	1950-1700	heroic	Hittites, in touch with the Sumero-Akkadian Mezzogilgamic civilization, absorb the domestic population together with its religion. Linguistic dualism of the Hittites (Nesite and Luwian).	Hittite arrival in Asia Minor. Origins of tribal principalities.
ditto plus Taurus and Antitaurus regions.	ditto plus middle Euphrates region and Northern Syria.	1700-1450	foundation	Beginnings of Hittite and Hurrian cuneiform script. Sumero-Akkadian examples. Beginnings of Hittite hieroglyphs alongside cuneiform script (dualism of script) Hurrian art flourishes.	Political concentration of Hittites. Rise of Hurrian Mitanni and its expansion. Origins of Hittite empire - Labarna I. Hittite monopoly of iron metallurgy. Hurrian handbook of horsemanship. Hittites in Babylonia. Telepinus' reforms.
ditto plus Northern Syria	Van and Urmiah region only.	1450-1200	classic	Cultural emancipation of Hittites. Codification of Hittite law. Beginnings of Hittite historiography. Signs of Aegean cultural influence.	Hittite-Hurrian rivalry. Hittites destroy Mitanni, their struggle with Assyria. Hittite-Egyptian rivalry over Syria. Hittite penetration towards the Aegean.
ditto minus Halys region	ditto	1200- 950	recession	The art and hieroglyphic writing of the Hittites flourish in Northern Syria. Decline of Hurrians and their transformation into Neo-Gilgamic Urartu.	Invasion of Asia Minor by the Moski and the Phrygians. Destruction of Hittite empire in Asia Minor. Plurality of Hittite states in Northern Syria.
ditto	ditto	950- 700	fatal	Hittite culture fades out. Urartian literature, in Assyrian cuneiform script and Urartian art flourish.	Expansion of Urartu and its contest with Assyria. Assyria destroys Hittite states and weakens Urartu.

TABLE 3

PHARAONIC EGYPT					
CENTRE OF GRAVITY of approximately the same territory. civilizational expansion into Nubia only)	TIME B.C.	CIVILIZATION	PHASE	MAIN CULTURAL EVENTS	MAIN POLITICAL & ECONOMIC EVENTS
concurrently: in the western Delta: Pe-Dop (Buto), in upper Egypt: Nekhen (Hierakonpolis)	(3050?)–2850	Pre-pharaonic Early Pharaonic	recession heroic	Establishment of Horus' cult & beginnings of hieroglyphic script. Cultural dominance of the Delta.	Gradual fusion of individual states, centres of unification – Aun and This. Attempts at unification of the whole of Egypt.
in upper Egypt: This	2850–2650	Pre-pharaonic Early Pharaonic	fatal foundation	Pharaoh – incarnation of Horus, his immortality assured by the provision, after death of material needs and by repeated ritual. Rivalry between the cults of Horus and Set. Beginnings of cursive hieroglyphs and sculpture.	Unification of upper and lower Egypt – Mena. First and second dynasties: formation of unified state. Tendency towards imperiate autocracy. Development of copper metallurgy. Growth of trade & market.
in lower Egypt: Men Nofer (Memphis)	2650–2450	Early Pharaonic	classic	Pharaoh's well-being the central aim of societal endeavour. The Great Pyramids. Khufu (Cheops) – paradigmatic incarnation. Cult of Re begins to have influence.	Third dynasty: completion of centralized state. Fourth dynasty: peak of Pharaonic power in Egypt. Annexation of Sinai peninsula.
in lower Egypt: Aun (Heliopolis) & Men Nofer (Memphis)	2450–2200	Early Pharaonic Late Pharaonic	recession heroic	The art of portraiture at its height. Cults of Re and Ptah officially established. Beginnings of ethical concepts: Ka-gemni and Ptahhotep. Book of the Dead, a mixture of magic and mythology.	Fifth dynasty (adherents of Re) and Vizierate (adherents of Ptah). State functions start becoming hereditary. Contract with Phoenicia and Somaliland (Punt). Sixth Dynasty: beginnings of feudalization. Beginning of expansion into Nubia.
concurrently: in central Egypt: Het-Nemissouet (Heraclopolis) in upper Egypt: Opet (Thebes)	2200–2000	Early Pharaonic Late Pharaonic	fatal foundation	Pessimistic and prophetic literature. Decline of art. Origins of ushabtiu ('answerers'). Spread of the cult of Osiris and its entanglement with the practices of magic.	Break-up of state unity. Libyan and Semite invasion. Social revolution and great shifts of social stratification. New centres of state power in Thebes and Nemissouet. Eleventh dynasty: re-unification of Egypt
in upper Egypt: Opet (Thebes)	2000–1800	Late Pharaonic	classic I	Beginning of henotheism. Reunited with other gods, of these Amon of Thebes paramount. Literature (especially the novel) and artistic crafts flourish. Late Pharaonic ideal at its height –	Twelfth dynasty: feudal seigneurs curbed but not overthrown. Beginning of permanent army. Growth of the middle class. Development of the economy. Fayyum region made fertile. Pressure on Nubia. Amenemhet III. Prosperity at a peak.
in the eastern Delta: Het-Uart (Avaris)	1800–1600	Late Pharaonic Hyksos invasion	early recession interlude	Decline of creativity. Hyksos assimilated, but the Egyptians remain hostile to them.	Decline of Pharaonic power. Power vacuum – invasion of the Hyksos and occupation of the Delta. Their suzerainty over upper Egypt, where the resistance then starts.
in upper Egypt: Opet (Thebes)	1600–1400	Late Pharaonic	classic II	Revival of ethics: Ani and Amenemope. Monumental buildings and sculpture – Thebes. Schism in pharaonate: kings and high priests. Beginnings of philosophical thought: Ptah – logos.	Expulsion of the Hyksos. Eighteenth dynasty: abolition of feudal rights. Beginning of professional army. Expansion into Syria & Nubia. Influx of slaves. Prosperity, growing share of temples in it. Unified organization of priests.
firstly in upper Egypt: Opet (Thebes), then in the eastern Delta: Ramses (formerly Avaris)	1400–1150	Late Pharaonic	recession	Ikhnaton's (Akhenaten's) monotheism, its enforcement & neglect of state interests. The vernacular in literature & realism in art. Religious reaction. Victory of hierocracy & machiocracy. Trinity of principal gods, introduction of trials by ordeal. Spread of scepticism. Semitic influence. Egyptianization of Nubia between the second and fourth cataracts.	Decline of imperial power. Slackening of internal power. Economic stagnation. Horemhebs laws and consolidation of the empire. Renewed expansion into Syria. Ramses II. Attacks by the Peoples of the Sea, their repulsion.
concurrently: in upper Egypt: Opet (Thebes) in the eastern Delta: Zaenet (Avaris)	1150– 950	Late Pharaonic	fatal	Decline of priests' morality, growth of superstition. The practice of magic and the cult of animals flourish. Cultural archaism. Prevailing decadence.	Growth of priests' power. Refeudalization. Theban Amon's high priests become pharaohs. Secession of the Delta under lay dynasty. Intermittent reunification through dynastic marriages. Professions become hereditary.
in the eastern Delta: Perbastet (Bubastis)	950– 730	Para-Pharaonic	heroic	Shift of centre of gravity from upper Egypt to the Delta. Beginnings of demotic script. Decline of the priesthood continues. Beginning Para-Pharaonic foundation in Nubia.	Dynasty of Libyan generals. Feudalism reaches its peak. Theban high priests nominated by Libyan rulers; slackening of their organizational unity of the priesthood. Secession of Nubia.
firstly in Nubia: Napata, then in the western Delta: Sais	730– 525	Para-Pharaonic	foundation	Women among high priests in Thebes, their dependence on the dynasty. Purism against foreign influences. Saitic renaissance. Archaism alongside the modern style. Circumnavigation of Africa (Phoenician seafarers).	Rochoris' reforms in the Delta. Nubian dynasty. Class struggle. Gradual abolition of feudal rights. Assyrian conquest, liberation – Saitic dynasty. Greek mercenaries. Maritime activity. Economic development. Internal struggle in the priest's and military estate. Beginning of iron metallurgy. Amasis in the Delta.
in the western Delta: Sais, in Nubia: Napata, Meroe	525– 330 550– 250	Para-Pharaonic	recession classic	Cultural stagnation in Egypt. In Nubia shift of centre of gravity from Napata to Meroe. Origins of Nubian writings.	Persian conquest, temporary liberation. Frustrated expansion into Syria. Persian re-conquest. Greco-Macedonian conquest.

