

CULTURAL STREAMS FROM THE ICE AGE TO THE 21st CENTURY

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A two-day Seminar was held on 13th and 14th December, 1969. Some fifty participants led by Dr. Jaroslav Krejčí of Lancaster University and Mr. J.G. Bennett, Director of Research, discussed the cultural history of Asia, Africa and Europe since the end of the Ice Age and attempted to apply the principle of 'cultural levels' to forecasting the course of events during the next period of the evolution of the human mind.

FIRST SESSION: THE FORMATIVE STAGE

J. G. Bennett

Whether we are specialists in history and sociology, or whether our interest is in the human situation in which we are all involved; we must be concerned in the basic sociological questions: how far can we predict from what we can learn about human societies the likely course of social development and how far can our present actions be expected to influence the future?

There are several premises from which the enquiry can start. I shall assume that we all agree that the problem is one of mind rather than matter, of cultural rather than economic factors. This premise is by no means axiomatic and the many social historians would probably reject it. There is a corollary to this premise: the solution of social problems is not to be found in economic and material factors, but in cultural and mental attitudes.

Some problems, apparently intractable, may be seen in the perspective of twelve millennia that have elapsed since the retreat of the glaciers in the Northern hemisphere to be the natural and even necessary consequences of the stage reached in the evolution of the human mind.

Many parents pass through a period of distress when their children of the age of four or five appear to go out of control and their behaviour loses the apparent rationality they had at the age of two or three. They think their children are going to the bad, and wonder if they have made some disastrous mistakes that caused these children to become so intractable. One has only to advise them to be patient for two years and come and talk about it again. After two years they come back and say that things are very different now. This is because from eight years on child development enters another period of relative tranquillity, or sometimes does not do so.

We are now at an alarming moment, when for the first time in history mankind is faced with global disaster. When the Roman Empire collapsed and Europe entered the dark ages, India, China and Arabia were flourishing. When the Mongols ravished half of Asia in the thirteenth century, Europe was preparing for the Renaissance. Today any disturbance reverberates throughout the world. There are global economic problems of production and distribution, demographic problems of population control, political problems of threatened war and revolution and psychological problems in the breakdown of value systems. None of this is new in itself; but the advance of communications has given them a totally new global character.

In the development of mankind over the ages there have no doubt been similar awkward periods; so one should learn to think in terms of millennia, not of centuries, and least of all of decades. Nothing global can be understood if one looks at the history of mankind or the human situation in a tiny span of ten years, which is almost vanishingly small over the whole period of history. It is not easy to open one's mind to millennial thinking; that is, thinking in terms of long periods of perhaps one or more thousand years. It is

only when one looks on a sufficiently large scale that it is possible to detect a clear evolutionary progress, and unmistakable advance. Otherwise, if one takes human life in smaller cycles, one can see periods of growth and expansion, of stabilisation, of regression, of those cycles that historians recognize. Such a short view can lead to disappointments and alarms because they incline one to imagine that the end of the beginning is the beginning of the end.

Let us add two further hypotheses, without attempting to justify them because this would require that we go further back than the proposed starting point, which is the end of the last glaciation, about eleven thousand years ago. The first is that modern man is essentially a creative being, and that creativity, or urge to introduce new things into his life and experience, is something that man does not share with other animals. He has other distinctive qualities; for example, his capacity for looking into the past and the future and of taking into account distant events, distant in place as well as in time. This also seems to be something we do not share with animals as individuals, though we undoubtedly do find this capacity for dealing with remote events in space and time in the species of animals. You find it in migrating animals particularly, who seem to have an even more remarkable sense of distance and of timing, and of the cycles of nature, than we human beings have. And therefore one should say that perhaps we more consciously take account of past and future and of the cycles of nature than the animal species do. We have to adapt ourselves to these cycles; we have to foresee and we have to build upon past experience, which probably an individual animal does not; but certainly an animal genus or species does. When we come to this creative impulse in man, we seem to have found something that is absent in animals individually, but also does not seem to have any place in the general animal life on the earth. This latter is a stable symbiosis, developing and changing under the environmental influences by various mechanisms of mutation and adaptation, but there is no sign of the creative urge that is man's great blessing and also his great curse if he misuses it.

The second hypothesis that I wish to introduce is that this creative character is of comparatively recent origin in the evolution of man on the earth. I would place it at not more than 35,000 years before the present, as compared with probably one million or even, according to some recent views, a million and a half years of human life on the earth.

Creativity is the mark of *Homo sapiens sap*, i.e. modern man, and was absent from the predecessors of our present sub-species. One simple reason for making this assumption is that there is no evidence of human creative activity before about 35,000 years ago. If earlier man had been creative, there would not have been the long stagnant periods marked by the most gradual change in the use of simple instruments reported to us by prehistorians. I shall assume that some time during the last interglacial period or the beginning of the last glaciation, something happened to man which we do not attempt to explain. We simply observe that the records appear to show that creativity developed in man and most obviously so in art, because we have these wonderful works of art of the Aurignacian and Magdalenean periods. These indicate that man was creative and delighted in creation. People began to ornament themselves.

They also began to be concerned with problems of life and death, to be concerned with the fate of the person after death as evidenced by the kind of burial rites that were introduced at that time. In other words, man began to ask the kind of fundamental question that we ask ourselves today.

We can deduce that, during this same period, a vastly significant social development occurred. Close to the caves in the Dordogne district of France where the most beautiful works of art — implying an advanced technology — have been preserved, we can see primitive cave dwellings and the evidences of hunting and food-gathering groups such as had existed for a hundred thousand years. A two-level culture had made its appearance with immeasurable consequences for the future of mankind.

I referred to technology as well as art, because we must recognize the technical insight implied by the selection, preparation and dispersion of pigments, the use of artificial light in the caves, the ability to

recognize rock surfaces dry enough to preserve paintings over long periods of time together with the instruments of stone and wood. Man's creativity was, from the start, aesthetic, scientific and social.

The artists and technicians must have formed stable communities, for the pictures and drawings stretch over long periods of time. The hunters and fruit gatherers must have moved constantly in search of food. These observations are not speculative: for the evidence is there for all to see. The speculative element in the hypothesis I am putting forward consists in the assumption that creativity is a property that appeared late and rather suddenly in the evolution of the human mind and in the still more hazardous assumption that this could have occurred without an intelligent decision that the pre-creative men could not have taken by themselves.

I have put this second assumption in the form of the hypothesis of demiurgic intelligence. Many students of evolution, recognizing the objections to the doctrine of fortuitous originism or the operation of blind chance, have postulated a purposive or at least a directional character in the process. Orthogenesis and syntropy are among the names given to the property by which evolution tends towards greater complexity and organization. There is an obvious objection to using meaningless words as a means of avoiding the avowal of ignorance. Recently, the tendency has been to refer to evolution as an 'intelligent process'. Teilhard de Chardin exemplifies this tendency. The concept of an 'intelligent process' begs the question. Intelligence is not skill, but decision-making. In the absence of intermediate decisions, the process would be predetermined --whether by Divine Decree or by the 'nature of things'--to move unerringly towards a fixed goal. Intelligence without will is meaningless. If there were no finite wills within the world, then the only admissible Intelligence would be that of the Prime Mover and this is a conclusion that evolutionists wish to avoid. The only alternative is to assume finite wills capable of making intelligent decisions. Since these wills preceded the appearance of man on the earth they cannot be regarded as human, and I have therefore called them by the old Greek name of Demiurges. I have given, in *The Dramatic Universe*, my reasons for concluding that Demiurgic Intelligence has guided the arising and evolution of life over the past three thousand million years. One consequence of this conclusion is that time scales must be ascribed to the Demiurgic Intelligences incomparably greater than those of our human experience and this is one of the main reasons why their operations are not easy for us to detect. The Demiurges are spiritual but natural beings operating within the constraints of rational laws.

According to the views developed in *The Dramatic Universe* there has been a gradual approach between the material and the spiritual elements in nature. The advent of man marked a decisive step in this approach. An even more decisive step came when creativity--until then the prerogative of the Demiurgic Intelligence--entered into man. For a long time the separation between the creative and non-creative elements was sharp; but gradually - probably by interbreeding - the creative character, spreading throughout and the new sub-species *Homo sap. sap.*, came to dominate and drove non-creative man out of the main areas of human activity.

Towards the end of the last glaciation, the creative explosion lost some of its force and the creative activity began to flow in new channels. There was an unmistakable falling-off from the height of the ice-age culture, that of the late Palaeolithic, to the time when the Neolithic began. There was a falling-off in the quality of art and apparently a dispersion of people.

It seems probable that creativity had not spread through all people. A comparatively small proportion of people Whom we look upon now as magicians, or shamans, seem to have acquired and known how to exercise this new power and did so in quite different ways; in ways that we should now perhaps call power politics, economics, artistic creativity. Others were perhaps actually concerned with the problems of the future, and foresaw the present needs of man some ten or eleven thousand years ahead. These workers for the future, seeing that something was not going quite right, set to work to study it.

The people who undertook this work must have been of a higher order of intelligence and understanding than we are. They were capable of thinking in terms of much longer time-cycles, and in fact were looking

forward several thousand years as to what would be required when human societies began to develop. They recognised that what was required was some kind of unifying or stabilizing attitude towards life: that is to say, a belief, or set of values, principles of living, that would go beyond the needs of food-gathering or the satisfaction of animal impulses.

It seems that those leaders who were aware of this gathered together groups — which may not have been very large, numbered in hundreds or at most thousands — and they retired to certain centres where the further development took place independently.

The evidence for the 'hypothesis that there were independent centres of development is of two kinds. The first is linguistic. One fact that is obvious to all of us is that the languages of Europe, Asia and Africa are extraordinarily different, so different that it is out of the question to ascribe them to a common origin. It is not only that the naming of objects was totally different, so that very few names or name-words are common, let us say, to the Indo-European languages, the Turanian languages, the African and the Semitic languages; but the actual modes of thought that entered into the formation of language were different. There was the kind of language that builds up an event rather than a combination of ideas. Those who created this kind of language — to be found in Chinese and the Finno-Ugrian and Turanian dialects — were concerned with displaying to one another different kinds of events. They created agglutinative languages or languages which were built up round an act. Our European languages are quite different, with their construction of sentences, which are alien to the other languages. We tend, because we have come to a position of dominance in the world, to impose our linguistic forms when we interpret languages totally alien to our own. We do not realise that sentences are characteristic of our Indo-European languages and do not occur elsewhere. We tend to make statements which we can recognise as true or false, or think we can. We tend to make our statements by connecting things and actions through sentences. But there are other languages where this mode of thought is not inherent in the language structure, where the words themselves are re-shaped in such a way as to convey the mode in which the action-root is being used. This characterises the Semitic-Hamitic languages with their bi- and triliteral roots and the ability that they have to express a whole range of modes—both of action and of experience and value by the changes that they produce in the relation of the letters that form the roots and by the use of the auxiliary voiced sounds that represent the different modes.

These differences are such that I would say it is impossible for anyone who studies them to hold that the great language systems could have evolved from some common linguistic stock. It is almost inevitable for one who studies the history of languages to come to the conclusion that these did not arise, as people commonly think, by unreflecting usage and by accretions of more and more forms, to satisfy the needs of the users. They were a creative work deliberately undertaken - not for the purpose of ordinary communication, but for a purpose connected with the beliefs and modes of thought of the people who created them.

If we look at the second element, the beliefs and modes of thought of people. we see again that these are very different for people belonging to the main linguistic groups. I do not believe that this can be accidental. The main theme that I want to put to you in this connection is that the general beliefs of mankind have developed from four sources. The first kind of belief is the animistic belief that there is a spiritual power that is independent, in some way, of the material substratum. There is a kind of anima, or soul, or breath, in everything that exists that enables it to be what it is. From animism comes the notion of the Great Spirit. This Great Spirit notion that there is some spiritual power that is impersonal and universal is common to a vast region from Central Asia to the Pacific and throughout the Americas. I refer to the time before the arrival of European immigrants in the Americas. The Far Eastern regions had in common one or another form of belief in the Great Spirit. This could take an extremely refined and philosophical form, as in the Chinese doctrine of Tao, or it could be a very crude kind of animism. It could be the notion of spiritual power with which it was possible to communicate and communicate in a special way; not in a personal

way, but through possession. This is the foundation of Shamanism, which holds that it is possible for certain people to be taken possession of by the spiritual power and so become the mediums for the expression of this power. It is interesting here to note, many thousands of years later, that this particular concept was responsible later for the greatest historical catastrophe, that is, the eruption of the Mongols from Central Asia in the 13th century. Ghengis Khan was himself not only a Shamanist, but relied entirely upon his Shaman for advice and guidance. How are we to say that the extraordinary achievements of Ghengis Khan, which are almost inexplicable, owed nothing to some spirit power that resided in his Shaman? We must not underrate this aspect of the Great Spirit notion which has been able to produce an extraordinary kind of ruthless power drive in the people who became possessed with it. Another example is to be seen in the Iroquois Indians of Canada, with their extraordinary endurance of suffering, their thirst for power, which at one time almost destroyed the attempts of the white people to colonise Canada. This also was associated with Shamanism. So this is the first concept of a source that, in the Far East, was a centre of development, linguistic and cultural in part, but mainly, connected with the development of the Great Spirit belief, and the use of this belief to produce a certain kind of social order.

The second region of development was in the Levant. One can almost say specifically that it was located in Asia Minor, where a characteristic concept of life was developed and also went back a very long way. This is what I call the Great Mother concept, the Earth Mother beliefs which were shared by people over a large region and continued to be shared until recent times. One of the oldest settlements where one can find a clear evidence of this is at the site of Catal Huyuk, which lies north of the Taurus mountains in Asia Minor. This city is about 8 to 9,000 years old and was clearly the centre of a Great Mother culture. An interesting feature of the Great Mother culture is that its main characteristic is social practicality, or interest in the social problems of man. It was in this area almost certainly that agriculture developed. It was certainly in this area that bronze and iron metallurgy developed. It is probably here that token trading developed. For example, the people in two or three areas where there were volcanoes, producing a high grade of obsidian, a kind of glass that can be chipped to produce tools of remarkable precision—even today people shave with obsidian razors.

There was a trade in obsidian instruments because they can be found as far south as Jericho down here, and they went right here into the Persian Gulf. The obsidian came from the Hasan Dag a hundred miles north, and there was also indication of trade in ceramics and also in grains for planting. By the sixth millennium B.C. they had already developed most of the grains that we now use. This is interesting for us because the development of technical skills, which formed one necessary part of the whole evolution of mankind over the centuries, did not arise in China, for example, until several millennia later. We are accustomed to associate China with high technical achievements, like printing and gunpowder and so on, but this occurred very much later than the technical achievements that we find in the regions of the Great Mother culture.

So far as I am able to see, there was no characteristic linguistic development. The Earth Mother people were not interested in the profound ideas that were associated with some of the other language systems. They were satisfied with their Mother Culture, which was not a universal culture. Mother Gods were local, but later the Mother Gods were assimilated to a single God for the purpose of unifying a larger society. Even so, people were satisfied with local Mothers to look after their problems, to provide them with a cult and also to sustain a matriarchal social system. The Mother Goddess was also Mother Earth. This gives us a consistent picture of the conditions required to permit concentration on improving the standard of living, as we should call it nowadays, on developing new techniques and new modes of life, and of stabilising the first urban societies. One of the remarkable things about some of the sites is that one can find whole villages that are seven or eight thousand years old without signs of weapons, and without signs that the inhabitants had to put up defensive walls to protect them from attack. Internecine conflicts began later, about the fifth millennium B.C., when the need for offence and defence showed itself in the Levant and

elsewhere. The antiquity of the early developments is fairly clearly established. They must have started not less than 10,000 years ago, and continued to develop actively more continuously than in any other part of the world.

