

THE SENTENCE

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1. A sentence says something.
- 1.1 A sentence is articulate: it has distinguishable parts and it constitutes a whole in which these parts are composed together.
- 1.11 A sentence has the external form of a line or sequence, in which the distinguishable parts are ordered.

2. The parts of a sentence **indicate**.
- 2.1 Parts alone say nothing. A collection of parts says nothing. A non-articulate sequence of parts is a confused indication.

3. The **meaning** of a sentence is not in *what* is said, but in *that* it is said.
- 3.1 Nothing beyond the sentence can be said.

- 4.0 The composition of parts into an articulate whole means that there are forms **of indications** in which something can be said.
- 4.1 Forms of indication must themselves be indications.
- 4.1 If there were no such forms of indications, there would be no distinction between sentences and parts of sentences, between saying and indication.
- 4.11 The form of indications is in the order of the parts and in their indications.
- 4.2 There must *be at least two kinds* of indication. If there were only one kind of indication, there could be no forms of indication. If there were only one kind of indication, then a sentence could only indicate.
- 4.21 The parts of a sentence indicate and also indicate how the indications are composed together. With only one kind of indication there would only be a sequence of indications and nothing could be said.
- 4.22 Indications of composition go outside the line of the sentence. They indicate how the line is divided and its parts connected.
- 4.23 Indications of composition are *instructions on reading*.

- 4.3 A sentence is *closed*.
- 4.31 The space of any one indication in the sentence is indicated by the form of indications and the remaining indications.
- 4.32 There must, in every sentence, be some form of indications for which every space that it indicates is occupied. Otherwise, *there is no sentence*; nothing is said.
- 4.33 A sentence has many *forms of indications*, which are equivalent in that which is said.

- 4.4 Indications can be indicated, as in the forms of indications.
- 4.41 A sentence can be indicated.
- 4.42 What is said cannot be indicated. Indication does not say anything.
- 4.43 Indications have no meaning.

- 5.1 **Syntax** enables what can be said to be said. Syntax consists of the *possible* forms of indication.
- 5.2 Syntax consists of the rules of composition of indications according to kind.
- 5.3 Syntax ensures that what is said is what is read.
- 5.31 Syntax in itself cannot determine *how* the sentence is to be read.
- 5.32 How the sentence is to be read is dependent on the meaning of the discourse in which it exists.

- 6.0 **A discourse** is composed of what is said and what is not said.
- 6.1 The universe of discourse is *all that can be said*.

- 6.1 The meaning of a discourse cannot be said.
- 6.11 The meaning of a discourse can be indicated, but *what* is meant cannot be indicated.

- 6.2 *All* that is said is not equivalent to what it is that can be said. Else, meaning would be extensive.
- 6.21 The meaning of a discourse is not in the aggregation of all that is said in it, but in that everything that is said is *equivalent* to ever} other thing. In the meaning of the discourse, every sentence is equivalent: this sentence which says something is equivalent to that sentence which also says something.
- 6.22 In every sentence there is the meaning of the discourse, in *that* it says what it says.

- 6.3 The meaning of a discourse enters the discourse by *the saying of what it is that can be said*.
(This is how proof brings conviction into a mathematical system.)
- 6.31 In saying what it is that can be said, the forms of indications become articulate.
- 6.32 How what is said is said is inseparable from saying what it is that can be said.
- 6.33 That which says what it is that can be said is no one sentence.
- 6.34 That which simply says something is every sentence.

- 6.4 Meaning arises from a discourse by consent to what it is that can be said.
- 6.41 The meaning of a discourse is grasped by reading in it only what it is that can be said.
- 6.42 What it is that can be said can be read only by grasping the meaning of the discourse.

- 6.5 In saying what it is that can be said, form and content are one.
- 6.51 The separation of form and content constitute the extension of the discourse.
- 6.52 Meaning is not extensive, being in *that* this is said and that is not said.
- 6.53 In the discourse, what it is that can be said and what it is that cannot be said, interpenetrate in what is said and what is not said.

- 6.6 The meaning of a discourse is found in understanding its silence.
- 7.0 The **value** of a discourse is unsayable.
- 7.01 Value cannot be said in any system of discourse.
- 7.02 Value has no meaning. The value of a discourse is the origin of the meaning there.
- 7.03 The unsayable is inarticulate in indications.
- 7.1 The saying of what it is that can be said is in agreement with a value.
- 7.2 In grasping the meaning of a discourse a value is assented to.
- 7.3 A discourse without agreement and assent to value can have no meaning.
(Questions of both truth and aesthetics are resolved together in saying what it is that can be said. Questions of this kind arise *because a sentence says something*)
- 8.0 Only when *that* something is said is meaningful is there a **sentence**.
- 8.1 Whereas in what is said there is no meaning, in that it is said there is meaning.
- 8.2 Meaning cannot be said, but what is meant *is said*.
- 8.1 The sentence is the interface between indication and value.
- 8.2 The sayable and the unsayable are distinguished only in the act of saying what it is that can be said, only in the origin of meaning.
- 8.3 Through the meaning of the discourse what is said finds a place in the unsayable.
- 8.4 The unsayable is a promise of a new beginning in determining what can and what cannot be said.