TABLE 4

SYRIA'S OWN CIVILIZATIONS							
PLACE	TIME B.C. to A.D.	(QUASICIVILIZATION) CIVILIZATION	PHASE		MAIN EVENTS		
			IN SYRIA	IN ITS PERIPHERY	WESTERN MEDITERRANEA	SYRIA	ARABIA AND RED SEA AREA
Syria	(2700-2400)	(Syro-Canaanite)	(heroic)			Beginnings of Semitic settlements. Influence of Pharaonic and Gilgamic civilizations spreads.	
Syria	(2400-2100)	(Syro-Canaanite)	(foundation)			Jubayl (Byblos) flourishes. Invasion of Amorites.	
Syria	(2100-1800)	(Syro-Canaanite)	(classic)			Ugarit flourishes. Beginnings of Aegean influence in the arts. Yamkhad state flourishes.	
Syria	(1800-1500) 1700-1400	(Syro-Canaanite) Syro-Phoenician	(recession) heroic			Invasion of Hyksos and the Hurrians. Beginnings of Protosinaitic writing. Beginnings of Jubaylitic writing. Beginnings of Ugaritic writing.	
Syria	(1500-1200) 1400-1100	(Syro-Canaanite) Syro-Phoenician	(fatal) foundation	heroic		Invasion of the Habiru. Invasion of the Aramaeans. End of Ugarit. Invasion of the Israelites and Philistines. Crystallization of Phoenician script.	
ditto plus North Africa, Southern Spain & South-west Arabia.	1100- 800	Syro-Phoenician	classic	foundation	Beginning of Phoenician colonization in North Africa and southern Spain. Carthage founded.	Phoenician prosperity under the hegemony of Tyre. City timocracy at its height. Beginnings of iron metallurgy. Assimilation of Aramaeans. Phoenician influence on Israel. Beginnings of Assyrian expansion. Sanchniathon of Berytus - summator?	Beginnings of Minaean state & script. Domestication of the camel spreads. Beginnings of Sabaeen state & script.
ditto plus Western Sicily & Sardinia	800- 500	Syro-Phoenician	recession	classic	Beginnings of colonization of Sicily and Sardinia. Hegemony of a prosperous Carthage, its overseas expansion. Struggle with Greek colonies - Carthaginian success.	Assyrian conquest of most of Syria. Neo-Babylonian conquest. Persian conquest.	Sabaeen writings flourish. Extinction of Minaean state. Saba at its height, its maritime expansion.
ditto	500- 200	Syro-Phoenician	fatal	recession	City timocracy and slave economy flourish in Carthage. Contest with the Greeks over Sicily. Puno-Hellenic synthesis in Spain. Fatal Carthaginian encounter with Rome.	Beginnings of Hellenic radiation. Greco-Macedonian conquest. Autonomy and federalization of Phoenician cities.	Political and cultural differentiation.
ditto minus Sardinia, Western Sicily & Southern Spain, plus North-west Arabia	200-0-100	Syro-Phoenician	residual	fatal	Fall of Carthage. Assertion of Numidians & Mauretanians, and their gradual incorporation into the Roman empire. Spain starts becoming Romanized.	Hellenization. Syncretism of Olympian and Baal worship.	Beginnings of the Nabataeans and of the Himyarites. Extinction of Sabaeen empire. Invasion of Ethiopia by Semitic Ge'ez. Beginnings of Aksumite empire.
ditto minus North Africa & Syria minus Western Arabia, Ethiopia, Western Sahara	100- 400	Syro-Phoenician	—	residual	Beginnings of Retreat of Syro-Phoenician residuum into the Sahara.	Christianity.	Expansion of Aksumites. Beginnings of Christianity.