Thus it comes that we find evidence of continuous culture occupation in regions over as much as six or seven thousand years - not at one single site, but in one single region. Stability and progress combined were the great achievements of the Great Mother culture.

We now come to the third source. I can only make a guess that the third centre was in Africa, possibly in Ethiopia, possibly in what is now Uganda. We know that during the Ice Ages, the tropics were much drier than they are now because there was much less water available. It may have been during this dry period that there were more habitable regions than there were later. Somewhere or other a culture developed and a language system was created which are quite different from anything that we have met with so far in our study. The sun was the decisive experience for man, living in tropical regions, and especially at times when rainfall was uncertain. The sun dominated everything. And from this dominant role of the sun in human life came a totally different notion of deity from the notion of the Great Spirit culture. This gave birth to the concept of a single creator, of a single power, of One Supreme Being. This Being was at first identified with the sun, but philosophically extended beyond this developed the notion of a Supreme Being in whose hands the entire creation was held. With this there developed a language system that slowly made its way northward. The Hamitic languages were indigenous to this region, but the culture made its way northward into Arabia and produced the Semitic culture.

I am making the assumption — for which I have given some evidence in *The Dramatic Universe* — that this system originated at the same period as the others, ten to twelve thousand years ago, and that it was the work of a creative centre which developed the cult and the belief surrounding the idea of one Supreme God, that is, of a monotheistic belief system. This did not prevent acceptance of intermediate powers, which later in Egypt came to be known as the Neter or Nature powers, and which were associated in some way as manifestations, or instruments of the Supreme Power, but never as independent gods. The most important character of this Supreme Being was the notion associated with it of divine omnipotence, of complete domination over the world. Any person who, in some way, became associated with the Supreme Being, as were the Pharaohs later in Egypt, also was endowed with this same halo of omnipotence and immortality, and held to stand totally apart from ordinary people.

The language system has the same characteristic. The Hamito-Semitic languages are based on the notion of an instrument which represents an action. The sounds that are put together are the sounds that express and produce an action, and it is the Supreme Power that makes the action possible. As in later Jewish and Islamic beliefs, no part of the creation has any independent power at all. Even the least action is nothing other than the manifestation of the Supreme Will operating through a particular instrument. This creates great philosophical difficulties but it is so ingrained in the Creator God notion that people accept the illogicality of attributing responsibility to man without admitting that man has any power of acting by himself. This is a legacy of the basic attitude towards life, which asserts that there is only one power to be taken into account; that is, the Creator God of whom the sun is the visible manifestation. The languages have the same kind of characteristic, that everything can be made to mean just what you choose to make it mean. This attitude can be detected in a pride in the power of words and the notion that words are themselves powerful in a way somewhat different from what I shall speak about when I come to the fourth group. About 10,000 years ago there developed a combination of beliefs, linguistic forms, cults and social organization all centering around the monotheistic belief, and with this also of course belief in absolute laws and total human dependence upon them.

Now we come to the fourth centre. This is what I shall call the Aryan culture. I personally accept the theory put forward by B. G. Tilak about eighty years ago that the Aryan culture originated in the Arctic Circle towards the end of the Ice Age. I think it is almost impossible to read Tilak's book *The Arctic Home in*

the Vedas and other studies of the same kind -- comparing them with the early scriptures and texts — and doubt that the people who wrote these early hymns, whether they are the Vedic or the Avestan hymns — those pre-Zoroastrian hymns that were subsequently taken into Zoroastrianism — were portraying the life of people who lived either within or very close to the Arctic Circle. They understood the notion of a six-months day and night; they had clearly the idea of the long dawns that are only found in the Arctic Circle, where the sun below the horizon goes round and the flush of the dawn is continuously present. Only those who have been in the Far North can have an idea of the strange feeling that is engendered in people when they see this circular movement of the dawn that is about to come. The melting of the snows, the liberation of the waters, which are constantly spoken of in the Vedas, are meaningless words for people living in a sub-tropical climate.

Without going into details, I must say that my own conviction is that there is something substantially true in the hypothesis that there was a centre of cultural creativity in the far north. Most of the theories about the origin of the Indo-European language system locate it somewhere in the region of the Urals. Not many authorities are prepared to place it further north. The Arctic origin of the Aryan culture is not essential for what I want to speak about; but if it is a correct picture, it seems to be very important. It means that when there was a breakdown, the great cultures that we know of in Western Europe, of the Magdalenian period and the parallel cultures of the Caspian region, moved northward in order to find a place where they could undertake the task of creating a new language and belief system. A very strange feature of this culture is that we find a totally different conception of God. He no longer remotely resembles the Creator God of the south, for He is God in trouble. All the way through: the Vedic and Avestan gods, the gods of the Greeks and the Norsemen, are gods in trouble. They have to surmount difficulties which they are not sure how to overcome. There is an atmosphere of *Gotterdammerung* throughout these beliefs and, with that, the feeling that it is necessary for man in some way to co-operate with God or the gods in order to avert the dangers that threaten.

This is why sacrifice is introduced, and the explanation is actually given in the Vedas and other old hymns, that by this means the return of the sun, and liberation of the waters is made possible. The great horse sacrifice, for example, is wholly designated for this purpose. This attitude towards deity is obviously natural in northern countries where life is so uncertain. There must always have been a yearly terror that the spring would not come in time to save the people from starvation. Indeed, it did not always come in time to save them, when the melting of the waters was prolonged too late and the foodstuffs gave out. One can understand that people would feel that it is necessary to do something to ensure that the Bright God, representing the sun who had been imprisoned in the dark regions, should be liberated and that the monster or serpent who had been imprisoning him should be overcome. From this it is an easy step to the idea that the god sacrifices himself to save the life of the world. Indra and the other early Vedic gods were depicted as somehow being prepared to sacrifice themselves. In later myths, we see Siva, who turned blue from having drunk the poison which would otherwise have destroyed the world. There are ancient myths that there is a grave danger threatening all life and that this grave danger can only be averted by some kind of sacrifice that will turn the scale. This idea was brought into more specific form later, in Zoroastrianism, with the notion of the Saoshyant, the redeemer who was to come and save mankind. Of course, we can see in this a precursor of the Christian belief in the Incarnation.

But the interesting and important thing to my mind is to recognize that these two beliefs: belief in the gods in trouble, the gods that require to sacrifice, that require human help; and the other belief in the one supreme, immortal, omnipotent god, the sun, Ra, could not have developed side by side. They are so contradictory to one another that they had to be developed in isolation. And yet both of them represent some profound need of man: he needs to be able to believe both that there is a Supreme power and also that there is a Supreme Hazard. If man turned his attention only to the supreme power then he expects everything from that and he becomes inert, as it sometimes has been the case with people in the Creator

God region. The belief in Kismet or the inescapability of fate is associated with the same thing. Man needs the other view. He is aware that life is hazardous, he is aware that his own existence is uncertain and that his food-supply is uncertain and that life itself is a problem. Therefore he cannot feel at home with a situation where his god has no concern with problems and hazards. But he does feel at home with the conviction that his problems are shared by a compassionate deity who is willing to take His own part in the sacrifice. He is also acutely aware that salvation is a group activity dependent upon co-operation between the lesser and greater powers. I think you will agree that we can recognize beliefs of this very kind all the way, from the sagas and the Norse legends right through to the Vendidad and the Vedas, that is, in all that we regard as Aryan culture. They are all unmistakably associated with a language form; namely, the inflected or Indo-European group of languages, all of which originated from a single source.

Looking at the map, we can recognize that Northern Siberia is the most natural centre of diffusion. The Indo-Iranians went South and East. The Greeks and Latins South and West. The Norsemen, Slavs and Celts turned to the West. All would spread in these different directions and bring with them a certain system of beliefs and a certain kind of language. These beliefs and these languages are so extraordinarily similar, even to the obvious identity of names, from the Norsemen to the Vedas, that I think no scholar doubts that they had a common origin. They form such a consistent, well-conceived structure that I think one must also accept — what is perhaps more difficult for some people — that this must have been the outcome of a creative undertaking that occupied perhaps two or three thousand years.

But why should it have been undertaken? What were people trying to do? The proposition that I would put to you here is the recognition that a human society that would be viable and capable of development cannot be formed without a common and accepted value-system, or set of beliefs. These cannot develop without adequate instruments 'of communication; including a high level language in which deep notions can be adequately spoken about. Therefore, the parallel development of language, beliefs and social customs is a natural process.

We must also take into account that the people who participated in this did not at the start enjoy any high level of culture—probably far from it. Only relatively small groups had this high level of culture and their problem was to do what we nowadays call 'motivate'; that is, to develop in the ordinary people a desire to master higher language forms and higher beliefs and thought structures. For this they needed to acquire ascendancy over the ordinary people. One can see how this happened in the north. The belief was spread that without sacrifices, without the rituals, there would be a danger that the spring would not return, and therefore that the wise men who could perform these sacrifices were essential to the welfare of the community. They had their own language. There are still in remote places ritual languages preserved from the general people who use another kind of language. In some of the Polynesian Islands this division between the ritual language and the common language continues to our time. This is probably how it was in each of these cases. I am not referring only to the Aryan culture, where the need for ritual and for magicians was explained in terms of the obligation to assure the return of the sun. In dry regions there is a need, equally essential, to assure the return of the rain, to propitiate the destructive force of the sun and assure that the rivers were flooded in due season. There is also the need to be filled with the power of the Great Spirit in order to hold together the migrating nomad groups of Central Asia and the Far East. There was also the need for these local, much more restricted and specialised Great Mother cults to give each of the city states a sense of their own identity, almost a brand name for their trading: "We are selling you obsidian from Mother Mountain, the best obsidian there is." It is worth mentioning that one of the wall paintings discovered at Catal Huyuk was of Hasan Dag in eruption: an event that has not occurred for seven thousand years. It must have produced quantities of high grade obsidian.

About 7,000 years ago there began to be great migrations and diffusions. This was due partly to the climatic changes that occurred then. This was a period of dry heat which, although favourable in many respects, resulted also in the great winds which produced the Sahara and the central Asian deserts. The

Polar Regions became uninhabitable and people from all of these cultures, except the Great Mother culture, began to migrate. There were movements from North to South. The African culture moved north, entered into Egypt and set in motion the developments that led to pre-dynastic Egypt. The Great Spirit people moved into the Pacific and also over into America through the Northern land passage. These Great Spirit people moved downwards through the Americas and reached Peru. Most important was the migration of the Aryan people which went south, south-east, south-west and west. When these different cultures began to come into contact, there must have been a great effervescence. Astonishing ideas met one another. From this, came the great diversification and also the possibility of much larger, bolder undertakings, particularly the undertakings that were concerned with the development of the great river cultures. The river civilizations arose during this period.

After this period of diffusion and migration, which lasted more than two thousand years, and resulted in more composite, less rigid modes of thought and social forms, but also in quite considerable breakdowns, no doubt, there followed what I have called the Exoteric Epoch, the fourth cycle.

I must digress to explain what I mean by 'Epoch'. For reasons I have developed elsewhere, I reached the conclusion many years ago that human life has been dominated over long periods of time by different basic value-systems. These basic systems, or attitudes towards the aim and purpose of our existence, are so universally accepted that contrary views are rejected without thought. I believe that we can distinguish six such epochs since the end of the last Ice Age.

I Epoch of Withdrawal. 12,500-10,000 B.P. The period when the great cultures were founded by isolated communities. The Master Idea was that of Higher Wisdom, on which the people depend.

II Epoch of Diffusion. 10,000-7,500 B.P. This period was characterized by the desire for change. Nomadic herdsmen, agricultural innovation, migration of peoples, interpenetration of cultures made this a period of restless search for new ways of life. The Master Idea was that of search and innovation.

III Epoch of Settlement. 7,500-5,000 B.P. Occupation of river valleys. Development of a three-level society. Emergence of city states. Invention of writing and other arts appropriate for settled communities. The Master Idea was that of the middle class.

IV Hemitheandric Epoch. 5,000-2,500 B.P. Dynastic period in Egypt. India and Mesopotamia. The Heroic Age. First empires. Codification of laws. The Master Idea was that of the superman as incarnation of the gods.

V Megalanthropic Epoch. 2,500-100 B.P. Founding of the revealed religions all tending to exalt the human person. Humanism emerges as a dominant value system. The Master Idea was that of man the master.

The later Epochs come within the periods which Dr. Krejei will examine with us, but I have included them for the sake of completeness. Our immediate concern is with the transition from a two-level society in which there was an unbridged gap between the magicians or initiates and the common people to the three-level society which included a middle class in which creativity was exercised in the search for improved conditions of existence.

This search led to the externalization of knowledge and techniques. During this time, writing began to develop, and people were shown and used a whole variety of practical techniques which resulted in the formation of a new middle class. A typical three-class type of society is that of the Vedas, where the Brahmin caste, having the exclusive knowledge of the way in which rituals should be carried out, were separated from the practical or Vaishya caste, whose function it was to handle all the technical requirements of the society. They in turn stood apart from the people who had not been initiated into any

kind of technique, the Shudra caste. There were also warriors forming a group necessary for defence. During this Epoch societies began to emerge which had provided the division of labour needed for the first organization of city-states and stable agricultural communities. From these small centres there began to come the concentration into states that were held together by a general cultural community and some form of authority.

For example, there was the transition from the pre-dynastic to the dynastic period in Egypt; there was the appearance of the large cultural areas in Mesopotamia and India and so on, and the arising of the cultural groupings in Europe. So this is the beginning of an economic society with the use of money as the medium of exchange, and from that the transition to the hero-period.

The heroic or hemitheandric period was the final development of the notion that it is necessary for mankind to have an effective means of communicating with the higher powers, and this effective means can only be if the divine power were to enter fully into a human person. One form was the Shaman, who was temporarily invested with the spiritual power. In another form it was the Pharaoh who was himself the incarnation of the deity. Egyptian incarnation was quite different from the notion of the Aryans of the god who, like Mithra, incarnated so that he could be sacrificed in order to save the world.

That period saw the origin of religion, like Mithraism, let us say, or the Egyptian notion of the Pharaoh cult, and the great law-givers like Manu, the great heroes like Gilgamesh, all of whom, at the early stages, made it possible for comparatively large regions, like the whole Nile delta or a great part of Mesopotamia, and similar regions in India, to form great cultural units.

That brings me to the end of the period I want to talk about, but before I leave this subject I want to point out that by the time we are speaking of now there was already a strong interpenetration of these different streams of culture, and it is even quite remarkable that it is still possible to trace them back to their origins. The Theogony of Hesiod provides an instructive picture of the interaction of the Creator God, the Saviour God and the Great Mother cultures. The poet cannot recognize the way these should coalesce. This shows how very strongly each of these streams had developed its own identity, its own ethos, its own set of beliefs and, what is perhaps even more fundamental than that, a specific way in which the human mind worked. One of our great difficulties is that we find it almost impossible to realize that there are great groups of people whose mental processes are very different from our own, even today, after there has been such a considerable blending of cultures. It was almost impossible for the French, when they went into Canada, to understand how it was possible that the Iroquois and the other Indian tribes could look on human life as they did. How was it possible that they had an attitude towards suffering that was diametrically opposed to what the Europeans thought of the significance of suffering. Suffering was deliberately administered and accepted as a necessary part of the transformation of man, as a condition for entering into the 'Long House' of immortality. The modes of thought of the Iroquois and other Indian groupings were so strangely different, chiefly because of their beliefs and languages; but it was also influenced by something else, to a very long mental formation in which the notion that the reality of man is the Great Spirit power and that his body had no real importance.

