from In Search of the Miraculous by P.D. Ouspensky
from VIEWS FROM THE REAL WORLD – G. I. GURDJIEFF
NEW YORK, FEBRUARY 1924
On the subjectivity of verbal mentation
For an exact study, an exact language is needed. But our ordinary language in which we speak, set forth what we know and understand, and write books in ordinary life, does not do for even a small amount of exact speech. An inexact speech cannot serve an exact knowledge. The words composing our language are too wide, too foggy and indefinite, while the meaning put into them is too arbitrary and variable. Every man who pronounces any word always attaches this or that shade of meaning to it by his imagination, exaggerates or puts forward this or that side of it, sometimes concentrating all the significance of the word on a single feature of the object, that is, designating by this word not all the attributes but those chance external ones which first spring to his notice. Another man speaking with the first attaches to the same word another shade of meaning, takes this word in another sense, which is often exactly the opposite. If a third man joins the conversation, he again puts into the same word his own meaning. And if ten people speak, every one of them once more gives his own meaning, and the same word has ten meanings. And men speaking in this way think that they can understand each other, that they can transfer their thoughts one to another. It can be said with full confidence that the language in which contemporary men speak is so imperfect that whatever they speak about, especially on scientific matters, they can never be sure that they call the same ideas by the same words.
On the contrary, one can say almost certainly that they understand every word differently and, while appearing to speak about the same subject, in practice speak about quite different things. Moreover, for every man the meaning of his own words and the meaning which he puts into them changes in accordance with his own thoughts and humors, with the images which he associates at the moment with the words, as well as with what and how his interlocutor speaks, for by an involuntary imitation or contradiction he can involuntarily change the meaning of his words. In addition, nobody is able to define exactly what he means by this or that word, or whether this meaning is constant or subject to change, how, why and for what reason.
If several men speak, everyone speaks in his own way, and no one of them understands another. A professor reads a lecture, a scholar writes a book, and their audience and readers listen to, and read, not them but combinations of the authors' words and their own thoughts, notions, humors and emotions of the given moment.
The people of today are, to a certain degree, conscious of the instability of their language. Among the diverse branches of science every one of them works out its own terminology, its own nomenclature and language. In philosophy attempts are made, before using any word, to make clear in what sense it is taken; but however much people nowadays try to establish a constant meaning of words, they have failed in it so far. Every writer fixes his own terminology, changes the terminology of his predecessors, contradicts his own terminology; in short, everyone contributes his share to the general confusion.
This teaching points out the cause of this. Our words have not and cannot have any constant meaning, and to indicate at every word the meaning and the particular shade which we attach to this word, that is, the relations in which it is taken by us, we have in the first place no means; and secondly we do not aim at this; on the contrary, we invariably wish to establish our constant meaning for a word and to take it always in that sense, which is obviously impossible, as one and the same word used at different times and in various relations has different meanings.
Our wrong use of words and the qualities of the words themselves have made them unreliable instruments of an exact speech and an exact knowledge, not to mention the fact that for many notions accessible to our reason we have neither words nor expressions.
Summary points
- Words cannot have constant meaning
- Problem of indicating meaning and shade of meaning at every use of a word
- We have no means of doing so
- We do not aim to do so
- Instead we wish for what is impossible
- We also lack words for many ideas
He goes on to speak of number as exact but difficult to relate to qualities.
The language of numbers alone can serve for an exact expression of thought and knowledge; but the language of numbers can be applied only to designate and compare quantities. But things do not differ only in size, and their definition from the point of view of quantities is not sufficient for an exact knowledge and analysis. We do not know how to apply the language of numbers to the attributes of things. If we knew how to do it and could designate all the qualities of things by numbers in relation to some immutable number, this would be an exact language.
He claims that his teaching can approximate to this ideal
The teaching whose principles we are going to expound here has as one of its tasks the bringing of our thinking nearer to an exact mathematical designation of things and events and the giving to men of the possibility of understanding themselves and each other.
He illustrates his view of the confused use of words by the example of ‘world’ (as in Beelzebub)
If we take any of the most commonly used words and try to see what a varied meaning these words have according to who uses them and in what connection, we shall see why men have no power of expressing their thoughts exactly and why everything men say and think is so unstable and contradictory. Apart from the variety of meanings which every word can have, this confusion and contradiction are caused by the fact that men never render any account to themselves of the sense in which they take this or that word and only wonder why others do not understand it although it is so clear to themselves. For example, if we say the word “world” in front of ten hearers, every one of them will understand the word in his own way. If men knew how to catch and write down their thoughts themselves, they would see that they had no ideas connected with the word “world” but that merely a well-known word and an accustomed sound was uttered, the significance of which is supposed to be known. It is as if everybody hearing this word said to himself: “Ah, the ‘world,’ I know what it is.” As a matter of fact he does not really know at all. But the word is familiar, and therefore no such question and answer occur to him. They are only understood. A question comes only in respect of new unknown words and then the man tends to substitute for the unknown word a known one. He calls this “understanding.”
If we now ask the man what he understands by the word “world,” he will be perplexed by such a question. Usually, when he hears or uses the word “world” in conversation, he does not think at all about what it means, having decided once and for all that he knows and that everybody knows. Now for the first time he sees that he does not know and that he has never thought about it; but he will not be able to and will not know how to rest with the thought of his ignorance. Men are not capable enough of observing and not sufficiently sincere with themselves to do so. He will soon recover himself, that is, he will very quickly deceive himself; and remembering or composing in haste a definition of the word “world” from some familiar source of knowledge or thought, or the first definition of someone else’s which enters his head, he will express it as his own understanding of the meaning of the word, though in fact he has never thought about the word “world” in this way and does not know how he has thought.