TABLE 5

JUDAIC PALESTINE		
DATE	PERIOD	MAIN EVENTS
1400 1300	prehistory	Hebrew tribes settle in southern Syria. Some of the Israelites go to Egypt.
1200 1100 1000 900	Introductory phase Phase of Judges and Kings	Return of Israelites from Egypt – Moses. Arrival of Philistines. Period of Judges) Transportable Ark of the Covenant.) Contest between Israelites and Philistines. Beginning of kingdom of David, conquest of Jerusalem, political advance, foundation of the Temple. Beginnings of Hebrew literature, Phoenician influence. Solomon's economic advance. Division of kingdom into Israel and Judea. Cultural influence of Phoenicians. Political supremacy of Egypt. Israel flourishes: Omri, Ahab.
800 700 600	Phase of Prophets – messengers	Prophets Elijah and Elisha. Coup d'etat in Israel and Judea, but religious syncretism continues. Great prophets Amos, Hosea, Isaiah and Micah. Assyrian conquest of Israel. Abduction of elite. Judea tributary. Vain attempts to strengthen Yahvism. Pro-Assyrian period in Judea (Manasseh, Amon). Josiah's reforms. Deuteronomy – beginnings of written law. Jeremiah and his defence of the living word. Neo-Babylonian conquest of Judea.
500 400	Phase of Prophets – law-givers	Babylonian captivity – Ezekiel, Deutero- and Trito-Isaiah, beginnings of the priestly code. Persian conquest of Babylonia and Syria – including Judea. Return of some Jews from captivity. Autonomy of Judaic community. Maturing of Gilgamic and beginning of Mazdaic influences. Completion of priestly code: Ezra and Nehemiah. Ezra's reforms; opposition – Zechariah, Ruth. Secession of Samaritans. Their temple on the Mount of Garizim.
300 200 100 B.C. 0 A.D. 100 200	Phase of Interpreters of the Law and Fighters	Greco-Macedonian conquest. Influence of Hellenism. Jewish lands part of Ptolemaic empire. Growth of diaspora and of philosophically orientated syncretism. Melancholic utterances, eschatology and apocalyptic visions. Jewish lands part of the Seleucid empire. Epiphanes' attempts at forceful Hellenization. Maccabean insurrection. Renewal of Jewish state with the help of Rome. Four schools of thought and conduct – Sadducees, Pharisees, Essenes & Zealots. Roman conquest. Gradual limitation of Jewish political autonomy. Hellenic influence continues, Pharisees the most influential and successful in ideological integration of non-Hellenized population. Jesus Christ – his reconstruction repulsed by Jews. Sharpening of Hellenic-Judaic differences. Insurrection in Judea. Destruction of Jerusalem and of the Temple. Synod in Jamnia. Insurrection in diaspora. Insurrection of Bar Kokaba. Expulsion of Jews from Palestine.
200		Centre of gravity of Judaism shifts to the diaspora.

TABLE 6

Table 6 MAZDAIC IRAN					
PLACE	TIME	CIVILIZATION	PHASE	MAIN CULTURAL EVENTS	MAIN POLITICAL & ECONOMIC EVENTS
Iranian highlands and Oxus basin.	780-580 B.C.	Early Mazdaic	heroic	Mythology resembling that of the Vedas. Influence of Elam and Urartu. Zarathustra flees.	Rise of the state of Mana. Assyrian expansion. Tribal federation of the Medes, their emancipation from Assyrian supremacy. Assyria beaten by coalition of Medes, Elamites and Babylonians.
ditto plus Armenia	580-380 B.C.	Early Mazdaic	foundation	Zarathustra at court of Vishtaspa, Gathas. Zarathustra again loses government support. Gatha of the Seven Chapters. Magi, and later on the dynasty, take over the cult of Ahura Mazda. Tendency to syncretize. Cuneiform writing. Aramaic as official language. Introduction of Zarathustrian calendar	Persians take over the role of the Medes. Cyrus - conquest of Lydia and Greek cities in Asia Minor. Conquest of Babylonia, Phoenician cities and Egypt. Unsuccessful expedition to Nubia. Usurper Gaumata's attempts at reform. Darius I successful builder of empire. Expansion into India and Europe. Greco-Persian wars.
ditto	380-330 B.C.	Early Mazdaic	recession	Cultural stagnation.	Gradual dissolution of empire.
ditto minus part of Armenia	330-130 B.C.	Early Mazdaic Levantine Hellenic	recession invasion interlude.	Hellenization cult of Seleucid dynasty, syncretism. Greek as official language. Dedication of Arsac I. Influence of Magi, their special cult carried through.	Alexander of Macedonia, Seleucid dynasty. Urbanization and commercialization. Self-government for hellenized cities. Independence of Bactria and Parthia (Arsacids). Parthian expansion into the West. Massagetae in the Oxus basin.
ditto minus part of the Oxus basin	130 B.C.-70 A.D.	Levantine Hellenic Late Mazdaic	invasion interlude foundation	Superficial hellenization continues. Buddhism in Bactria, Greco-Indian synthesis in art. Anti-Hellenic reaction. Beginnings of Zarathustrian renaissance. Pahlavi as official language.	Parthian dynasty of Arsacids. Diminution of Bactria. Kushan empire. Arsacid influence in Armenia. Parthian confrontation with Rome.
ditto	70-270 A.D.	Late Mazdaic	classic	First redaction of Avesta (under Vologases). Commentary on Avesta: Zand. Dualism versus Zurvanism. Pahlavi literature. Tansur, a new redaction of Avesta-Zand. Christianity on the horizon. Syncretism of Shapur I. Kartir versus Mani.	Kushan empire flourishes. Parthian rivalry with Rome. Building of estate system. Decline of Arsacids. Sassanian take-over. Ardashir, Shapur I. Tightening of government rule. Defeat of Kushans, success against Rome.
ditto minus the whole of Armenia	270-470 A.D.	Late Mazdaic	recession	Victory for Kartir's dualism, persecution of other creeds, especially of Manichaeans. Occasional support for Zurvanism. Influence of Greek and Indian philosophy. Atarpat's Denkart - summation of Mazdaism.	Christianization of Armenia. Subjugation of Kushans, Shapur II. Partition of Armenia and Transcaucasia by Parthia and Rome. Ephthalite pressure begins from the north-east.
ditto plus East Caucasia	470-670 A.D.	Late Mazdaic	fatal	Zaradust and Mazdak. Khusraw's Mazdaic orthodoxy tinged with syncretism and toleration. Cultural discrimination against fourth estate. Pahlavi literature (historical novel and the epic) flourishes.	Ephthalite victory, Iran now tributary to them. Mazdaicite revolution with King Kavar's connivance. Defeat of Mazdakites. Khusraw I's reforms: political advance of gentry. Defeat of Ephthalites. Khusraw II - exhausting war with Byzantium. Muslim conquest of Iran.
Diminishing enclaves in Iran.	670-1070 A.D.	Late Mazdaic Early Islamic	residual foundation classic recession.	Muslims tolerate mazdaism. Successful Islamization of Iran and West Turkestan. Religious writing in Pahlavi and theological discussion continue. Gradual extinction of Mazdaism in Iran. Arabic language adopted for Iranian literature.	Muslim conquest of West Turkestan and Transcaucasia. Defeat of Chinese on River Talass. Repeated insurrections of the Sogdians. Iranians assert themselves within the framework of the Islamic political structure.