What mattered to the American Indian was the possibility of being re-assimilated into the universal spirit power, where he would again be able to exercise all his bodily functions because they were quite adventitious. This kind of attitude prevailed also in China, where we can observe the total inability of the Europeans and the Chinese to understand one another. For example, the Jesuits gained an enormous prestige on the strength of their technical knowledge in China, and in spite of this their missionary effort failed completely for one reason only: complete inability to understand how the Chinese value system was rooted in Great Spirit beliefs.

I have spoken about this persistence of forms of thought, which I think can only be explained by saying that they originated and developed in such a way that they became almost atavistic, they were actually built-in so that generation after generation could pass and something remained of this kind of attitude to

life. We are still, to this very day, confronted with world problems that arise from causes that originated eight or ten thousand years ago.

Discussion

Q. Was nothing similar happening in South America?

J.G.B. Clearly there was an Andean centre of culture, and I think it is very, very ancient: but this Seminar is confined to the Eurasian-African complex. It would be possible to speak of the whole world complex and include the Andes and Central America. I do not pretend to understand how the Andean culture developed. I cannot make up my mind, for example, whether it was autochthonic, developing within the country, or whether it was brought from the West. The North-American culture was clearly dominated by the Great Spirit beliefs; but in South America we find something that is much closer to what occurred in North Africa. How is it that they had the same sort of creator sun god belief there? In it merely a matter of climatic condition that what would arise on the Equator would arise in any such region? The objection to this is that nothing of the kind occurred in South-East Asia and Australasia although there were similar climatic conditions.

Q. Do you accept a transatlantic communication in early periods?

J.G.B. There have been various experiments to demonstrate it was possible, with primitive shipping, to get across both North and South Atlantic, so that one can account for similarity by diffusion. It is strange that we should find such an extraordinary high level of culture in the Andes and no corresponding development on the west coast of South America, in Brazil or the Argentine. If it came through that way, how is it that something was not left on the West? There is no evidence, as far as I know, that there was an Amazonian culture like those of the Nile, the Blue River, or the Indus.

Q. Were they Indians? Or were they some other race?

J.G.B. The question of race is one that I have not discussed. Cultural streams are not racial streams. It is fairly certain that there were migrations from the north, and the American Indians seem to have blood groups in common with the Eskimos: but it does not follow that cultural connection is the same as racial identity.

Dr. K. It seems that at the beginning the racial and linguistic groups were identical, but during different migrations the racial features mixed much more than the linguistic elements. Culture was stronger to persist because the people had to live together and had to adapt a common means of understanding. This was primarily the language, and hence a connected way of thinking and evaluating, not physical features of the human body. So the result was that the races are more mixed than the cultures.

J.G.B. I entirely agree with that.

Q. Have you been able to form any hypothesis about where two or more of these basic four groups met and interacted. If so, which basic culture pattern tended to dominate?

J.G.B. I should think that the region called Turkestan or in older times Chorasnia has been cross-roads in the migration routes for more than eight thousand years. At the time of Zoroaster there was already an ancient culture in Bactria. The city of Balkh was an ancient and notable city five thousand years ago. Another region is the Caucasus. Many hordes were attracted to this corridor through the mountains. One of the most remarkable contacts occurred in Babylon, at the time of the Jewish captivity, when the Jews, who had derived their earlier beliefs from Egyptian monotheism, suddenly found themselves in contact with Saviour-God beliefs and acquired the notions developed by the later Isaiah. The account in Genesis of

the creation by the Elohim betrays a Great Spirit origin. The legends of the flood belong to the Aryan tradition; but even more so the doctrine of the Messiah to come. These beliefs appear to have entered into the Jewish scriptures after the captivity in Babylon. As a result of this interaction, the Jewish people have had a very extraordinary destiny. They seem to have collected something from all three traditions excluding only the Great Mother. They may have been a kind of exception to the rule, in as much as they seem to have a certain ethnic continuity and a cultural discontinuity. Their culture undoubtedly changed radically, although they claim that it has been continuous. This is a very controversial question which we have no time to discuss adequately.

Dr. K. I don't think that they changed more than, for instance, the Indian or Chinese cultures. Within their continuity, there is also a good deal of cultural change.

J.G.B. I agree. My point is that, although undoubtedly there must have been a certain break in the ethnic continuity, but in fact the cultures did penetrate and act on one another.

Until the third millennium B.C., the Great Spirit culture predominated in Dravidian India. The late arrival of the Aryan culture produced the contrast of the Vedic hymns with their emphasis on sacrifice and the Great Spirit notion of the Supreme Self. Brahminism shows the results -of this interpenetration. Buddhism, which arose a thousand years later, is in some respects a reversion to the Great Spirit culture and a rejection of the Saviour God notion in favour of something more like Tao. That is why Buddhism was able to move to the North, and was so easily assimilated by Great Spirit people but rejected by Aryan India.

Dr. K. The pre-Vedic period is something we do not know much about. We have only a slight knowledge about the spiritual outlook of the proto-Indic people, but what we know shows that it was quite another culture than the Indo-Vedic culture. Then Buddhism is something different and Hinduism also. There are four subsequent culture formations which are perhaps connected also with ethnic and racial changes as well, because of the mixing of people of different races, of different languages and of different cultural heritage. But why they produce these changes, why Buddhism is succeeded by Hinduism, this is a very complicated problem.

Q. How were the Greek and Latin languages formed?

J.G.B. These languages were probably influenced by borrowing from the Great Mother culture. People who were dependent upon their horses developed different words from those more used to sea transport. This led to different linguistic developments and certain different results in characteristic social types. You know Frédéric Le Play's work: *Comment la Route crée Le Type Social?* His notion of the effect of the migration route, both on the language and on the social form, must be taken into account. But it is a second order effect; the Greeks, Romans, Celts, Norsemen, people had much more in common with one another, not only in their language but also in their belief system and modes of thought than they have for instance, with the Chinese and the Turkish peoples.

Q. I mean, from which of the root languages do they come?

J.G.B. From the Indo-European. Greek is very similar to old Persian. It is easy to form a family tree of this language. It is not so easy to reconstruct the original Aryan tongue. Many attempts have been made to get back to what was the proto Indo-European language. It was once said to lie between Sanskrit and Lithuanian. People realise nowadays that it is not so simple as that. The reason why it is not so simple is that the time-scales are greater than people have supposed. People generally think that these languages have developed in the last four or five thousand years, but I believe it has taken ten thousand. If so, the original Indo-European is much further away. Just as it is probable that the original Semitic language is

much further away. The earliest known no proto-Egyptian, which has a higher proportion of bi-literal roots than Hebrew and Arabic: but even so it is probably five thousand years from its origin.

Dr. K. I think there were two contradictory trends in the development of language. There seems to have prevailed a continuous differentiation until the historic period. Since then there is another trend towards the unification which results from cultural and political influences. This starts, for instance, in Mesopotamia with the emergence of the Akkadian language, which was for a long time the common language of the whole Mesopotamian area. It is the same with Sanskrit in India, or Mandarin Chinese in China, Phoenician, Greek, Latin and so on. These are the languages of either strong political powers or culturally very influential ethnic groups. Both these countervailing trends are continuous. For instance, in Europe you can follow this development. The Slavonic languages differentiated until the present century, forming distinct literary languages, the last instance being White-Russian and Macedonian. In the Low Countries, the separation of Dutch and Flemish, in Scandinavia of Norwegian and Danish are similar examples. The opposite tendency prevailed in France and in Italy. Quite considerable linguistic differences were overcome by forming a common literary language. The same occurred in Germany. I think that both the opposite processes of differentiation and unification became, in Europe, largely stabilized with the 19th century. Since then there is rather the trend for purification which prevails. On the other hand, in the 20th century new literary languages were formed from spoken dialects, for instance, in Soviet Russia.

J.G.B. It has been happening in the Far East also. The Malays and the Indonesians have developed new literary languages. At the origin is a very simple language; the Malays have had to borrow from Arabic and Sanskrit to get abstract words.

Dr. K. Despite of several languages with old literary tradition such as Javanese or Sundanese, the Malay dialect was accepted as literary Indonesian—Bahasa Indonesia—for the whole Indonesian republic. Here, I think that the process of differentiation is coming to an end and the process of unification is getting stronger.

J.G.B. It is partly connected with the change in the use of language. Where language was essentially cultural and was required in order to maintain the precise needs of the rite then language had to maintain its identity and its sacred character, as Latin has done for Western Christianity, until recent times. But when it becomes demotic the unity breaks down by interpenetration of cultures and then a new unification, a new stabilisation comes from a different kind of need: that of political and economic communication.

Dr. K. I think this hypothesis might explain, in the long run, the opposing trends in language formation.

The other question is, What are the reasons for the fluctuations in high and low cultures? It is a very complex phenomenon. Mr. Bennett rightly pointed to the human creativity as being at the bottom of the origin. There is a certain rhythm which I shall discuss later. The reasons are in Toynbee's view the challenges and responses; the responses in their turn can be creative only if a favourable combination of factors occur. This latter idea was elaborated both by Toynbee and by Sorokin.

In general it may be inferred that a favourable combination of factors include especially: biological vitality, a certain social mobility (both vertical and horizontal), certain tolerance, freedom of expression, and an adequate stimulation, either from within or from outside.

J.G.B. We have concentrated upon the linguistic element in culture. I hope that we shall be able to give equal attention to the basic value systems including, where appropriate, the religious beliefs. In principle there are two kinds of motivation in human life: the satisfaction of needs and desires and the pursuit of

aims and objectives regarded as valid independent of human needs and desires. We need to make up our minds as to the relative contributions these two kinds of motivation have made to the sociological evolution of mankind over the past ten thousand years. I hope that Dr. Krejčí will pursue this theme in the next session.

SOCIO-CULTURAL FORMATIONS

Dr. Krejčí

I have to thank Mr. Bennett for giving me the inspiration to go beyond my field of study. Until now I had limited my studies to historical periods of societal development and he broadened my horizon far into pre-history and, in doing so, provided me with a missing link in my theory. This was done by his theory which he expounded this morning. He explained when, probably, and how, the different focuses of civilizations and their development arose. I will perhaps have an opportunity to come back to his special theme in expounding my own theory.

Now, what concerns my own theory? I started from another angle, from the present time, from my country, from Central Europe, from the 20th century. However, because I found no answer to the great and most difficult actual problems within the scope of this century, and less within my country and even Europe as a whole, I slowly expanded my interest to the whole world and until the beginnings of historical time, until what Mr. Bennett calls the Hemitheandric Period.

I did not go further back. But what I discovered was that the greatest differences, the most important differences between people are not those of economic standard, of race, of social status, but of the manner of thinking and evaluating. This is what enables you to understand anybody else. If you speak with anyone who has another manner of thinking and evaluating you cannot come to terms with him. This I do not know from books only but also from my own experience in life. I was not only a research worker, I was a civil servant, a university teacher, a manual worker and prisoner; I learnt to see life from different angles. I spoke with different people from different realms, and what divided us most was a different manner of thinking and evaluating. I understand very well a worker whose reasoning was on a common sense basis, but I didn't understand anybody from my own class, of my own education, who had doctrinarian approach, who held that only one idea is right, only one creed is correct and everything else is wrong or even sinful.

Projected into the broader context of history and of the world we can see in different parts of the world and in different epochs a different approach to life, different modes of thinking and different modes of evaluating. I find correct the idea of plurality of civilization which divides the world and its history.

In the second half of the 19th century only the world seemed to be tending towards one civilization. The old socio-cultural differences seemed to be gradually overcome by common economic problems becoming more and more dominant. The idea that economic life formed the basis of the societal structure, whilst political and cultural life together formed the superstructure, spread during the second half of the 19th century. This opinion must in particular have been held by people living in this country because the economic problems to a large extent formed its policy. But the twentieth century showed that there are not so much economic problems which divided the world as the problems of power interests which, especially in the second world-war, became decisive. Also the subsequent differences between East and West and later on also between particular groups within these parts of the world are so far not of a mainly economic nature. The whole socio-cultural heritage of the past, with its different mental bents and power interests, is accumulated in them. -

In the 19th century we experience a phenomenon which was almost approaching an apogee, the phenomenon which I would call Europeanism. As Droysen once coined the word Hellenism for a period

when Hellenic culture spread to the Levant, and left a superstructure over the different Levantine civilizations, so now, starting from the 16th century, Europe gradually covered all the world with a net of economic and political institutions and also tried to introduce her culture to the other civilizations. At the beginning of the present century this trend seemed to be victorious all over the world. Not only European technology and economic organization but also political institutions and also cultural forms were spreading widely throughout those countries which, until then, revealed the most independent outlook. However, later on, especially after the Second World War, despite the continuing unifying trend of technology, the world looks more and more spiritually divided.

At first it seemed to be the division between the capitalist and socialist camps, both headed by originally European nations. Later on, as the non-European nations were emancipated, it became progressively more clear that most of them are inclined to retain at least a part of their socio-cultural heritage. Even if they attempted a thorough-going reconstruction and accepted some of the European ideologies, they did it whilst displaying their particular mental bents and proclivities so that the originally European ideology acquired a quite distinct outlook. This happened also within Europe itself, the division of which into the West and East by far surpassed the differences of mere socio-economic systems.

I shall touch on this topic later on. In this context, I wanted only to show that the plurality of socio-cultural formations (civilizations) all over the world is not matter of history only.

Having shown how the topic under discussion is also relevant to the present time, and in so doing helped, I hope, to explain my starting point, I can return to our historical review and link up with Mr. Bennett's opening exposé.

As you know, before the dawn of history there were about three great glaciation periods and people were obliged to change homes, settlements, or hunting places. In the glaciation periods mankind was divided by ranges of high mountains covered with ice and in post-glaciation periods by higher seas resulting from melting ice; both in different ways hampered human contact, providing suitable conditions for the differentiation of societal development. During the last glaciation period (approximately between 10000 and 8000 ac.) it is widely assumed that the languages arose, and I agree with Mr. Bennett that in the same period the principal foci of different socio-cultural orientation of mankind developed. I cannot say, at the present stage of my study, whether these are just the four that Mr. Bennett has described; probably they were, but my study has not gone so far. What seems to be certain, however, is that in what Mr. Bennett calls the Hemitheandric epoch, nature provided men with a new challenge. Large stretches of land in sub-tropic regions started to desiccate and people were forced to go to the river valleys and to discover another way of living. This was the challenge which was appreciated in Toynbee's work, that the people had three possibilities: either to move away and to keep to their way of life, or to stay in the same place and change their habits, or to move away to change their habitat as well as their way of life. This was the most creative response, because it gave birth to the so-called potamic or, as Wittfogel puts it, hydraulic civilizations. Thus, in the second half of the fourth millennium B.C. two civilizations developed, to a large extent independently: in the Nile valley and in the Euphrates and Tigris valleys. These are the first civilizations of the world. About 3000 B.C. we have some evidence of incipient Sumeric civilization in Mesopotamia and of pre-dynastic civilization in Egypt. (In dating, I keep to the so-called short chronology which is the most recent one and seems to be best supported by archaeological evidence). Later on, during the second quarter of the third millennium B.C., another 'hydraulic' civilization, that in the Indus valley, originated followed, in the first half of the second millennium, by another civilization of this type in the Yellow River valley in China. Meanwhile, another new focus of civilizational development arose, this time not in a valley where people from desiccating areas took refuge, but on the islands in the Aegean.