After various descriptions he goes on to postulate a kind of total all-round meaning that would incorporate all the diverse understandings.
All these definitions of the word "world" have their merits and defects: their chief defect consists in that each of them excludes its opposite, while all picture one side of the world and examine it only from one point of view. A correct definition will be such as would combine all the separate understandings, showing the place of each and at the same time giving, in each case, the possibility of stating about which side of the world the man speaks, from which point of view and in which relation.
This teaching says that if the question of what the world is were approached in the right way, we could establish quite accurately what we understand by this word. And this definition of a right understanding would include in itself all views upon the world and all approaches to the question. Having thus agreed on such a definition, men would be able to understand one another when speaking about the world. Only starting from such a definition can one speak about the world.
This is the beginning of systematics
VIEWS FROM THE REAL WORLD p. 105
This extract provides context for the model of three centres and speaks of work on thinking. I see it as an example of practical systematics.
I say that until now you have not been working like men; but there is a possibility to learn to work like men. Working like a man means that a man feels what he is doing and thinks why and for what he does it, how he is doing it now, how it had to be done yesterday and how today, how he would have to do it tomorrow, and how it is generally best to get it done — whether there is a better way. If man works rightly, he will succeed in doing better and better work. But when a two-brained creature works, there is no difference between its work yesterday, today or tomorrow.
During our work, not a single man worked like a man. But for the Institute it is essential to work differently. Each must work for himself, for others can do nothing for him. If you can make, say, a cigarette like a man, you already know how to make a carpet. All the necessary apparatus is given to man for doing everything. Every man can do whatever others can do. If one man can, everyone can. Genius, talent, is all nonsense. The secret is simple, to do things like a man. Who can think and do things like a man can at once do a thing as well as another who has been doing it all his life but not like a man. What had to be learned by this one in ten years, the other learns in two or three days and he then does it better than the one who spent his life doing it. I have met people who, before learning, worked all their lives not like men, but when they had learned, they could easily do the finest work as well as the roughest, work they had never even seen before. The secret is small and very easy—one must learn to work like a man. And that is when a man does a thing and at the same time he thinks about what he is doing and studies how the work should be done, and while doing it forgets all—his grandmother and grandfather and his dinner.
In the beginning it is very difficult. I will give you theoretical indications as to how to work, the rest will depend on each individual man. But I warn you that I shall say only as much as you put into practice. The more there is put into practice, the more I shall say. Even if people do so only for an hour, I shall talk to them as long as is necessary, twenty-four hours if need be. But to those who will continue to work as before—to the devil!
As I said, the essence of correct man's work is in the working together of the three centers—moving, emotional and thinking. When all three work together and produce an action, this is the work of a man. There is a thousand times more value even in polishing the floor as it should be done than in writing twenty-five books. But before starting to work with all centers and concentrating them on the work, it is necessary to prepare each center separately so that each could concentrate. It is necessary to train the moving center to work with the others. And one must remember that each center consists of three.
Our moving center is more or less adapted.
The second center, as difficulties go, is the thinking center and the most difficult, the emotional. We already begin to succeed in small things with our moving center. But neither the thinking nor the emotional center can concentrate at all. To succeed in collecting thoughts in a desired direction is not what is wanted. When we succeed in this, it is mechanical concentration which everybody can have—it is not the concentration of a man. It is important to know how not to depend on associations, and we shall therefore begin with the thinking center. We shall exercise the moving center by continuing the same exercises we have done so far.
Before going any further, it would be useful to learn to think according to a definite order. Let everyone take some object. Let each of you ask himself questions relating to the object and answer these according to his knowledge and material:
- Its origin
- The cause of its origin
- Its history
- Its qualities and attributes
- Objects connected with it and related to it
- Its use and application
- Its results and effects
- What it explains and proves
- Its end or its future
- Your opinion, the cause and motives of this opinion
The guidelines on thinking I find apposite to thinking about systematics. It would of course be valuable if time were spent working on such questions.
VIEWS FROM THE REAL WORLD p. 140
In this passage, G uses number as quantity to speak of a ‘measure’ of a complete man. This gives a clear perspective on ‘making a whole’. It points to a way of thinking about a complete system in a practical way.
Suppose in a given case we represent essence as 3 units: 3 represents the number of postures. In the case of this man's body the number is 4. The head is represented by 6. Thus, when we speak of 6 we do not refer to the whole man. We must evaluate him by 13, for 13 is his manifestations, his perception. When it is the head alone, it would be 6. The important thing is not to evaluate him by only 6 but by 13. The total is what defines him. A man should be able to give a total of 30 for everything taken together. This figure can be obtained only if each center can give a certain corresponding number—for instance, 12 + 10 + 8. Let us suppose that this figure 30 represents the manifestation of a man, a householder. If we find that one center must necessarily give 12, it must contain certain corresponding postures which would produce 12. If one unit is missing and it gives only 11, 30 cannot be obtained. If there is a total of only 29 it is not a man, if we call a man one whose sum-total is 30.
- Anthony Blake; October 2005