TABLE 7

STRUGGLE FOR THE LEVANT

PLACE	TIME	CIVILIZATION dominant	PHASE	MAIN CULTURAL EVENTS	MAIN POLITICAL & ECONOMIC EVENTS
Mesopotamia Egypt Syria Iran Asia Minor	330-150 B.C.	Neo-Gilgammetic Para-Pharaonic Syro-Phoenician Early Mazdaic Late Hellenic - Levantine Hellenic branch	residual fatal recession heroic	<i>Attempt at Helleno-Iranian symbiosis.</i> Greco-Macedonian immigration. Hellenization of Northern Syria, Phoenicia and large cities. <i>Religious syncretism, but distinct social stratification</i> - (Hellenes and non-Hellenes). Flourishing of science and the arts (Alexandria & Pergamum). Hellenistic centres also in Iran.	Alexander's conquest of the Persian empire. Two great powers - Ptolemaic & Seleucid dynasties - rivalry. Foundation and unification of self-governing cities. New technology, economic advance. <i>Plurality of socio-economic systems</i> Tightening of regulated economy in Egypt. Slavery in Pergamum. Bactria, Parthia and Pergamum gain independence.
ditto minus Iran and Lower Mesopotamia plus Armenia	150 B.C.-50 A.D.	Para-Pharaonic Syro-Phoenician Late Hellenic - Levantine Hellenic branch	residual residual foundation	Penetration of Hellenism into Asia Minor. Attempt at Helleno-Mazdaic synthesis in Pontus and Armenia. Phoenician cities support Hellenism. <i>Intermingling of religious and philosophical concepts.</i> Anti-Hellenic reaction in Judea - Zealots. Beginning of anti-Hellenic reaction in Iran. Roman support for Hellenism. <i>Jesus Christ.</i>	Chronic economic difficulties in Ptolemaic Egypt. Insurrection of Maccabees. <i>Roman expansion.</i> Insurrection of Aristonicus in Pergamum. Parthian expansion into Mesopotamia. Decadence in Egypt. Pontus at its height - its three wars with Rome. Armenia's short-lived empire. Roman conquest of Assyria and Egypt. Consolidation of Roman Levantine provinces. Economic revival, <i>urbanization.</i>
ditto	50-300 A.D.	Late Hellenic - Levantine Hellenic branch All-Christian	recession heroic	<i>Paul of Tarsus</i> - first Christian communities. Attempt at a Helleno-Judaic synthesis - <i>Philon of Alexandria</i> Beginning of the <i>Gospels.</i> Emancipation of Christianity from Judaism. Spread of gnosticism, Marcion, Montanists. Apostolic profession of faith. Formation of episcopate - Tertullian, Origenes. Lucian of Samosata, Bardesanes - beginnings of literary Syrian. <i>Neoplatonism</i> - Saccas, Plotinus. Spread of Mystic cults especially <i>Mithraism.</i> Cult of Apollonius of Tyana. Edicts against Christians - partial persecution.	Origins of Aksumite empire in Ethiopia. Insurrection of Jews. Destruction of Jerusalem. Roman conquest of Armenia and Upper Mesopotamia. Insurrection of Jewish diaspora. Jews in Ethiopia. Insurrection of bucols in Egypt. Economic stagnation. Temporary Christian rule in Edessa. <i>Roman citizenship extended to all free inhabitants.</i> Beginnings of patronage and commendations in Egypt. Short-lived Palmyran empire. Diocletian's reforms.
ditto plus Ethiopia	300-450 A.D.	Late Hellenic - Levantine Hellenic branch All-Christian	fatal foundation	<i>Christianity official religion</i> in Armenia, Roman empire and Ethiopia. Council of Nicaea. <i>Controversy of Iota</i> (Arius versus Athanasius). Attempt to renew Roman-Hellenic religion (Julian). <i>Christological controversy</i> - Nestor, Cyrill, Eutyches. Council of Ephesus and Calcedon. Edessa prospers. Armenian cultural emancipation - Mesrop.	<i>Constantine's reforms.</i> <i>Limitation of social mobility, bondage of the coloni, obligatory liability of curiales.</i> Aksumites destroy kingdom of Meroe. Partition of Armenia by Rome and Parthia. <i>Decline of Greek bourgeoisie, especially in Egypt. Advance of well-to-do Levantines (Copts and Syrians).</i>
ditto plus West Turkestan and Nubia	450-650 A.D.	All Christian Levantine Christian	recession heroic	Attempt at reconciliation with monophysites - <i>Henoticon.</i> <i>Nestorians</i> (Church of the East) gain independence. Attempt at forceful Mazdaization of Armenia. Christianity in Nubia. Armenians and Georgians accept moderate version of monophysitism. Jacob Baradaeus - <i>Jacobites.</i> Two versions of literary Syrian. Nestorians spread to east, conversion of Sogdians. Attempt at a compromise in monotheletism - Maronites. Return of Georgians to orthodoxy. <i>Muhammad.</i>	Egyptian patronage becomes seigniorial. Vain attempts to put an end to commendations in Egypt. Cities and oases thrive in Turkestan. Two-fold political pressure on Armenia (Persia & Byzantium). Nabataean state flourishes - support of Jacobites. Attempts at suppression of monophysites in Egypt. Perso-Byzantine war. Enforced migration of population. <i>Muslim conquest of Egypt, Syria and Iran.</i>
ditto	650-850 A.D.	All-Christian Levantine Christian Early Islamic	fatal foundation (Armenia, Ethiopia Lebanon, Nubia.) heroic - remaining countries. foundation (610/20-760/70) classic (760/70-910/20)	First conversions to Islam, toleration. Culture flourishes in West Turkestan. <i>Syrian Christians pass on the Hellenic heritage to the Arabs.</i> John of Damascus - premature summation. Spread of Paulician heresy. Nestorianism spreads to India and China. <i>Manichaen - Uighur culture</i> thrives. Islam-Arabic culture thrives.	Caliph's rule - differentiation in taxes. Muslim conquest of Armenia. Formation of the <i>Paulician state.</i> Damascus seat of the Caliphs - <i>enlightened Umayyad dynasty.</i> Muslim conquest of West Turkestan. Baghdad seat of Caliphs. Tightening of muslim ideocracy. Armenian insurrection. Khazar menace. Arabo-Armenian rapprochement. Byzantium at war with the Paulicians. Origins of Tondrakite movement. Dissolution of Uighur state.
ditto plus East Turkestan	850-1050 A.D.	Levantine Christian Early Islamic	classic - Armenia & Nubia foundation - East Turkestan foundation and invasion interlude - Ethiopia residual - remaining countries. classic 760/70-910/20 recession 910/20-1060/70	Christianization of north-western Uighurs. Islam takes root among Sogdians. Armenian culture flourishes. Slowing down of cultural development in Ethiopia. <i>Islam dominant in the greater part of the Levant.</i>	Weakening of the Baghdad caliphate. Tephrike falls. Political emancipation of Armenia, its rapprochement with Georgia. Muslim penetration into East Turkestan. Muslim states in southern Ethiopia. Dissolution of Aksumite empire, Agaw invasion. Byzantine pressure on Armenia, the latter's home guard disbanded. Beginnings of Armenian emigration to Cilicia. Beginning of Saljuq attacks.