So we can list, in the old world (i.e. with exclusion of Americas) five focuses of civilizational development, Mesopotamia, Egypt, Indus Valley, Aegean, and Yellow River Valleys. Of these, two—the Mesopotamian and Egyptian—came in touch very soon; there was an interplay, a lively contact between them. As I have

shown in the last issue of *Systematics*, after 3000-4000 years these two areas eventually became united under the Late Islamic civilization. So, in the second millennium A.D., they merged into one civilizational area—the Levant. The other civilizational areas remained independent until the 19th century A.D., when they were all assaulted by modern European civilization.

What is very interesting in this whole development is that there is a certain continuity and a certain rhythm of change. These are, in my opinion, the most important regularities which can be discovered in the whole historical period.

I think I should first speak about this rhythm of development. We cannot say that one civilization must die before the other can originate; living and dying of human communities are interconnected phenomena; one civilization goes over to the other continuously. I have shown it in the chart in the last issue of *Systematics*; here I can repeat only the basic idea.

I conceive civilization as a social-cultural formation; as a society which has a common manner of thinking and evaluating, a common way of life, common artistic expression and common symbols.

Now we are living in a period of transition; it is not an epoch of one distinct civilization, characterised by the unity of the above-mentioned features. There are only certain periods in the life of civilizations when this unity of thinking and evaluating can be detected, when it can be clearly observed. These are, in my terminology, classic periods of a particular civilization, where everything that is done is dominated by this common spirit.

If you look back, for instance, to the twelfth century of Western Europe, you will see that no discipline of art, no book, no aim, no popular festivities could be conceived otherwise than in a certain manner of a certain type of Christianity. This was the classic period of the society in Western Europe which I will call Latin Christian Civilization. Almost every civilization has such a classic period.

Assuming that a civilization attains its full integrating strength in only one period of its life, this can be styled as its classic period. What precedes it is a foundation period, during which the elements of the old civilization are for the most part hidden under the still dominant remains of the old civilization whose integrating force is, however, on the decline as signs of recession from its traditional values and beliefs begin to appear. From the point of view of the old civilization this is the recession period, from the point of view of the new one, the heroic phase heroism being understood as a new appreciation of traditional values, a bold but not yet successful attempt to put a new spirit into both the transcendent needs and the human relations of society. The 'heroes' may lose their cause for the time being, but followers inspired by their work succeed in due time in building the institutions prerequisite to the new spiritual integration of the society. These then become founders of a new civilization, and the period of their successful activity is the foundation phase of the civilization in question. This period coincides as a rule with what can be styled the fatal period of the former civilization. Classic phases are the periods of complete integration; all others are the periods of transition.

This conforms with the principle of dialectic, formulated by Gurvitch, who speaks about structuration, de-structuration and re-structuration. Heroic and Foundation phases are a structuration, Recession and Fatal phases are de-structuration, but in my concept, both structuration and de-structuration are simultaneous. The old will be de-structured and life new re-structured or, with respect to socio-cultural formations, better to say disintegrated and reintegrated.

In the ancient Chinese annals there is a good name for this double character of an epoch: Spring and Autumn period (771-479 B.C.). Autumn may be equalled with the Recession and Fatal phases of the old civilization, Spring with the Heroic and Foundation periods of the new civilization. The Chinese in those days were, perhaps, aware of the fact that simultaneously something dies out and something is born. This dual character of most epochs is what makes obscure the trend of development.

We are now just in such a double-character epoch, and therefore the analysis is so difficult. We understand that Latin Christianity is passing away - I lay the stress on Latin, not on Christianity — and

something new is being born, and if by the rhythm of change should continue with the same velocity, with the same wave-length of individual phases, we shall come approximately around 2000 A.D. to the classic period of the new civilization.

However, as the scheme which I have drawn earlier is not valid without exception, the contemporary period of transition can be either prolonged, or end with the collapse of integrative forces.

As in most transition periods, there are five tendencies competing. One is the tendency to decadence, which is the worst one. Then there is the tendency to retain whatever can be preserved — the conservation tendency. Another tendency is towards renaissance, aiming at coming back to some former stage, to resuscitate a more valuable past; it may be even that of an older civilization. Often foreign influence takes place and a receptive tendency starts in. However, the most edifying is the reconstruction tendency, where from one's own roots one tries to bring about something new. If the reconstruction tendency succeeds, then only the normal trend of development as scheduled in my scheme takes place.

However, it can happen that neither in the recession, nor in the fatal phase, does any trace of a new creation appear. This is an ominous sign testifying that there is something wrong with the society in question. Such a society may easily become prey of another civilization which may thus expand its own area. This happened, e.g., in the seventh century Iran, where the native Late Mazdaic civilization did not find enough internal strength to bring about a reconstruction on lines proposed alternatively by Mani and Mazdak, and the Iranic society became victim of Muslim conquest which, during the following five centuries, was followed by a wholesale absorption to the Levant-wide Islamic civilization. If there is no such conquest, resulting in an assimilation of conquered society, the reconstruction may happen at a later stage, it may start in the fatal phase of the old civilization only. Then the heroic stage coincides with the fatal stage, the foundation stage with the residual stage of the old civilization. In addition to that, the foundation phase may be largely protracted. This happened in Mesopotamia, when the Mezzo-Gilgamic (Sumero-Akkadian) civilization transformed itself, under the impact of foreign invasions, to the Neo-Gilgamic (Assyro-Chaldaeo-Elamite) civilization. As this example shows, a foreign conquest need not bring about an incorporation of the conquered country to an alien civilization. This is most often the case when people on a lower stage of development, as nomads, invade the territory and make only a break in its civilizational development; (this I call invasion interlude). Either they are ousted, as were for instance the Hyksos from Egypt, or the Mongols from China, and the civilization succeeds in catching up with its former development, in which circumstances the classical age may be repeated a second time, or the intruders are absorbed and a new civilization develops, as was the mentioned case in Mesopotamia; the invaders stayed and the civilization had to take account of these new people and absorb them. However, the reconstruction itself does not mean that the normal development is safeguarded. It may be not sufficiently sustained to attain the thorough-going integration of the society in question, i.e., to reach the classic phase. This happened, e.g., to the Early Mazdaic civilization, which after a brilliant ascent during the 6th and 5th centuries B.C., lost momentum and was superseded by the Late Hellenic intrusion which, however, in its turn proved to be no more successful in the spiritual integration of the Levantine' area'.

So, the regularity is not so strict, but there may happen several exceptions; there could be an additional stage (residual phase) of the dying civilization, there could be an invasion interlude, and a civilization can break down before attaining the classic age. With these reservations in mind, you may accept this model as an indicator for the present day development, too.

With the help of this model, I also try to explain the historical development in the whole world, century after century, country after country. I do not want to omit any country having history, or any period of this history. With the exception of the Pre-Columbian Americas, the study of which is still before me, historical development of all other parts of the world has already been examined. Step by step with the results of this examination I adapted my scheme to the empirical analysis so that it has acquired this elastic character fitting well to the facts.

So, for the dynamic part of the model. I think I will stop for a while to give opportunity for questions; I would only like to stress that all this model must be viewed on very broad lines, as a tool of a very long-term analysis and in view of all possible alternatives. Every civilizational pedigree can have a different course. The chain of civilizations can be very diversified; it is not necessary that it be a straight line according to the discussed model, it can take on many alterations, but in principle the main phasing is always kept.

J.G.B.: When you have an entire chain like that, what makes it a chain is the basic value system and modes of thought. These may be a debased or successful or unsuccessful: but whether it is in a state of degeneration, or something, this is the common thing that makes it one civilization. If you change a civilization, the change is a change of value-systems.

Dr. K.: The change of the manner of thinking and evaluating may be of different intensity, therefore, I make a difference between civilizations and their groups of pedigrees. Greater difference is found between pedigrees than between individual civilizations within these pedigrees. What makes the unity of the whole pedigree is a certain, almost constant mental bent; only changing slightly, and in a very long time. It is characteristic for the whole civilizational area for the most part of its history. From this point of view, the whole old world may be divided into four main areas; The Levant, Southern Asia, Europe and the Far East.

In the Levant, God was, as a rule, the centre of the community. He was the law-giver and supreme owner of all the land. The ruler was either his incarnation or his plenipotentiary, or his high priest. Throughout all its history, the Levant always remained faithful to the concept of personal god. The trend of development was towards monotheism. This characteristic feature of the Levantine cultural tradition may be labelled as theocentrism and the Levant may be characterised as having the theocentric mental bent.

On the other hand, in India, already in the Vedic epoch, there is something more powerful than gods, i.e., the rightly-pronounced formula or mantra; there prevailed the conviction that the rightly-used formula had in itself the power to bring about certain results. In Egypt it was necessary, by a right formula, to convince, to persuade God, that the man in question had not committed any sin. In Mesopotamia it was necessary to lure, to gain the favour of God, whereas in India, God's will was not so important as the rightly-pronounced formula itself.

This produced a favourable climate to develop ideas on the impersonality of God, which is perhaps the utmost form of Mr. Bennett's Great Spirit. In India this found its outlet in the cosmic principle of Brahman to which corresponds the psychic principle of Atman. Connection of individual souls with Atman is often explained by the simile of sparks (souls) flowing out of a fire (atman) and falling back into it.

The idea of impersonal transcendency is still more developed with Buddhism. In Buddhism the most important element is the spiritual strength of man, how to overcome the obstacles of life, how to overcome the bodily pains and sorrows, how to get rid of the chain of incarnations and to attain the blissful stage of Nirvana. This is the stage, not of death, but of non-causality, non-relativity, or unification of the individual soul with the essence of the universe by the strength of spirit as given by the example of Buddha. Buddhahood is the highest attainable aim to man; on the other hand, man only is able to attain it; not gods who, being more ethereal beings than man, were thought to be incapable of spiritual exercise.

Then, after Buddhism receded in India, gods again re-emerged into the fore of social life, but never attained the predominant position as in the Levant. They were always thought to be lower emanations of the cosmic principle, Brahman. This kept his role of highest principle even if its importance dwindled in practical worship. However, the strongest religious minds abode by the principle of superiority of Brahman. For instance, Ramakrishna and his pupil Vivekananda attempted to attain Nirvana through yogistic concentration combined with different channels of adoration, even by means of the non-Hindu religious imagination. Identifying themselves with Vishnu or Shiva, with the goddess Durga, or identifying themselves with Muhammad or Christ, they always aimed at the state of impersonal Brahman, the highest principle of universe.

What I wanted to demonstrate is that already since the Vedic period the stress was laid more on some form of an idea, either in a formalised or later on in a more spiritualised, contemplative or concentrative way. This attitude can be labelled as ideocentric. Ideocentricism seems to me to be the best characterisation for the mental bent of the whole area spiritually involved by Indian culture.

Another example is China. Here almost at the same time as Indians receded from Vedic gods to the universal principle of Brahman and psychic principle of Atman, the Chinese came over from the principle of personal God to that of impersonal Heaven. Impersonal Heaven, this is somewhat similar to impersonal Brahman but the difference is that whereas man can attain Brahman by his own spiritual exercise and everybody can once, perhaps after many incarnations, attain this capacity to overcome the law of rebirth, in the Pre-Buddhist China there was no chance for a man, by his spiritual exercises, to attain something similar. There was only one intermediary between heaven and earth, and this was the Emperor; he was the mandatary of heaven, and he was in charge of keeping the harmony between heaven and mankind, i.e., both the cosmic and social harmony. Only the Emperor, as a ruler, and not the subjects could contact the transcendental powers. But such a privileged emperor had also his duties. Good government, bringing order and prosperity for the whole country, was the main issue of philosophical preoccupation in China. Because of all this together, we may speak of the most characteristic feature of the Chinese attitude as of a cratocentric one. As you see, there was a big difference between India and China in this very concept, in the very approach to the human fate. But China did not remain so different for ever. India, in the Buddhist period, was spiritually so strong that its cultural force emanated all over Eastern Asia, to the further India, to Indonesia, China, and to Japan; the first millennium A.D. is a period of Indian cultural expansion. As Christianity stretched to the West, so Buddhism stretched right to the East.

In China, Buddhism found a fertile soil and also congenial foe in Taoism, which being originally a competing philosophy to Confucianism, changed at the time when Buddhism penetrated to China from philosophy to a religion. This is a very interesting tendency which asserted itself all over the civilized old world during the first century A.D. However, Taoism and Buddhism in China, in order to come to terms with the Chinese tradition, had to accept the idea of Emperor as the mandatary of heaven, as a key-point in the Chinese life. Buddhists already in India were inclined to accept the ruler who was good in the Buddhist sense as an autocrat. And as the Chinese Emperors were inclined either to accept Buddhism because of its high prestige at that time, or at least to tolerate the Buddhist way of life, in exchange the Buddhists in China were ready to comply with the cratocentric orientation of Chinese society. Cratocentrism has remained to be the most characteristic mark of the Chinese life, until recently. It finds its full reflection also in the Maoist concept of the communist society. It has not been substantially weakened by any European influence. Of the other Far Eastern countries, Korea and Viet Nam mostly followed the Chinese pattern. Only Japan, in receiving the Chinese culture selectively and combining its influence with their own tradition, developed special, distinct features. On the other hand, in Tibet a mixture of Chinese Cratocentrism and Indian ideocentrism took place.

I think that I need not dwell longer on these nuances and can turn to Europe. In contrast to what has been heard on the other civilizational areas, Europe's most characteristic feature may be called anthropocentrism. This can be traced already from the Minoan civilization; although its writing has not yet been deciphered, by what we know from visual arts, it was a very life-oriented civilization. Of main interest is man, not so much nature and still less gods. Similarly Hellenic civilization is anthropocentric, its gods are indistinguishable from men and their interference is rather on the side of particular human interests than above them. In the late Hellenic era gods acquire a more independent function but this is either overshadowed by the philosophical speculation, or practice of mysteries, aiming at the achievement of eternal life for men.

In this social climate Christianity seems to be an alien factor. Its theocentric orientation seems, at the first sight, to contrast distinctly with the Hellenic anthropocentrism. However, viewed from the world point

of view, Christianity is not so one-sidedly theocentric. As I already indicated in my previous paper, it attempts at combining theocentrism with anthropocentrism. This found its way both in theological and moral aspects. In Christianity the Judaic theocentrism which represents the quintessence of the religious development of the Levant till then, got another attitude. Jesus Christ, as Son of God, was a man and God at the same time. And the moral point is that God has loved the world so much that He sent His only -Son to save it through His utmost suffering. This is the basic idea of Christianity. God was interested in saving mankind, and He brought the highest sacrifice to that end. So Man comes to the centre of God's interest, and this unique incarnation, not in order to rule, not in order to make miracles, but in order to save the whole of mankind, is an original great concession of theocentric approach to the anthropocentric orientation.

Thus Christianity was able to penetrate to Europe and make a great success in these countries, whereas the Levant, the native area of Christianity, returned under Islam to the theocentric orientation. After several centuries of co-existence Islam superseded Christianity in almost all parts of the Levant. The compromise with anthropocentrism proved to be unacceptable to the Levantine nations in the long run. Although Allah was conceived as more merciful than Yahwe, he did not go so far as to sacrifice something of his substance for the salvation of men as did the Christian god. Man had but to surrender to his will. This was the theocentric essence of Islam.

But neither was Europe ready to abide by the compromise solution for ever. As the religious wars (in the 16th and 17th centuries) have weakened the moral appeal of Christianity, Europe started to turn from religious to secular orientation. Already the Renaissance brought to the forefront the worldly interests of man, especially the strong one. This approach was temporarily pushed back by the age of reformation. However, Enlightenment and herewith connected utilitarian morals, reintroduced the anthropocentric attitude in full vigour, which prevails until now.

However, the picture given so far pertains only to Western Europe. Eastern Europe took on another development; in Orthodox Christianity the anthropocentric elements were less outspoken and less individualistic than in the Western, Latin Christianity. Whereas in the West the church was a highly-organised body understood as the institutional heritage of Jesus Christ who intentionally has founded it for these purposes, in the East the church was conceived in a less rationalistic term, as the continuation of Christ's incarnation, as the mystic body of Jesus Christ, as the original primary reality preceding any human thought and action. The emphasis upon the organic unity between personal life and the mystic body of Christ has fostered, as Professor Hromadka rightly points out, the collectivistic tendency which was taken over by the Soviet Order.

This dichotomy in the European development has very old roots. It goes back to the Roman-Hellenic times when, despite all similarity and co-operation of both these ethnic groups, distinct ideational features could be observed. However, in those days the mutual relationship was not so tense as it became later in the Christian epoch when the identity of the faith was counter-balanced by different life attitudes and self-consciousness.

Greeks were always more philosophical and artistic, Latins more pragmatic, more interested in law and order than in speculation. This difference continued throughout Christianity. Between Catholic and Orthodox Christianity the dogmatic difference was quite negligible, but what mattered was the difference of the manner of thinking and evaluating. For a Greek monk, the most important thing was the contemplation and artistic performance. For the Latin monk, especially in the period of growth, the worship was combined with hard work and discipline. Order and discipline was the slogan of Tertullian; of St. Benedict of Nursia, '*ora et labora*'.

J.G.B.: Could I just ask one question here: in this period, was not the incursion of the Goths and of the Barbarian invaders an essential part of the event? On account of the need to assimilate the Nestorian Christianity they had brought from the East? They were the politically dominant.

Dr. K.: I don't think so. I think that the Western Christianity was moulded predominantly by the Latin spirit.

J.G.B.: They had to compromise with the Goths, they had somehow to win the Goths over. Was there no compromise?

Dr. K.: Yes, but I think that this pertained mainly to lesser issues, not to the main concepts. We have to keep in mind that the Goths came without any deeper religious concept of their own; they were from this point of view, as Toynbee rightly stresses in similar cases, *tabula rasa*. The religious reform which took place about 1,000 years later seems to be more slanted by what may be called the Germanic spirit; but I think what preceded is predominantly Latin whereas the Germanic nations, unlike the Irish, didn't seem to bring any other contribution to the spiritual tenets of Western Christianity than their own sense for work and discipline, in which they gradually superseded the Romanized (Latin) nations.

John Bristow : When did the split actually come?

Dr. K.: Split between Greek and Latin Christianity? It started already in the 7th century A.D., practically, but the apogee was attained in the middle of the 11th century. Afterwards, there were attempts to breach it, to come to terms with the Pope. The Byzantine Emperor was several times in favour of unification and sometimes even the Patriarch, but the monks used to arouse the street demonstrations, people's upheavals which made impossible any rapprochement with the Pope.

Large vociferous sections of Byzantine population eventually preferred the Sultan to the Pope.

There was an irreconcilable feeling which seemed not to be present in the ancient Hellenic times. On the contrary Romans were able to win a substantial minority in Greek cities to support them, in spite of many violent clashes; the differences seemed to be more outspoken, but the Romans were more docile, they appreciated the Greeks very much, and therefore, in exchange for this, the Greek bourgeoisie, or timocracy, was in favour of Roman rule. Whereas, in the time of Graeco-Roman split within Christianity, the orthodox Christian civilization, the Byzantine society attained a higher level of development than Latin Christianity. However, this advantage was upset during the period of Crusades. The Latin Christianity was developing quickly, whereas the Byzantine civilization became more stationary, and as they found that they were losing the momentum, the hostility grew perhaps because of that more acutely. So there was a greater tension than between Romans and Greeks.

If we would like now to concentrate on the Western Europe, the picture may be drawn as follows: A specific West Christian, or as I prefer to say, Latin Christian civilization started to crystallise within the All-Christian civilization during the 5th century A.D., in the same period as in the East, the heresies of Monophysitism and Dyophysitism started to sever the Levantine Christianity from the common fold. Latin Christianity was in those days under the heavy impact of Germanic nations who, however, fell under the spell of Christianity and turned to be Christian, helping the newly-shaped Latin Christian civilizations to take root all over the Western Europe. St. Augustine may be viewed as the main initiator of Latin Christianity in this sense, and St. Benedict of Nursia, Gregory the Great, and Charlemagne can be listed as the main Founding Fathers.

The foundation period starts in the middle of the 8th century and comes to its end before the close of the 10th century A.D. The classic period lasts approximately from 1000-1250 A.D. Everything that happened in this period was completely moulded by the Catholic Christian faith. Generally there is not an enforced uniformity in this period. As in every classic period there prevails a spontaneous uniformity endowed with a certain polarity, a certain tension, but these tensions are within the common ideation base. This is given by the Christian creed, by acceptance of the council decrees and authority of the Pope, and by the acceptance of the Holy Scriptures in the interpretation of these bodies. Until the beginning of the 13th century there is no Inquisition, and the monastic ideal remains to be faithful to the maxim 'ora et labora'.

Towards the end of this period falls the life of Thomas Aquinas. He summarises the spiritual basis of Latin Christian Civilization. However, also about this time comes St. Franciscus; his monastic order is not a

working order but a contemplative order, a begging order. Then come the Dominicans, an order which, virtually, took over the police activity, i.e., took responsibility for finding out the heretics. These are the years of the pontificate of Innocent the Third. Innocent the Third attained a great victory within the Western Christianity; he succeeded in forcing the most powerful monarchs of his 'flock', the French and English kings, to recognize his sovereignty not only in purely spiritual matters and became thus the highest feudal lord in Latin Christendom. However, the first crusade against Christians was instigated during his life. At first an attack was made on Constantinople, capital of sister- Orthodox Christian civilization; soon after that much more bloody and devastating crusades against Albigeois, in Southern France, in the bosom of one's own civilization, were instigated. This heralded that there was something wrong within Latin Christianity. Violent enforcement of orthodoxy meant that the Classic phase of the civilization in question was over and the foundation of Inquisition is a further proof of it.

Whereas the first half of the 13th century brings ominous signs that the classic age is approaching its end, in the middle of it Thomas Aquinas accomplishes the summation of its intellectual riches. According to my theory, this conclusive act of classic age is called civilizational summation, be it either on the intellectual or moral plane (the latter is as a rule achieved more by exemplary personal conduct than by literary work).

This is the highest achievement of the period of the civilization in question. It usually falls already into a period when the signs of recession may be seen. In the case of Latin Christian civilization this was demonstrated by the example of crusades organised against co-believers, by the example of the Inquisition, and by the shift in the monastic ideal.

Further signs may be seen in the slackening of faith in some important quarters. Frederick the Second may be seen as the prototype of this attitude. He is the first non-believer of standing but he is still an exception. More importantly, priests and clergymen ceased to be the only protagonists of the society. Until then they were the main bearers of culture but since the 13th century laymen of the cities, townsmen, started to be interested in art and in literature, at the beginning without developing new ideas of their own but gradually preparing ground for a more worldly outlook. In the 13th and 14th centuries a renaissance of ancient Hellenic culture takes place in Italy. The 14th century witnesses first attempts at the religious reform in England and the 15th century, more violently, in Bohemia. This is already the time when something new is being born but all these changes are still within the framework of Latin Christianity. Hussites in the 15th century will not break the unity of the church; they want to reform the church to bring it back to its original ideals. This is also, strictly speaking, a renaissance tendency: rebirth of the church, endeavour to return to the origins but nothing alien to the Christian faith. This continues throughout the 16th and 17th centuries. Meanwhile, the Renaissance in its proper, historical meaning, swings from Italy across the Alps; it touches, however, only the upper strata. It means a return to a civilization before Christianity but it remains to be reconciled with the Christian ideas and the Christian morals. However, it is already a clear recession from the Christian manner of thinking and evaluating.

In my opinion, the 16th century already opens the fatal phase of Latin Christian civilization. However, the decadent tendency which seemed to take place in some quarters during the preceding two centuries seems to be overcome by different kinds of renaissance, not only renaissance of pre-Christian Antique heritage but renaissance of Christianity itself and this both in its Reformation (Protestant) as in its Counter-Reformation (Catholic) shape.

Simultaneously with these tendencies and, for a long time, over-shadowed by their struggle, a new independent searching spirit developed. It was voiced especially by Leonardo da Vinci, Machiavelli, and Bacon. Then in the 17th century, Descartes and Newton prepared the way for a new spiritual outlook, the basic tenets of which are the scientific thinking and secularized moral evaluation. Religious wars bringing the dogmatism to its utmost nuisance value and being the most cynical mockery of Christian morality opened the door ajar to the new manner of thinking and evaluating.

Approximately in the middle of the 18th century Western Europe enters into a foundation age of a new civilization. Latin Christianity is getting into the residual stage; this does not mean that the Christian heritage is dead. On the contrary, much of it will be taken over. This always happens when one civilization succeeds another, and especially if this transition is completely on the lines of a reconstruction. This is the case of transition from Latin Christianity to the civilization which I might call provisionally Cartesian-Newtonian civilization. The new civilization is based on what I call the Positivist ideation. The criterion of truth is no more the faith in Holy Scriptures, in Revelation, but in a scientifically established knowledge. It is in essence knowledge based on the perception of senses, however widely extrapolated by means of scientific instruments and computing methods. The supreme value is more centred to the men's fate in this world. What matters is self-determination and prosperity, so both the manner of thinking has changed and also the hierarchy of values.

As yet we still do not realise the full implication of this because we are still in the foundation phase of the new civilization. There are several competing ideation types with different criteria of truth and different hierarchy of values. Christianity (no more Latin Christianity) is still one of them but has as yet not become fully adapted to the new social climate.

In this context, there has arisen an important question, i.e., whether positivistic ideation type which seems now to be holding the upper hand and which is also in essence of the new civilization could integrate a whole society in the same manner as Christianity did. The 19th century protagonists of the new civilization were optimistic in this respect. Now, in the middle of the 20th century, we are more doubtful about this possibility. Science has its own criteria of truth; it solves separate problems, but science doesn't bring answers how to live, why we live, what is the sense of life. Science gives a good account of man from without but gives no positive answer to steering his sentiments, his affections, his proclivities, so there is something missing in its spiritual guidance.

Translated to macrosociological terms of the development of civilizations, it means: if our society should be spiritually integrated again, it must have the capacity of integration. But there are some disturbing signs that it has not this capacity. This seems to be proved by the recalcitrance of the young generation. Young people often feel that something is missing. Their reaction is mostly irrational, incomprehensible against the background of what has been achieved on the political and economic levels — but comprehensible in terms of spiritual satisfaction. Modern society has brought forward utilitarian ideals. Utilitarian moral has good sense, but in moments of crisis it breaks down. Unless supported by a firm belief that even if it is not useful for me, even if it is quite noxious to me, I must behave morally because there is some higher command or principle, any morality loses its integrative strength and its substantiation. A strong moral conviction can rarely lack transcendental anchorage. This means that I must behave in such a way because there is something which is more imperative than all my practical utilitarian considerations.

Therefore if the positivistic strain in the emerging civilization will not come to terms with a certain transcendental attitude in which it could not only anchor its morality, but by means of which it could respond to the natural spiritual longings of men, we shall hardly attain the classical phase of the new civilization, i.e., the age of spontaneous integration of our society. Then this civilization might fail similarly as the Late Hellenic civilization, which also was not able to integrate spiritually all

the area incorporated into its political unit.

Discussion

J.G.B.: Thank you very much. I think that we now can ask any questions — I am sure that this is the best way of continuing the discussion.

John Bristow: Has the civilization ever attained the classical period without some contribution from the theocentric period?

Dr. K.: As a pre-condition of a civilizational integration need not be just theocentrism, but something more than only material interests; so, for example, the Early Hellenic civilization attained its classical age approximately between 750-500 B.C. And this was a very anthropocentric civilization, but with a deep sense of duty towards its community. Gods were, of course, also important but not so much as in, for instance, Sumeric Mesopotamia. In Greece every city had a god as its mythic lord and the highest duty for a citizen was to offer all his forces to the well-being of the city. There was, if not a transcendental idea in the sense of transcendency from humanity to something beyond humanity, it was a transcendency from the personal point of view, subordinating personal interests fully to that of the community.

The Late Hellenic civilization wanted to substitute this parochialized integration on the panhellenic scale by means of the philosophical ideas. Socrates was apparently that person who united both the Early and Late Hellenic ideal. He was a summator of the Early Hellenic civilization and at the same time a quasi-prophetic hero of the Late Hellenic civilization. As I indicated in my last article, the summation can be of two different kinds; it can consist either in a literary work as that of Thomas Aquinas, or in a personal example, which I call paradigmatic incarnation; Socrates was in this sense a paradigmatic incarnation of the early Hellenic ideal but at the same time he opened, by his eudaemonism, the door to the more individualistic approach within larger, gradually more and more despotically governed society. Socrates' position between two successive civilizations is somewhat similar to the role of the Upanishads in the Indic civilizational pedigree. The Upanishads close and summarise the wisdom of the Vedic epoch, at the same time opening the period of new imagination, of new reasoning.

J.G.B.: Not in one and the same Upanishad; the early Upanishads, such as the Brihad Aranyaka, and so on, look backwards, but the late Upanishad, like the Maitri and the Katha, look forward to the new age.

Dr. K.: I fully agree. The creation of Upanishads covers a period of more than 300 years. The different Upanishads must have been written by different persons. However, Socrates was one man. As far as the Late Hellenic civilization is concerned there was a remarkable duality of integrative endeavour. There were two streams, one of the philosophic speculation and the second (under-stream) was a mixture of ideas brought to Greece from Thrace, from Asia Minor, from Egypt. This stream responded more to the transcendental needs of the Hellenic man who was losing his firm basis in his city state. As he lost the city as the means of attaining a full life, so he was frustrated and he found thought for consolation either in philosophy or in a mystery cult. Developing on these lines, the Late Hellenic civilization was less successful in achieving integration than the Early Hellenic civilization. Only with the help of Romans was it possible, and predominantly in the Western part of Mediterranean, that the Late Hellenic civilization attained its classic phase. Although it was one of the most anthropocentric civilizations. it achieved its integration only in symbiosis with religion. It can be inferred that always, if something other than religion integrated a society, it must have been a symbiosis with old religious cult or the philosophy itself became religious. However, religion is not identical with theocentrism. As I have shown in my sketch of particular bents of individual civilizational areas, both India and China have developed quite distinct non-theocentric religions.