TABLE 8

ISLAMIC LEVANT					
PLACE	TIME	CIVILIZATION dominant (tolerated)	PHASE	MAIN CULTURAL EVENTS	MAIN POLITICAL & ECONOMIC EVENTS
Arabia	- 610/20	Levantine Christian Judaic Early Islamic	heroic diasporic heroic	Spread of Christian and Judaic communities. Competition of <i>Arabic poetry</i> – Hijaz. Beginnings of Arabic monotheism – Hanifiyya. <i>Muhammad's mission</i> in Mecca.	Nomads, semi-nomads and sedentary population. <i>Struggle for Yemen</i> – Ethiopian and Sassanid intervention. Decline of the Yemen. Transfer of commerce to Hijaz: Medina, Taif and Mecca, the latter ruled by commercial patriciate, discontent of others because of hardship.
ditto plus Syria, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, North Africa.	610/20– 760/70	<i>Early Islamic</i> (Late Mazdaic) (Levantine Christian) (Latin Christian)	foundation (fatal and residual) (foundation and residual) (heroic)	Muhammad's departure for Medina – <i>Hijra</i> . Caliphs – successors to Muhammad's secular function. Beginning of <i>codification of the Qu'ran</i> – school of Medina. <i>Differing opinions</i> : charisma of the community (Kharjites) versus personal charisma (Shi'ites), primacy of faith (Murji'ites), spiritualization and Hellenic influence (Mu'tazilites).	Muhammad's <i>community of the faithful (Umma)</i> cuts across tribal differences. Unification of Arabia. Foundation of caliphate, its expansion. <i>'Umar, Non-Muslims</i> (People of the Book) taxed extra, but <i>tolerated</i> . Mu'awiya– <i>Umayyad dynasty</i> –centre of gravity in Syria. Non-Arabic Muslims strive for equal rights.
ditto plus Spain, Sind, West Turkestan.	760/70– 910/20	<i>Early Islamic</i> (Late Mazdaic) (Levantine Christian) (Latin Christian)	classic (residual) (residual and classic in Armenia) (residual in Africa; Spain – at invasion interlude stage)	Success of Islam in Iran. Spread of <i>Arabic</i> language, study of <i>Hadiths</i> . <i>Jurisprudence at its height (shari'at)</i> , <i>four schools</i> . Divisions within Shi'ist camp. Culture flourishes. Beginnings of 'Non-Arabic' doctrines (Arabic <i>science</i>). Beginnings of mysticism and asceticism (Sufi). Shi'ist left becoming more radical.	Transfer of centre of gravity to Iraq – Baghdad. <i>Abbasid dynasty</i> . Equal rights for non-Arabic Muslims. <i>Iranian</i> influence in state administration. Political dissolution of caliphate. <i>Technical and economic advance</i> . Centre of gravity of militant Kharjia transferred to N. Africa. Insurrection of Zanj in Iran and Khurremish in N. Iran. Karmathians in East, fortified monasteries in the West.
ditto plus Sicily, Sardinia, East Turkestan, Mauritania	910/20–1060/70	<i>Early Islamic</i> (Late Mazdaic) (Levantine Christian) (Latin Christian)	recession heroic (residual) (ditto, as preceding phase) (ditto, as preceding phase)	Execution of the mystic al-Hallaj. <i>Summation by al-Ash'ari</i> . <i>Spread of Sufism</i> ; tension between Sufism and Sunna. New Persian language (Daria), beginnings of cultural and linguistic <i>dualism</i> (Persian-speaking Turko-Iranian East, Arab-speaking Semito-Hamitic West). Spain at its height. Al-Qushairi foreshadows synthesis of Sufism and Sunna. <i>Codification of al-Ashari's summation</i> .	Plurality of emirates and <i>three caliphates</i> . Success of Shi'ist dynasties. Economic prosperity at an end. Exacerbation of political struggles. Origins of system of <i>military slave guards</i> . Increase in taxes. Beginnings of <i>commendations</i> (especially in the East). Invasion of <i>Saliqs</i> (East), primitive Arab nomads (West). First wave of Christian Reconquista.
ditto plus Punjab, Asia Minor, Mali; minus Sardinia, Sicily, Northern Spain.	1060/70–1210/20	<i>Early Islamic</i> (Late Mazdaic) (Levantine Christian) (Latin Christian)	fatal foundation (residual; and in Armenia – recession)** (ditto, as preceding phase)	Spread of Sufism. <i>Al-Ghazali</i> – founder of <i>synthesis of Sufism and Sunna</i> . Defence of orthodoxy – <i>madrasas</i> . Beginnings of <i>mendicant orders</i> and <i>modus vivendi</i> with lawyers. Science flourishing in Spain, Ibn Rushd. Chivalrous love poetry. Almohad – renaissance of Sunna.	<i>Almoravids save the Islamic west</i> . Saliqs conquer Northern Syria and Asia Minor. <i>Crusades</i> . Latin states in Syria. Political activity of Iranians revitalized. <i>Feudalization</i> and economic advance of Egypt under Ayyubids. Second wave of Reconquista checked by Almohads. Terrorism of Shi'ist left (Assassins).
ditto plus Central, Sumatra, Hindustan; minus majority of Southern Spain.	1210/20–1310/20	<i>Late Islamic</i> (Levantine Christian)	invasion interlude	<i>Sufi mysticism at its height: al Arabi, al-Rumi</i> (Mawlawi). Their works almost Holy Writ, almost like the Qu'ran. Failure of Levantine Christian missions. <i>Islamization of Mongols</i> and penetration of Islam into China. Origins of <i>legal dualism</i> (religious and secular law).	Loss of greater part of Spain. <i>Mongolian invasion</i> . Only military slave guards in Egypt and India (Mamluks and Delhi sultanate) repulse it. <i>Struggle between differing concepts of life</i> . <i>Feudalism at its height</i> . Bondage and serfdom. Expulsion of Crusaders.
ditto plus Volga region, Southern Ukraine, Balkans, Malaya, Java, Niger; minus the rest of Spain (Granada)	1310/20–1510/20	<i>Late Islamic</i> (Orthodox Christian)*	classic (fatal)	Religion ceases to be a close link between culture and politics. <i>Summation in middle of classic period</i> , in three forms: <i>Ibn Khaldun, Hafiz, Timur Lenk</i> . Then cultural epigones. Origins of <i>syncretism</i> – Bedr-ed-Din, Bektashi. Timurid renaissance in central Asia. Shi'ist reformation in Iran, its failure in Turkey.	<i>Ottoman expansion</i> into south-east Europe, Janissaries. Mamluks wipe out Armenian kingdom in Cilicia. Revolution of Serbedars and their state in Khurasan. Climax of Mongol assimilation – <i>Timur's empire</i> . Longevity of <i>Mamluk rule</i> and prosperity in Egypt. Dissolution of Qipchaq horde. Conquest of Constantinople. Fall of Granada. Portuguese in India, Uzbeks in Central Asia. Safavid revolution in Iran.
ditto plus Nubia, Somaliland, Northern Nigeria, Bengal, rest of Indonesia; minus Southern Ukraine, Volga region	1510/20–1710/20	<i>Late Islamic</i> (Orthodox Christian)* (Hindu)	recession (residual) (recession)	<i>Shi'ist doctrinarism in Iran</i> (against both Sunna & Sufism). Ottoman and Shaybanid dynasties protectors of Sunna. Self-government for Christians in Ottoman empire (Millet). Hindu-Islamic syncretism – Akbar; Sikhs. High point in Hindu-Islamic arts. Beginnings of Shi'ist heterodoxy in Iran.	Ethnic and class changes within the power base in Iran. Babir and beginnings of <i>Mughal empire</i> . Ottoman conquest of Arabic lands; climax of their power. <i>Akbar's reforms</i> . Climax of Mughal power. British come to India and Dutch to Indonesian. Janissaries become hereditary and system decays. Retreat of Ottomans from Danube basin. Stagnation in Iran. Tightening of Mughal rule. Insurrection of Marathas.
ditto plus Upper Volta, Chad; minus Balkans, Crimea.	1710/20–1910/20	Late Islamic Euro-Islamic?	fatal heroic?	Nadir Shah's attempt to bring about Sunnitic revival in Iran. Sikhs get closer to Hinduism. <i>Indian summer of Sufism</i> . <i>Wahhabite renaissance</i> of orthodoxy. Tendency towards conservatism in India, Morocco & Turkestan. Tendency towards reconstruction in Iran only (Babism and Bahaism). Elsewhere the <i>tendency towards reception</i> is getting stronger. University of Aligarh. Khilafat movement in India.	Invasion of Iran by Afghans. Sikh state in the Punjab. <i>European infringement of Ottoman sovereignty</i> . Babist revolution in Iran. Young Ottoman movement. Ottomans lose the Balkans. Mahdi in the Sudan. Sepoy insurrection in India. End of Ottoman empire.
ditto plus ? minus ?	1910/20	Late Islamic Euro-Islamic?	residual foundation?	<i>Abolition of caliphate</i> . Introduction of Latin alphabet in Turkey. Introduction of Latin & then Russian alphabet for Muslim nationalities in U.S.S.R. Non-Muslim elements in Turkish and Iranian nationalism. <i>Attempts to graft Europeanism onto Islamic tradition</i> .	Republic of Turkey, <i>Kemal Atatürk</i> . Reforms in Iran. Socialization in West, & later in East Turkestan. <i>Political emancipation of Muslim nations</i> . Renewal of Israel; confrontation with Arabs. <i>Arab nationalism and Islamic socialism</i> .