J.G.B.: I would like to ask something now about the Hellenic tradition with reference to one unifying factor that we have not yet considered, and that is the ownership of land. If you look at what I call the Great Mother Culture, certainly the Great Mother was always more or less identified with Gea the earth goddess, Mother Earth, and certainly associated with the foundation of agriculture. You spoke of respect for the city and the readiness to serve the city. These were in effect a readiness to serve a place and is due to the association of the deity with a place, and hence with the land. The Roman principle of Roman law that distinguished land, *res nobilis* from movable property, *res vilis* continued right through to feudal times. Until the 19th century the foundation of greatness was land. Then came, with this new culture that you are speaking about, the departure from regarding land as the central factor of nobility, and stability of life, to

mobile wealth. We no longer think as the Romans did: for us money is noble and land is comparatively vile. We have very little respect for land — we break up properties in all countries. The idea of a certain sacredness of traditional ownership of land, which continued through thousands of years, is in my opinion, associated with the values of the Mother Culture, was the reason for its stability and so on. There has been since the Renaissance and the end of feudalism, a gradual departure from a *geocentric* system, in the sense of attachment to the land, to a *technocentric* system, the attachment to artefacts including money. Artefacts have become the dominant interest in human activity. People are interested nowadays in having motor cars and machinery of all kinds to enable them to expand their experience rather to having land. All this change seems to me to be characteristic in the change-over from the Mother Tradition which runs right through the Near East and the Levant, and certainly communicated itself to Rome, where land was the basic value. And it continued right through — the monasteries also, in spite of all their other values, still regarded their greatness as lying in the ownership of great tracts of land and their domination over land. This was their downfall when you come to the end of the period and you have the dissolution of the monasteries, it was really the break-up of the geocentric system. Land began now to be something that could be freely given away; the respect for the long traditional ownership began to break, and a new set of values and ways of thinking came. With this, the European interest in leaving your land and going into other countries and the Europeanisation of the world came, in a way, from the departure from the respect for land as the basic value; the respect for gold, power and the rest, this is the basic value. Would you think that there is some — to be explained about this?

Dr. K.: Yes, but this is not so much a socio-cultural phenomenon. I think it is rather a politico-economic phenomenon which cuts across what I have spoken about until now.

J.G.B. : And yet such a lot of the old worship you spoke about — the Greek city state, after all, the Roman worship was a worship connected with place — and it was only places for the Greeks.

Dr. K.: In this respect you are right, something very similar was also in China. I think this is a phenomenon which is more universal. There are some forms — economic and political forms, which are common — although not as permanent features — for the whole of mankind. Although people have developed different languages and different socio-cultural outlooks, and even different physical features, some forms are basically the same all over the world. So, for example, feudalism, which is only an abbreviated expression for a much more complex phenomenon, can be observed in different parts of the world, where similar conditions emerged.

J .G.B.: You showed the importance of land and feudalism, but in most of these cases it had not a religious significance. In the Levant, it had more of this. I am not so much concerned with the question whether the value attached to land is more politico-economic or religious. My point is that the cult of the land is certainly very strong in any Mother- God system, because the Mother-God herself is associated with the land. But what I am saying is that this is one very characteristic feature of our modern time that this respect for land has changed in the last two hundred years or so. This is affecting our whole culture. What is regarded as one of the major problems of the world is pollution, the destruction of land, the wastage of resources and so on. All this is associated with a certain change of attitude towards land. Wherever there is no respect for it, land is allowed to go to waste by desiccation; because the value-system and the modes of thought are no longer in terms of permanence associated with real estate. Land is something to be used, not something which has intrinsic value. You can use it, you can destroy it, you can build roads, towns, or anything else if you like, and you can pollute it, you can waste rivers and you can even pollute the ocean because this kind of respect that existed formerly for the land has disappeared and nothing has come to replace it. One cannot return to this perhaps, again, but this is really in connection with what you were saying before. We have to have some pride in earthly existence in order to preserve our society. The arguments that we bring against pollution are still purely anthropocentric; it is inconvenient for us to have polluted rivers. We see no moral imperative that requires us to have clean rivers. We kill millions of birds by

putting oil into the sea. There is only a small feeling of moral guilt in this; a great deal is connected now with how inconvenient it is. People will not be able to enjoy their summer bathing in the sea because there is oil on the beaches. This kind of attitude would not have been the same a few hundred years ago. This is all symptomatic of our great difficulty at our present time to see on what we can build a value-system. One of the things that have gone out with this feeling for land is connected with the Copernican revolution; who knows that it isn't the departure of the geocentric concept of the cosmos that has had some influence on people's geofugal thinking. This earth is, after all, not the centre of the universe and therefore is not to be worshipped as men worshipped it in the times of the early Greek civilization. And now again we think that we don't even need the earth anymore because we have other worlds to go to, and this is all part of this result that scientific discovery has perhaps had a certain breaking-down effect on certain traditional values, but it has not put something in their place.

Jaroslav Kohout: I just wanted to suggest that if we claim such a hypothesis that Mr. Bennett now mentions, maybe that Copernicus's system was connected with this declining sense for the ownership of land. On the other hand, we can quote Ptolemy's system which is geocentric and which coincides also with a lot of the sense of the value for land.

J.G.B.: I agree with Dr. Kohout, in Roman times land was the all-important value.

Jaroslav Kohout: It was at the beginning of the Hellenistic epoch that the Ptolemaic system was introduced, and it has been hinted some short time ago that the Late Hellenic civilization was also connected with the loss of sense for the ownership of land. The Roman capitalism in the first century A.D. was connected also with the loss of sense for land. This is one point I wanted to make, and then what my friend shows as the continuation of civilizations and the rhythm of their phases are features which are more general than the history of one socio-economic formation, which he also stated. But perhaps there are more general features than the civilizations and the period and rhythm of the civilizations, also such a thing as those four main areas in the pre-history era which you formulated; perhaps they are symptoms of those deeper sources than civilizations. Possibly there are some features of the life of mankind which are even deeper and which represent some cyclical movement which is longer than millennia, perhaps 10,000 years or so. So the sense for land, for instance, or for Mother culture and so on, may be much deeper tendencies which may emerge below different civilizations.

Dr. K.: I would like to continue this idea. I do not know whether the sense for land is connected only with the Mother God culture. I agree that the Mother God culture as Mr. Bennett conceives it had a conspicuous practical technical bent. Most technical discoveries originated really in this area. But I would not say that this area is particularly connected with sacred characters of land. In China which, according to Mr. Bennett's concept of socio-cultural areas doesn't belong to the Mother God culture, the land was sacred also. The Emperors of the longeval Chou dynasty, quite in line with the cratocentric conception, decided the time when the land had to be tilled. They opened it to the exploration in de-sacring it. As the autumn approached, villagers returned from the fields, the land was again closed to the peasants and reconsecrated.

J.G.B.: It was a totally different concept of where the sacred comes from. The sacred came through the Emperor. Here the sacred comes from the spirit of the place.

Dr. K.: Yes, this is a significant difference because of the cratocentric character of the Chinese society. Here the Emperor was more than the supreme or even God-sent ruler; he functioned as a physically and morally responsible junction between the society and nature.

J.G.B.: Fair enough, this is what I would call the Great Spirit in this case or some power or whatever it is. It is different from worship of land as a place, there was a local sacredness — but this is not very important for the argument. The important thing is what you were saying, that I agree with, that we have the problem of our present time, and I wanted only to point out that one of the problems of our present time is that there is no longer this sense of having roots.

Dr. K.: Yes, it seems that we have lost not only the sense of transcendental security but also the close contact with nature which both aid the sense of having roots. The latter may be a corollary of urbanization. But as far as I know, China, although in several periods of its history highly urbanized, has not lost a high appreciation of nature. Perhaps this might have been to a certain degree an antidote to the urbanization. However, a similar reaction was hardly connected with the kind of urbanization which was introduced in Mesopotamia, or in Roman Hellenic period. I don't know whether they had some deep sense for nature in Alexandria, or in Antochia. I think they had more a family cult.

J.G.B.: Yes, they had. The family cult was an important factor of civility. We have not got a family cult any longer.

John Bristow: In the Middle Ages in Europe there was a revival of the Mother Cult within the Catholic Church, when special emphasis began to be placed on worshipping Mary, the Mother of Jesus.

Dr K.: This is a typical example of the renaissance of a cultural heritage. It is a natural phenomenon. If a new idea, a new system of values wants to be victorious, it must accept something from the established customs. And Christianity drew heavily on the old religious forms. Even the days of the greatest holidays were put on the same days as were festivals before, however, with the complete change of the content of celebration. What matters is whether there is more continuity in form or more continuity in content; the more change in content, the more the change is real.

J.G.B.: Could you define for us more what is in this, the new heroic period, that you have put in here, where you say Aquinas represents the transition from one to the other. What is the mode of thought that you are now speaking about? What is this present civilization?

Dr. K.: The criteria of truth of Latin Christian Civilization was the Holy Bible as interpreted by the Church's authority. And there was a large scope for logical deductive speculation.

J.G.B. : Certainly Aquinas was very Aristotelian but he was also traditional.

Dr. K.: Latin Christianity combined fideism with logical speculation whereas now the manner of protagonists' thinking may be styled in logical empiricism. No more quoting Bible or Aristotle but in making experiments, or in thinking over the new things, such as Bacon, Machiavelli and Newton started to do.

J. Bristow : The 'progress' of the natural sciences during the 17th century in Europe was not guided by any overall sense of direction, as Koestler points out in his book *The Sleepwalkers*; there was simply great faith in the experimental method as a way to knowledge. This later affected Western Society's sense of values.

Dr. K.: In every society there were pragmatic people who behaved, it may be said, in positivistic or pragmatic ways. But the most important was how far they succeeded in influencing other people, how far they were imitated by the core of population. A visible indication of their significance is the literature, visual arts, and family life and customs. Where the pragmatic attitude did not penetrate to these pilots of human activity, it remained a marginal phenomenon and the society was moulded by other concepts.

POLITICO-ECONOMIC FORMATIONS

Dr. Krejčí : In the morning session I have concentrated on the socio-cultural development of that part of the world which is the subject matter of our seminar. Having started with the contemporaneous situation I have linked up with Mr. Bennett's idea of socio-cultural differentiation more than 10,000 years ago, and shown how about 5-6,000 years later five focuses of civilizational development originated in the Old World, focuses which are somewhat different from those in Mr. Bennett's concept. Then, I have indicated what was the rhythm of further development of all civilizations, and by what features the continuity of social life in individual civilizational areas has been preserved. To both these points I could lean on the evidence of the development of civilizations of the Middle Eastern area (the Levant) given in my article in the last issue of *Systematics*, and add some notes on the development in Europe, with special regard to its Western part.

In doing so I concentrated on the socio-cultural aspects of societal development. I expressed them in terms of civilizations which may be conceived as the main socially integrative formations of humanity. Although these formations supply, in my opinion, the fundamental tissue of social groupings, and accordingly also the main axes of societal development, they do not express their whole complexity.

Having this in view, it seems to be expedient, even within the seminar on cultural streams, to complete the picture with a short outline of structurative elements. These are mainly of political and economic content and may be lumped together in a system which may be called, analogically to socio-cultural formation, politico-economic formation. They are bound by many fibres with the socio-cultural, integration pattern. There is a mutual inter-relation among all of them, socio-cultural formations providing the fundamental value-orientation and politico-economic formations implementing it of practical institutional solutions affecting the everyday life in its more tangible aspects.

One of these connecting channels is the technology. Being brought into existence by human creative mind, and developing gradually, although with accidental reversals, towards a greater perfection throughout the whole history of mankind, technology provides in combination with material resources the main basis for the level of economy and its development.

It is, of course, not possible within the framework of this seminar to give a full account of all these aspects and their inter-relations. I shall limit my contributions to some aspects only, which are the most relevant to our topic. These are, in my opinion, the main political and economic institutions or behaviour patterns of the society. Political, because they play an important role in the integration processes, i.e., either in helping to promote them or, on the other hand, bringing about their breakdowns; economic, because they are, in our times, often viewed as main factors of societal development at large.

In the previous section I already mentioned a period in the socio-cultural development of Western Europe (this was the beginning of the present century) when it seemed that the European pattern would expand all over the world. It was a period when the idea of economic problems playing the most decisive role in social life gained ground. Since then it has been widely assumed that the economic needs represent the most cogent incentives to human action, and this has been inferred not only for the contemporaneity but also for the whole past, and not only for Western Europe, but for the whole world. Socio-economic formations have been widely accepted as the main intelligible field of study of societal development.

However, the most devastating war of the world history (the devastation being measured in terms of the damage on the absolute quantity of human lives and property within the period of hostilities) — the second world-war — revealed that the main issue at stake was not economic and the further world development could not but corroborate this statement.

The main divisions of the world since then appeared to be again of more complex kind; they centred around different evaluations and modes of thinking. Despite the heightened interest in scientific methods all over the world and despite the unifying influence of technology, all problems, even the economic ones, are being differently solved. This results not from different material needs but from different appreciation

of human needs, from different evaluation of what is good and wrong for human society. This is largely a matter of deeply ingrained value-pattern of particular societies and cannot be properly understood without recourse to the continuity of socio-cultural features in individual civilizational areas, as I have indicated this morning, and as I shall touch again later on.

In the adaptation of socio-cultural patterns of all non-Western areas, to the needs of economic development based on advanced technology, the political tools play an increasingly important role. This happened very often in times of civilizational change. As the whole world is now in such an epoch and as the different solutions of political and herewith connected economic problems are the front issues of the struggle, I think it worthwhile to devote some more attention to the most important features of what I have called politico-economic formations.

This is a very complex phenomenon which, if we want to get a true picture of particular society's real functioning, cannot be decomposed into its constituent political and economic segments. Several attempts undertaken on these lines, although widely successful as a matter of theoretical analysis, proved to be misleading as a matter of practical policy, just because the other part of the combination had been omitted. This happened to so many legislators in different parts of the world who, wanting to shape their countries on the model of modern parliamentary democracy in Western Europe and North America, thought it possible, by forming the political institution alone, to achieve the same effect. On the other hand, as the experience of the last two decades has shown, the programmers of socialism, proceeding from the deficiencies of the capitalist mode of production and concentrating mainly on economic issues, have overlooked the relevance of the political framework, the factual development of which proved then by far more important for destinies of people concerned than the changed economic components themselves.

The neglect of political aspects is reflected also in theoretical considerations. Socio-economic formations, as capitalism and socialism are, usually, conceived exclusively in economic terms; only in case of feudalism, a good deal of political elements are, as a rule, included. The neglect of politics is, as far as capitalism is concerned, quite understandable, because under this name there is understood a system where the political components are in positive sense less conspicuous than in other cases. Securing only the general framework for unhampered business and capital transactions, political system may be otherwise variable, provided it does not interfere in the mentioned sphere of economic action. On the other hand, feudalism and socialism (the latter at least as far as practised until now) are more dependent on direct and positive political support. However, this is not the only pitfall. Periods of transformation brought about many crossbreeds-, which in some cases remained permanent phenomena. Also, therefore, in my opinion, a more refined analytical tool, having due regard to all relevant features, is badly needed.

It is quite correct to take into account the changes in the means of production, in the forms of ownership, in factors determining the quantity and variety of produced goods and services (as market, plan or barter), and in the class structure or status of working population. All these aspects, put together, make up the main tissue of socio-economic formations. However, it is necessary to consider also the political structure.

In my opinion, this should concern principally the following points:

- 1 Who is actually the supreme holder of power?
- 2 What is the range of power at his disposal (how far is the power concentrated in his hands)?
- 3 What are the groups (strata, classes) of population on which the supreme holder of power may lean in making effective use of his power, especially of which the members of the power apparatus are as a rule recruited?

Although these items do not exhaust all the issues of political relations, they nevertheless represent the main components.

In historical development up until now these problems were differently solved. These alternative solutions can be ranged under several typical headings.

The supreme holder of power was either a person or a body or a combination of both these principles. More important, however, is how the supreme holder of power is constituted, who decides on his accession to power. A 'monarch' was usually hereditary but not always an 'autocrat', i.e. an exclusively ruling person. An autocrat in the full sense of the word was often a usurper.

The more is the supreme holder of power complex the less he can function without keeping to certain rules. These are especially in the case of a representative body as parliament (alongside which, as a rule, an independent executive and judicial branch of institutions operates), which is very complex and have to be strictly observed if the system has to work properly. Similarly a system where the general assembly of all citizens (agorarchic body) plays a decisive role (as was the case of some Hellenic and Latin cities) has to observe detailed rules. Comparatively more simple is the situation with the rule of a body which may be according to the Ancient Hellenic terminology called bularchic; this body may be hereditary or may be completed either by co-optation or by nomination by another body or person. Special, complicated relationships arise when the supreme rule is divided among monarch and several estates, each of which may be headed by differently composed and constituted bodies.

No less important is, of course, the range of power of the supreme ruler. In case where the supreme rule is divided among several bodies, the power is largely deconcentrated and there is a space for interplay of forces. On the other hand, the concentration of power can assume a different intensity according to whether only political or also economic and/or ideological power is involved. With regard to all this I propose the following categorization of what I call the power constellation. When the three mentioned types of power (i.e., political, economic and ideological) are distributed across and held by different institutions, the power constellation is pluralistic. When political power is concentrated in one body or person, it may be styled, according to the Ancient Roman terminology, an imperiate power constellation. When such a body or person holds both political and economic power, then it may be called a dominate constellation (after Diocletian's 'dominate'). If both political and ideological power is thus concentrated, then it can be labelled a su"premutz'Onal constellation (cf. The Act of Supremacy in English history); and finally, a concentration of all three types could best be called unitary constellation of power.

Of course, as I have already indicated, no power can be exercised without a certain mass support, without its basis of power. This may vary in size according to the groups of population involved. Qualitatively it may be categorized according to the principle constituting them or, to put it more squarely, according to whether the belonging to the power base depends, as a rule, on privileged birth (genocracy) or on acquiring a certain wealth (timocracy) or professional status (praxeocracy) — be it in the guise of priesthood (hierarchy), army (machiocracy), administrative or police apparatus (bureaucracy or phylacocracy respectively), or whether it depends on adherence to a certain creed or ideology (ideocracy); the state when all the adult population of a country may be endowed by civil rights giving them the possibility of effective participation in political decisions although in temporary intervals only but in form of genuine elections, may best be called democracy. However, in view of the fact that this term acquired in the course of its history several rather different meanings, I prefer to use, in this sense, the uncommitted term -- equally of Greek origin — laocracy.

J.G.B.: There is an important point here. There can be many forms of power structure established and accepted de jure: but de facto the exercise of power is almost invariably oligarchic. In representative democracy this is obvious. The oriental despot was equally dependent upon a handful of men who exercised de facto power. We have come to recognize the extent to which a Napoleon was run by his Ministers.

Dr. K.: Sociologically it is more important that the state be de facto and not de jure. Of course, every representative government may degenerate into an oligarchy and oligarchy in its turn into monarchy, or better to say autocracy.

Question: Could you give some examples of the different constellations of power in present times.

Dr. K.: Yes. For example, the constellation of power in this country is pluralistic, the same as in the Scandinavian and E.E.C. countries. The constellation of power in the U.S.S.R. is unitary, in Yugoslavia supernational. There seems to be no example today of a clear-cut dominate constellation of power. However, in several Latin American states, as for instance in the former Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic, or now in Guatemala, there can be observed a strong tendency to this type of power constellation. It is interesting that there is no example, and I could not find it either in the past societies, of a concentration of economic and ideological power without political power being involved. Political power is apparently the point of all power structures and can- not be omitted.

The different types of power constellation may, of course, be combined with different power base and different supreme holder of power which, taken together, make for a great variety of power structures; combined with other, economic, components the variety is still greater. Nevertheless, some combinations are more frequent than others. These observations provide the basis for conceiving broader categories as feudalism, capitalism or socialism, be it in Marx's or Max Weber's or Schumpeter's or somebody else's interpretation.

I think it worthwhile to show how my 'parameters' of politico-economic formations correspond to the customary general concepts, e.g. with those of Marx. I will demonstrate it in a comparative scheme showing historical development in Western Europe. From my concept there are combined the three political components which I have discussed earlier and additional three economic components, "i.e. the status of working population, ownership of the means of production and economic regulator.

Under the first heading (status of working population), different categories are understood such as slaves, serfs, villeins (I propose to make distinction between serfs as being ascribed to the soil, and villeins as obliged to perform manual work only as far as they are tenants of the land in question), free tenants, wage earners, individual owners or collective (sharing) owners.

To the second component the following has to be said: A telling categorization of the forms of ownership cannot be limited to the qualification of owners only but it should take into account also the content of the right. From this point of view, ownership can be either full (prototype, ancient Roman ownership), or divided (prototype, the feudal difference between upper-dispositional owner-landlord, and lower-working owner - the village commune or individual peasant).

The role of economic regulator is sometimes under-estimated in appreciation of politico-economic formations. Its alternative forms throughout the whole history may be classified as follows: ousehold, barter, market and targets given by political authority. Market in its tum can be either free, regulated, or managed, the difference between the last two being in the amount of direct or indirect (mainly financial) means used to the steering of market forces.

In terms of the six, in my opinion, macrosociologically most relevant components and their alternative forms, the 2,800 years of West European history from c.800 B.C. to A.D. 1970 can be divided into twelve periods (see Scheme), though they do not all occur at or last for the same time in every individual country. There is a time lag — Sicily and southern Italy at first being the furthest ahead and Britain bringing up the rear — which gradually diminishes and changes until, towards the end of this length of time, the order is reversed.

The sequence shown in the Scheme is not purely the result of internal development within each country, since external influences from one country to another and fro-m outside the area altogether also had an

Fig. 1

SCHEME

DEVELOPMENTS OF THE MAIN COMPONENTS OF POLITICO-ECONOMIC FORMATIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE

Periods	Prevailing status of the working population	Prevailing form of ownership of the means of production	Economic Regulator	Power Base (main core)	Supreme Holder of Power	Prevailing Power Constellation	Mark's Socio-Economic Formation
1	sharing owners	collective (communal)	barter	genocracy	bularchic body	patriarchal	primitive communal system
2	owners & sharing owners	collective & individual - private	barter & market	genocracy	bularchic body**	pluralistic	primitive communal system
3	owners & slaves	individual - private	free market	timocracy	bularchic body**	pluralistic	transition
4	slaves & owners	individual - private	free market	timocracy	autocrat	imperiate	slave holding system
5	slaves	individual - private	regulated market	praxeocracy	autocrat	imperiate	slave holding system
6	villeins & slaves	divided*	regulated market	genocracy	autocrat	imperiate	transition
7	serfs	divided*	barter	genocracy	seigneurs	pluralistic/dominate***	feudalism
8	villeins	divided*	regulated market	genocracy	seigneurs	pluralistic/dominate***	feudalism
9	owners & wage earners	individual - private	regulated market	praxeocracy & genocracy	autocrat	supremational	transition
10	wage earners & owners	individual - private	free market	timocracy	autocrat	imperiate	Capitalism
11	wage earners & owners	individual & collective - private	free market	timocracy	representative body	pluralistic	Capitalism
12	wage earners & owners	individual & collective - private (capitalist) & large share of public ownership	managed market	laocracy	representative body	pluralistic	?

*upper - individual seigniors, lower - collective village or individual tenants.
 **in co-operation with a less powerful agorarchic body.

***pluralistic as far as the monarch and the higher nobility are concerned, dominate in respect of the majority of population formed by dependent peasants.

effect. The large-scale practice of slave-holding, for instance, was brought from Greece and Carthage; serfdom and similar systems of bondage had their origins in the Levant; and other feudal practices were perpetrated as a result of changes completed by Germanic and Viking migrations which eventually brought about the final breakdown of the old and already weakening centralized political structures to replace them with a combination of contracts and compulsion.

Of course, the scheme does not include all changes in the societal structure, only the main ones are mentioned. However, in combination with a rhythm of socio-cultural formations mentioned earlier, they supply sufficient scope for appreciation of the main sociological changes. The only important indicator which is left out so far is technology. Its development provides the basis for the changes in the main means of production, the ownership—or better to say the disposition—of which plays such an important role in the societal structure.

As you know, technology is one of the few human activities where a continuous progress can be observed. However, this general statement can be maintained only in a very long run; actually the technological growth with respect both to time and space is very uneven, very often interrupted by long periods of stagnation or even relapses.

Discussion

J.G.B.: If you take the case of the Assyrian Empire, very high technology developed by the 7th century B.C. and one can say that the Achemenean Empire which followed offered a higher way of life, but they arrested technological progress.

Dr. K.: Yes, sometimes it would be misleading to judge the human progress on technological achievements only; the cultural and technological growth seems to be often only loosely interrelated. Even in times of relapses brought about by invasions of foreign people on a substantially lower level of civilizational development is the decline in culture and technology of different pace.

J.G.B.: If you take Samarkand after the time of the high level of this flowering in the 15th century, the Mongols were followed by the Turkish invasions;—the technology never recovered after that.

Dr. K.: Yes, central Asia suffered a terrible setback several times; the most devastating perhaps was that at the hands of Mongols at the beginning of the 13th century. The same invasion brought to an end the economic and, to a large extent also, the cultural flowering of Iraq.

Since then Iraq never recovered its previous reputation of being one of the richest countries in the world. The devastation brought about by two primitive Arab tribes who came to North Africa from the Arabian peninsula at the end of the 11th century had similar effects. Since then only North Africa, until then one of the most developed areas of the world, slipped gradually to the state of primitivity. Really, such invasions stopped the technological development. We often do forget such courses of events.

Now the progress in technology is most conspicuous and unparalleled in history. But who can assure that it will last for ever. Not only atomic war, or similar disaster brought about by the destructive power within the range of man's command, but also the change in the spirit of the people, bringing about a strong disincentive to work and create may result in a reversal of technological progress. Sometimes it seems that man is becoming oversaturated by this kind of progress. There are enough instances of people, of the younger generation especially, who are not interested in future progress on these lines. Especially in countries which have attained the highest level of economic development and welfare state a tendency of this kind can be observed. Even Sweden, which is in many quarters looked upon as the most happy country, seems not to be spared this symptom.

J.G.B.: We have this peculiar thing about them now, which seems axiomatic. Now we have so much knowledge that we can no longer handle it. We have come into an information crisis. It is a very unusual situation. In the past there have been information crises solved by destruction, as with the library of Alexandria. With the Greco Roman collapse the world was able to breathe again. What will happen now?

Dr. K.: Yes, I am thankful this has been mentioned because this is one of the challenges to my work; if I do not develop this system I would not be able to cope with the mass of information at my disposal. I think it is necessary to elaborate special simplifying tools, both analytical and synthetic, to master the enormous quantity of information which is growing over our head.

J.G.B.: That is what I am going to talk about later. May I just say one thing about what you said earlier, about not having an example of an economic and ideational power system which is independent of the political one. What about the Italian City States under the Holy Roman Empire, when the political power was the Empire but the economic power and also the religious power was in the Italian City States. They controlled their own economy and they also controlled their own culture: aesthetic and religious. In this they were independent of the Empire.

Dr. K.: I think that the religious power was in the hands of the Church; even if the City representative or other temporal ruler had the possibility to nominate ecclesiastical officials, he couldn't interfere with the question of the creed. Even when the cities were completely de facto independent of the Empire they had no ideological sovereignty. This happened only in time of the Reformation. It started in the 15th century Bohemia, when the Hussite revolution brought to life actually such independent cities, the representatives of which formulated their own versions of Christian faith. However, this state lasted hardly a quarter of a century. A similar, and still more short-lived, example was Savonarola's Florence. Only the 16th century brought much more, and also lasting instances of this kind, Calvin's Geneva and Zwingli's Zurich being the most outstanding ones. Similarly, the Islamic Levant knew many instances when the religious dissidents acquired the supreme power of a city, or even in a group of cities, where they upheld their factual sovereign rule for a long time (like the different groups of Kharijites in North Africa, or Serbedars in North-East Iran). However, in all these cases the political power was involved much more in the power constellation than the economic one.

J.G.B.: Yes, but I nevertheless think that there were instances where not so much political as economic and aesthetic and ideational autonomy of cities asserted itself.

Dr. K.: Yes, I agree: as an example the priestly or temple domains of Late Pharaonic Egypt or Gilgamic Mesopotamia may be quoted, where the priests united in their hands both ideological and economic power only. However, these domains did not enjoy political sovereignty as the mentioned city states did. They relied on the political power of the state, which was in most cases a larger empire with usually the Imperiate power constellation (only in Sumeric Mesopotamia it was often a city state with pluralistic power constellation). The existence of this political superstructure enabled a special constellation of power to exist within the smaller units such as the temple domains.

J.G.B.: This may have happened also in some Roman Catholic bishoprics.

John Bristow: But there was the build-up of commercial wealth in the cities of the Netherlands and of Northern Italy (and a strong commercial link between the two areas via the overland trade-route) before the cultural renaissance which originated there. Some historians argue that the accumulation and distribution of wealth in these countries made the renaissance possible.

J.G.B.: You talked about the power of Rome and of the Church but in the 17th century, it seems to me that more of the true ideational element was in the culture, the life concept, the aesthetic side. Already the religious side was in decline.

Dr. K.: Yes, because it was already the period of fatal phase of Latin Christianity, coinciding with the heroic phase of a new Newtonian- Cartesian civilization.

John Bristow: Perhaps afterwards you could say a bit more on what you mentioned in your article, about an integrative institution or activity at the classic phase of civilization, and about the necessary complexity in the prevailing modes of ideation to guard against any prematurely exhaustive and comprehensive expression of them in material form.

Dr. K.: The classical period need not be the most creative, but it is the most integrative. This does not exclude contests, even very fierce ones, but they take place within the ideational framework of the given civilization. So, for example, the struggle between Pope and Emperor, which filled up the greatest part of political history of the classic phase of Latin Christian civilization; Both contestants adhered to the same ideation type, to the same version of Christianity; the issue at stake was who should be the supreme head, not how the ideation should be framed up.

In the classical period there is almost always some polarity; but this polarity is within the ideation system. In the above example, there was the polarity between the temporal and spiritual power. In the classic period of the Byzantine branch of the Orthodox Christian civilization there was a polarity within the artistic and literary orientation, between the Hellenizing and modernizing tendencies. In the Early Islamic civilization the polarity was between written Prophet's tradition (Sunna) and the Prophetic Succession (Shi'a). Similar examples could be quoted for other civilizations.

J.G.B.: Could you say something about how you apply this double analogy, the civilization analogy between the political and economic one, the separate bodies of the given period or situation.

Dr. K.: In my study I tried to draw for every civilization, at least in its classical phase, a complete picture of the politico-economic formation. But as I am approaching the modern time so I try to do it for every phase, and if necessary also for smaller areas than for the whole civilizations.

J.G.B.: I came to a similar conclusion for some different reasons. That is that the politico-economic structure does not give the key to the character of the civilization.

Dr. K.: Until now I have not discovered any correlation between a certain phase of civilization and a type of politico-economic formation. This can best be demonstrated in the case of so-called universal states, which A. J. Toynbee holds to be a corollary of a later stage of civilizational disintegration (after the 'time of troubles'). In my opinion, however, a universal state, i.e. a state covering the whole or almost the whole area of the civilization concerned, can take place at any time of the life-span of a civilization. China, India, Egypt and the whole of Levant supply sufficient evidence to this assertion.