*mainly in the Balkans

**cf. Table No. 7

TABLE 9

LEVANT I (MESOPOTAMIA & EGYPT)

Table 9

(A) & (B) indicate two separate areas; (I) & (II) indicate two classic periods

CIVILIZATION	PRE-GILGAMETIC	PALEO-GILGAMETIC	MEZZO-GILGAMETIC	NEO-GILGAMETIC	PARA-GILGAMETIC	PRE-PHARAONIC	EARLY PHARAONIC	LATE PHARAONIC	PARA-PHARAONIC
PARENT CIVILIZATION	?	Pre-Gilgamic	Paleo-Gilgamic	Mezzo-Gilgamic	Mezzo-Gilgamic Aryan pre-civilization	?	Pre-Pharaonic	Early Pharaonic	Late Pharaonic
PROPHET	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
FOUNDING FATHERS	?	anonymous	Sargon I Naram Sin Ur Nammu	anonymous	(A) Anitas Labarnas (B) anonymous	?	First & Second Dynasty	Eighth & Tenth Dynasty	(A) Saitic dynasty (B) anonymous
PROTAGONISTS – social groups	?	priests – technicians	court nobility, priests, traders & bankers	priests, soldiers & traders	nobility (= ruling ethnic group)	?	scribes	(I) middle class (II) middle class & soldiers	(A) middle class (B) priests
PROTAGONISTS – ethnic groups	?	Sumerians & Proto-Elamites	Akkadians & Sumerians	Assyrians, Chaldaeans & Elamites	(A) Hittites (B) Hurrians	Egyptians	Egyptians	Egyptians	(A) Egyptians (B) Nubians
MAIN TERRITORIAL BASE	Euphrates & Tigris estuaries	Lower Mesopotamia & Karkah & Karun region	the whole of Mesopotamia, Karkah & Karun region & northern Syria	Mesopotamia, Karkah & Karun region, Van & Urmiah region	(A) Asia Minor (B) Van & Urmiah region	Nile delta	Lower & Upper Egypt	Upper & Lower Egypt	(A) Lower Egypt (B) Nubia
CLASSIC PERIOD	–3500?	2750–2550 B.C.	1950–1750 B.C.	900–700 B.C.	(A) 1450–1200 B.C. (B)	–3050?	2650–2450 B.C.	(I) 2000–1800 B.C. (II) 1600–1400 B.C.	(A) — (B) 550–250 B.C.
PREVAILING MANNER OF THINKING	?	mythical/pragmatic	mythical/pragmatic	mythical/pragmatic	mythical/pragmatic	?	magical/mythical	magical/pragmatic	(A) magical/speculative (B) ?
SUPREME VALUE	?	reverence for the gods & earthly well-being	reverence for the gods & earthly well-being	reverence for the gods & earthly well-being	reverence for the gods & state prosperity	?	The pharaoh's eternal prosperity, & preservation of socio-cosmic order (maat)	eternal prosperity for all, depending on righteous behaviour & magic.	eternal prosperity for all, depending more on magic
HOLY SCRIPTURE	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
MAIN INTEGRATIVE INSTITUTION OR ACTIVITY	?	Sumerian & Elamite pantheons	Sumerian & Akkadian pantheons, literature, concept of law	Sumero-Akkadian tradition, prestige of the city of Babylon	(A) priestly monarchy (B) ?	?	pharaonist, Horus cult	pharaonist, Amon – Re cult	(A) pharaonist, Re & Ptah cults (B) pharaonist, Amon cult
MAIN HORIZONTAL DIVISION	?	city states	ethnic groups & provinces	national states Ashur, Elam, Babylonia, Urartu	(A) feudatory principalities (B) ?	dynastic states	provinces (nomoi)	(I) aristocratic domains & provinces (II) provinces & temple domains	(A) provinces (B) provinces & temple domains
MAIN VERTICAL DIVISION	?	elders, plebeians, clients	freemen, villeins, slaves	freemen (warlords, priests & town dwellers), bondsmen, slaves	(A) freemen & slaves (B) nobility, middle class, villeins & slaves	?	scribes & villeins	(I) aristocracy, middle class, villeins, (II) soldiers, scribes, middle class, villeins & slaves	(A) soldiers, middle class, priests, villeins & slaves (B) ?
MAIN SPIRITUAL OR INSTITUTIONAL POLARITY	?	agorarchic v. bularchic body	courtiers v. hereditary nobility	aristocracy v. hierocracy	(A) imperiate v. pluralistic power constellation (B) ?	?	religious cults (Horus, Re, Ptah)	professions within the power base	(A) timocracy v. machiocracy (B) ?
MAIN PRACTICAL ACHIEVEMENT	irrigation & building techniques	plough, wheel, geometry, time measurement, cuneiform	rudimentary astronomy, accountancy, credit technique, retributive law	systematic astronomy, military administration, building techniques, horticulture	(A) iron metallurgy, historiography, restitutive law. (B) theory of horsemanship	irrigation & building techniques	geometry, hieroglyphic script, aesthetic development of culture.	rudimentary astronomy, hieratic script, art, social etiquette & moral doctrines	(A) rudimentary philosophy & maritime exploration (B) ?
SUMMA OR SUMMATOR	?	?	Hammurabi's Code & Enuma elish	Asshurbanipal	(A) ? (B) ?	?	Khufu (Cheops)	(I) Amenemhet III (II) Amenhotep III	(A) — (B) ?
FILIAL CIVILIZATION	Paleo-Gilgamic	Mezzo-Gilgamic	Para-Gilgamic Neo-Gilgamic	Early Mazdaic Judaic	Etruscan? Early Hellenic?	Early Pharaonic	Late Pharaonic	Para-Pharaonic Judaic	Late Hellenic (Levantine branch) All Christian

TABLE 10

Table 10 LEVANT II (SYRIA & IRAN)						
CIVILIZATION	SYRO-CANAANITE	SYRO-PHOENICIAN	JUDAIC Periods: (I) Pre-captivity, (II) Persian & Hellenistic, (III) Maccabean & Roman	EARLY MAZDAIC	LATE MAZDAIC	MANICHAEAN
PARENT CIVILIZATION	Paleo-Gilgamic Early Pharaonic	Syro-Canaanite Late Minoan?	Syro-Canaanite Late Pharaonic Neo-Gilgamic	Aryan pre-civilization Neo-Gilgamic	Early Mazdaic	Late Mazdaic All Christian Indo-Buddhist
PROPHET	—	—	Moses	Zarathustra	Zarathustra	Mani
FOUNDING FATHERS	?	?	(I) Josiah (II) Ezra, Nehemiah (III) Simon Maccabaeus	Darius I	Vologoes	?
PROTAGONISTS – social groups	?	traders & sailors	(I) prophets (II) scribes (III) pharisees	kings & magi	magi & nobility	the elect
PROTAGONISTS – ethnic groups	Gabalites & Ugaritians	Phoenicians (esp. Tyrians)	Jews (Israelites)	Medes, north-east Iranians & Persians	Parthians & Persians	Sogdians & Uighurs
MAIN TERRITORIAL BASE	Syria	(A) Phoenicia (B) Carthage & Sabaea	Palestine	Iran	Iran	Transoxania & Tarim basin
CLASSIC PERIOD	2100-1800 B.C.	(A) 1100-800 B.C. (B) 800-500 B.C.	—	—	70-270 A.D.	—
PREVAILING MANNER OF THINKING	mythical/magical?	mythical/pragmatic	(I) prophetic/fideistic (II) transition from I to III (III) doctrinarian/fideistic	pragmatic/speculative	mythical/speculative	mystical/contemplative
SUPREME VALUE	reverence for the gods & earthly well-being	reverence for the gods & earthly well-being	eternal life for the chosen people	virtue prosperity immortality	virtue prosperity immortality	salvation through mystic knowledge & virtue
HOLY SCRIPTURE	—	—	Torah, Nebim, Ukerubim (Law, Prophets & Writings)	Avesta	Avesta-Zand	seven inspired works by Mani
MAIN INTEGRATIVE INSTITUTION OR ACTIVITY	?	trade, phonetic script & Melkart cult	(I) } the Temple (II) } (III) } synagogues	the empire & magi	magi & the empire	local communities
MAIN HORIZONTAL DIVISION	city states?	city states	(I) tribes, two states (II) – (III) homeland & diaspora	provinces based on tribes or nations.	provinces based on tribes or nations.	national states
MAIN VERTICAL DIVISION	freemen & slaves?	freemen & slaves	ritualists, other freemen & slaves	nobility, priesthood (mag), villeins & slaves	hereditary estates & sub-estates	the elect & hearers
MAIN SPIRITUAL OR INSTITUTIONAL POLARITY	?	timocracy v. aristocracy	the living voice of the prophets v. priestly code	Zarathustrian teaching v. syncretic tendencies	orthodox dualism v. monist Zurvanism	Christian v. Buddhist affinity
MAIN PRACTICAL ACHIEVEMENT	rudimentary phonetic script, well cisterns, domestication of the camel.	fully developed phonetic script, its spread to the East & West; trans-desert & overseas trade, geographical discoveries.	monotheistic source of further religious creativity, longevul communal integration surviving in the diaspora.	concept of man's responsibility in the struggle for good, administration & communication systems.	revival of the early Mazdaic heritage & attempt at its philosophical elaboration.	Attempt at a synthesis of Mazdaic, Christian & Buddhist religions by means of mystical concepts, calligraphy.
SUMMA OR SUMMATOR	—	Sanchuniathon?	—	—	Aturpat	—
FILIAL CIVILIZATION	Syro-Phoenician	Levantine Christian Early Islamic	All Christian Early Islamic	Late Mazdaic Late Hellenic (Levantine branch)	Manichaean	—

TABLE 11

LEVANT III (SYNTHETIC ERA)					
Table 11					
<small>a) - (D) indicate separate areas</small>					
CIVILIZATION	LATE HELLENIC (Levantine branch)	ALL CHRISTIAN	LEVANTINE CHRISTIAN	EARLY ISLAMIC	LATE ISLAMIC
PARENT CIVILIZATION	Early Hellenic Early Mazdaic Para-Pharaonic	Late Hellenic (all branches) Judaic Para-Pharaonic	All Christian Syro-Phoenician	Syro-Phoenician Judaic Levantine Christian	Early Islamic Levantine Christian
PROPHET	—	Christ	Christ	Muhammad	Muhammad
FOUNDING FATHERS	Alexander Seleucus Ptolemy	Paul of Tarsus, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Origenes, Paul of Samosata	(A) Nestorius, Jacob Baradaeus (B) Mesrop (C) ? (D) Frumentius	Muhammad Umar Mu'awiya	al-Ghazzali al-Arabi al-Rumi
PROTAGONISTS - social groups	philosophers & craftsmen	lower middle class	priests & monks	scholars & jurists	dervishes
PROTAGONISTS - ethnic groups	Macedonians, Hellenized Phoenicians	Hellenized Levantines, Romanized Africans & Italics	Syrians, Copts, Armenians	Arabs	Arabs, Iranians & Turks
MAIN TERRITORIAL BASE	northern Syria, Phoenicia, Lower Egypt & Bactria	Roman Empire & Armenia	(A) Syria (B) Armenia (C) Nubia (D) Ethiopia	Arabia eastern Syria Iraq north Africa	the whole of the Levant
CLASSIC PERIOD	—	—	(A) — (B) 850-1050 A.D. (C) 850-1050 A.D. (D) 1150-1450 A.D.	760/70-910/20 A.D.	1310/20-1510/20 A.D.
PREVAILING MANNER OF THINKING	logical/speculative	fideistic/speculative	fideistic/doctrinarian	fideistic/pragmatic	fideistic/mystical
SUPREME VALUE	cultivated man	eternal bliss for growing numbers (through proselytism)	eternal bliss for growing numbers (through proselytism)	eternal bliss for growing numbers (through proselytism)	eternal bliss for growing numbers (through proselytism)
HOLY SCRIPTURE	—	Gospels & Epistles	Gospels & Epistles	Quran & Hadiths	Quran, Hadiths & Mathnawis
MAIN INTEGRATIVE INSTITUTION OR ACTIVITY	gymnasias & dynastic cults	bishops & their synods or councils	churches	religious law (sharia) caliphate	mystic orders (sufis) & religious universities (madrasas)
MAIN HORIZONTAL DIVISION	dynastic states, self-governing cities & tribal communities	provinces	national churches	dynastic states	dynastic states
MAIN VERTICAL DIVISION	Hellenes, Non-Hellenes, slaves	freemen & slaves, professions (which become hereditary)	(A) priesthood, middle class, villeins (B) aristocracy, priesthood, middle class, villeins (C) ? (D) aristocracy, priesthood, villeins	Muslims (graded according to their ancestors' relation to the Prophet), non-Muslims (differentiated according to tradition), freemen & slaves.	elite bodies of military & civil servants (partly of slaves), aristocracy, middle class, bondsmen & slaves.
MAIN SPIRITUAL OR INSTITUTIONAL POLARITY	rationalist v. mystic trends in philosophy	theocentric v. anthropocentric concepts of Jesus Christ	(A) Jacobites v. Nestorians (B) hierocracy v. aristocracy (C) ? (D) church doctrine v. religious folklore	tradition (Sunna) v. prophetic succession (Shi'a)	mystics (sufis) v. theologians (ulama)
MAIN PRACTICAL ACHIEVEMENT	Diffusion of Hellenic science, arts, philosophy, techniques & city institutions throughout the Levant.	equality of all men before God, ecumenism, emphasis on practical side of morality, charitable institutions.	(A) passing on the Hellenic cultural heritage to the Muslims, spread of phonetic script to the East. (B) long-term communal integration withstanding heavy pressure. (C) - (D) ?	religious integration of the nomad and sedentary population, religious & political basis for Levantine unification. development of Greek science & Indian mathematics.	interception of dangerous nomadic invasions & a more thorough re-integration of the whole of the Levant, continuance of science.
SUMMA OR SUMMATOR	—	—	—	al-Ashari	Ibn Khaldun Hafiz Timur Lenk
FILIAL CIVILIZATION	All Christian	Levantine Christian Orthodox Christian Latin Christian Manichaean	Early Islamic Late Islamic	Late Islamic	?