J.G.B.: You should perhaps evaluate also the importance of trading; international trading activities of Europe in the 15th and 16th, 17th centuries. This is a quite independent factor; it is not ideological, it has nothing to do with the civilization, but it had a great economic significance. It led to the European domination of other parts of the world. The same happened in Islam. Islam, in the 9th century, developed a world trade, and as a result Islam went to the Far East mainly as a trading power.

Dr. K.: Trade is beside war, migration, and missionary activity the main channel of contacts of different people. Traders did very much to bring people of different civilizations together. However, traders were interested mainly in exchange of goods, be it in the form of barter, or marketing, and in making profits. This did not help to the mediation of even technical innovations; to this end the exchange of craftsmen was necessary (hence such interest in the transfer of this population in e.g. Sassanid, Mongol or Timur's empires). The traders were less interested in exchange of cultural values: at least they did not leave, as a rule, any literary evidence of such an activity. Only after a priest, or a monk, or a state official, or an explorer-scholar joined the trader was the cultural contact and subsequently exchange of cultural values instigated.

J.G.B.: That is very interesting. We have ten minutes more; does anyone wish to say anything?

Fred Wilson: I would like to raise one point. Something you said about changes in the spirit of the people causing the youth in particular to lose interest in their future has, I feel, a very great significance. You mentioned the Swedes, their high standard of living and implied there was a kind of moral disarmament. I

did have an experience in France, in 1939. France had gone through a period of disappointment. There had been an aspiration for some kind of United Front government, I forget the exact term. This had not arisen as a result of some kind of political 'gimmick' but as a deep distrust, perhaps fear would be a better word, of totalitarian government whose victory seemed otherwise inevitable. In Spain a liberal-socialist government had been overthrown following a civil war in which the armed forces of Germany and Italy had played an important part. In France the outcome had been a feeling of despair, and those forces which, for good or ill, bind a people together, thus forming what we describe as a nation, had lost their power to impose the kind of instinctive unity and common will that is as necessary as cultural affinities. I spent four weeks in a non-metropolitan region (Chamonix) and had introductions to the Trade Unions, attending several meetings at which formal and informal discussions took place. When I returned to London a fortnight before war started, I was convinced that France had no life and power of unity as a nation and argued that she would not last a fortnight if active war occurred. I believe that what I have called Moral Disarmament could play a vital part in our future, as I am sure it has done in the past.

Dr. K.: Yes, it seems that man in affluent society easily loses his sense of life; paradoxically, after the living standard has surpassed a certain level the subjective enjoyment of life declines. This results from the easy access to opportunities for enjoyment and also from the growing supply of ready-made, not only material but also spiritual products. Men become somehow spiritually demobilised. I think Toynbee is right that man needs a continuous challenge which, however, must be neither overwhelming (destroying the capacity of men to react adequately), nor too weak (as to be insufficiently stimulating). Man needs to fight for something more edifying than the mere satisfaction of material needs. He strives for contest even if not with arms and in shedding blood. If he feels that he can obtain everything easily or that he cannot enjoy it in some deeper dimension he feels frustrated.

SYNTHETIC VIEW

Dr. Krejčí : I have tried to give a short account of two macro- sociologically relevant lines of development, those of socio-cultural formations (civilizations) which are integrative in the essence, and politico-economic formations, which can be labelled as 'primarily structurative'. Both are, of course, interconnected. This interconnection is expressed in the basic features of these formations and is given mainly by the value orientation. However, within this value orientation there is always enough scope for alternatives, especially with respect to politico-economic formations. On the other hand, many political and economic features appeared equally in different, even very distant civilizations.

To give some examples: Within the Latin Christian civilization different power structures and also different types of ownership» and economic regulator appeared. In the political sphere four basic types may be identified: (1) feudal monarchies, with the power base consisting of knighted landlords; (2) estate monarchies, with the power base in different types of genocracy, hierocracy and possibly timocracy organized in corporate bodies; (3) autocratic monarchies, with the power base combined of praxeocracy and genocracy; and (4) city bularchic timocracies. In the economic sphere, divided ownership existed alongside with the full individual ownership, market alongside the barter economy, and serfs, villeins, sharing owners, free tenants and wage earners, all were represented among the working population. Similar types of political and economic components existed also in many Asian civilizations. It seems that religious (extra worldly) orientation of the civilizations in question favoured a social climate where variegated forms of politico-economic structure could take place. On the other hand, a worldly orientation, which is substantial for our present day civilization, turned the attention of intellectuals more to the political and economic problems; the particular value system applied just to this field is the main assertion

of this orientation. Therefore, in our days, the socio-cultural formations and politico-economic formations are more closely knit together than so often in the past.

Similar bearing to the political issues prevailed also in ancient Greece, Rome and China. Nevertheless, within those societies also a plurality of politico-economic formations appeared. However, they represented rather different stages in the civilizational development than its alternatives. Perhaps only the genocratic and timocratic tendencies and different types of means of production and to a certain extent of economic regulator were coexistent in the above-mentioned societies. In Greece and Rome the democratic tendency, however, within a limited period has to be added.

In ancient China the problem of good government was at the centre of the intellectual interest and had a strong religious connotation. The problem whether the man is 'by nature good or evil and whether he has to be governed by laws or man, were the main issues, and on their solution depended the type of power structure. The solution, however, was bound to remain within the limits of the concept of the Emperor as a heavenly mandatory due to perform the essential link between the human order and that of the universe. This produced, of course, a certain limit to the choice of alternative politico-economic formations.

In general it may be said that whereas the socio-cultural formations tend to reveal a certain pattern of development, a rather regular rhythm of integration and disintegration, the politico-economic formations do not reveal such a clear-cut tendency. Many of their elements are rather recurrent and those which are unique derive their character mostly from the development of technology and human knowledge at large. As I have indicated earlier, the changes in politico-economic formations are only loosely connected with the rhythm of socio-cultural changes as revealed by the succession of phases. Usually the political and/or economic change within one civilizational phase concerns only some elements. The complete overhaul of politico-economic formations coincides, most often, with several phases of civilizational development. This statement can be checked against the scheme on page 35 tracing the changes of the main components of politico-economic formations in Western Europe during the 2,800 years, compared with the number of civilizational phases of the area in the same time span.

The period of 2,800 years has been divided into twelve periods which, together (but not in particular instances) correspond to the twelve phases of civilizational development, among which can be divided the life span of the Early Hellenic, Late Hellenic, All Christian and Latin Christian civilizations.

This equal number of phases is rather a matter of chance, not of principle. So, e.g. politico-economic phase No. 7, which is characterized by serfs as prevailing status of the working population, lasted in Western Europe approximately 500 years (circa c.u. from A.D. 900 to 1400), whereas the more recent phases (Nos. 10 to 11) lasted together no more than 200 years. The duration of the last phase does not exceed 30/50 years, with regard to changes in individual components. On the other hand, the duration of all the socio-cultural phases can be assessed within the limits of 200-250 years.

The acceleration rate of politico-economic changes in the recent epoch results mostly from the unprecedented advancement of human knowledge and technology. This affects, primarily, the relation of man to nature with the unparalleled enhancement of human command of it. On the other hand, the integrative changes do not indicate any acceleration. It seems that the process of changing human attitudes requires approximately the same time span to become socially effective. Technical progress could hardly produce any substantial change of this rhythm. Most effective means of spreading ideas (broadcasts, TV, etc.) and of personal control are, on the other hand, offset by the growing obstacles to sealing off the area in question from the foreign influences using similar technical devices.

Of course, in tracing back the changes of societal development, we have to face different degrees of availability and reliability of historical material. Socio-cultural streams are documented most amply, comparatively speaking. The best literary talents were interested in them and a lot of telling proves has been preserved in the works of visual arts and architecture. The second best documented are the political components of the societal life. This is due to the fact that these aspects of societal life attracted also keen

interest in literary circles, the changes of power structure being very often the main channels of individual promotion or demotion. The economic means, however, which were also much cherished among intellectuals, were very often frowned upon as something less worthy of the pen. Therefore, the level of economy can be better assessed by indirect means, by remnants of what is called 'material culture', by pictorial representation of it and by preserved monuments of architecture, allowing to appreciate the economic resources used to their construction. Literary evidence which is mostly only a complementary one is often very sketchy, leaving many important questions unanswered or answered in an ambiguous way.

As an example, the controversy on the interpretation of some legal documents from the Seleucid empire can be quoted, in which cession or sale of a landed property from the king to another person in high position is reported. These documents are so formulated that the peasants settled and working on the land in question may be understood either as villeins or serfs, or free tenants -or lower sharing owners. Even if we arrive at the most plausible interpretation of such documents we cannot assess how far it might reflect the general conditions in the country.

Similar difficulties arise with regard to all civilizational areas. Even China and Japan, the political and economic history of which is comparatively well documented, leaves many white spots on their maps of politico-economic formations.

J.G.B.: One form that you have not mentioned so far are the formations of nomadic tribes.

Dr. K.: Yes, I did not because so far I have dealt only with historical and not so much with anthropological material. I centred my research on literate societies», the development of which can be better appreciated because their integrative and disintegrative forces can be better assessed in dynamic terms. Nomadic societies can be studied within this framework only so far as they penetrated the historical, i.e. civilized societies and influenced their further development. The most outstanding example of this kind were the Mongols. Their impact in the 13th century was felt in all civilizational areas of the Old World, although with different intensity.

As I said earlier, there were, in general, two extreme reactions of settled community to the nomadic invasion. Either the nomads gradually accepted the way of life of the settled community and became absorbed by it; or they preserved a certain distinct tinge and eventually were ousted from the conquered society. The first solution may be envisaged as a more normal outcome of nomadic invasion. However, it must be stressed that the assimilation pertained rather to the socio-cultural not politico-economic formations. Whereas culturally the nomads became, as a rule, thoroughly assimilated to the tradition of the country, they very often introduced new features into its political and economic structure. As one of the most conspicuous examples of this may be quoted the feudalization of Iranic society, which was the corollary to the thorough Islamization of Mongols in that area. The other solution, i.e. the ousting -of the nomads, can be listed in two instances. There were, as I also mentioned already, the evasion of the Mongols from China in the 14th century A.D. and of the Hyksos from Egypt in the 16th century B.C.

Between the mentioned extremes a compromise solution can be arrived at. The nomads were confined on a certain territory within the invaded society, where they either continued their nomadic way of life (as the Calmucs who penetrated to the lower Volga region in the 18th century A.D.) or settled down, preserving the character of a distinct ethnic and political unit within the civilization which had absorbed them (e.g. the Magyars, who came to the present-day Hungary in the 10th century A.D.). However, it could also happen that the invading community was not completely nomadic. It could be just on a temporary move — as happened with so many settled tribes during the different instances of what is usually called by the German name of *Volkerwanderung*. This occupation of new territories had usually similar outcomes as the invasion of the nomads. Invaders were usually absorbed by the socio-cultural formation of the area. Only where these newcomers revealed a special ideational individuality were they able to compete with, or even surpass the cultural tradition of the conquered society; they might have imposed their own socio-cultural

formation to it, although at a cost of borrowing many essential features from its heritage. As outstanding examples of this- super-imposition of invading -- and partly nomadic — nations to the highly developed society may be quoted the Aryan invasion of the Indus valley which gave birth to the Indo-Vedic civilization and the Muslim conquest of the most of Levant which gave birth to the Early Islamic civilization. The Hittite conquest of the core of Asia Minor, giving birth to the Para Gilgamic civilization and Aryan occupation of Iran, where subsequently the Early Mazdaic civilization originated, touched only the fringes of highly developed civilizational areas.

But as you see, all the nomadic or otherwise migrant ethnic groups became historical only after having settled down. In general, it may be said that the importance of nomadic nations has been sharply declining since the greatest outbreak of them during the 13th century. As Toynbee has amply reviewed, Russian and Chinese empires contributed most to subdue the main bases of nomadic eruptions in the Central and North- Eastern Asia. The contemporary world is no more faced with this kind of problem.

Question: What is, in terms of socio-cultural formations, the main contemporaneous problem?

Dr. K.: The contemporaneous world has one thing in common; all its socio--cultural formations are in the state of transition or, to put it in more technical terms, none of its newly emerging civilizations has yet reached the classic phase of its development. This does not exclude a high degree of integration in particular countries but, taking the civilizational areas as a whole, there is nowhere that spontaneous unity of the mode of thinking and evaluating which is a typical sign of a successfully integrated society. This period of transition is already a long-lasting phenomenon. As I have said earlier, the last classic phase in Western Europe ended about the middle of the 13th century; it lasted from c.1000-1250 A.D. In other civilizational areas the last classic phase occurred at the later time; in Eastern Europe (Russia) between 1400-1650 A.D., in China between 1400-1600 A.D., in Japan between 1100-1330 A.D., in Tibet between 1400-1700 A.D., in India and also in Further India between 1300-1550 A.D., and in the Levant between approximately 1300-1500 A.D., in Indonesia between 1550-1800 A.D.

With regard to this long time-span, the new civilizational integration should be an outcome of a not too distant future. Western Europe seems to be the nearest to this phase in its development. I have already touched on this topic in the first talk, where I mentioned some obstacles in this way. The main one is whether the positivistic mode of thinking and evaluating gives adequate basis to the spiritual integration of the society in question. In my opinion, the successful result depends upon the capability of the society's cultural elite to respond to the complex, i.e. both material and spiritual needs of the broadest strata of population.

How far these needs are connected with the past and how far with the world-wide challenge of what I called Europeanism can be seen in comparison with other societies best. If we review the situation all over the world we see everywhere the fierce struggle for ideational integration. Although the political and economic issues play important roles in the struggle and sometimes are claimed to be the paramount questions, the solution depends, as I have already said, on the specific bent of evaluations in the area concerned.

In Western Europe several countries, especially in the North and North-West, have almost succeeded in integrating their societal life on the base of a symbiosis of the Christian heritage and positivistic manner of thinking and evaluating. The same trend could be also observed in the West European civilizational offshoot — North America. In other parts of Western Europe and also the Americas the integration did not go so far. In Latin countries on both sides of the Atlantic the obstinacy of Latin Christian establishment in coming to terms with positivistic trends has been attenuated only recently. Meanwhile, a new strong competing force to the positivistic outlook emerged across these areas in different versions of Marxism.

In Eastern Europe, i.e. in Russia, the civilizational transition took at first a rather receptive outlook. Since Peter the Great, who aimed to be a founding father of Westernised Russia, until the February Revolution of

1917, this westernising trend plays the dominant role in the attempts to bring about a new socio-cultural formation of Russian society.

However, the conservational tendency was strong enough to oppose this clear-cut westernising trend. The outcome could not be otherwise than an attempt at reconstruction which would combine to sufficient extent both the modernising tendency and the traditional bent of the society which had to be transformed. This kind of answer was given by the adaptation of Marxism to Russian needs undertaken by Lenin. We cannot understand the success of his life-work without appreciating the ingenuity of how to combine the originally libertarian and egalitarian ideology with a traditional genius loci of Russia with so many elements of Byzantine and Tartar heritage. Stalin brought the Leninist compound still more to the traditional image of autocratic rule, the range of which he by far surpassed in many respects, especially in the degree of concentration of power, and in ideological orthodoxy. The actual question standing before his heirs now is whether they will be willing and able to bring their country again more close to Western Europe and how far they will take into account the general trend towards intellectual freedom, which is an inseparable corollary of scientific development without which, in its turn, the technological progress, an achievement so much cherished by the Marxist-Leninist civilization, could not be continued. Importance of genius loci is also distinctly remarkable in China.

Here the last phase of the great revolution is concerned with the adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to the Chinese cultural tradition. This adaptation is undertaken on a large scale under the present leadership of a charismatic leader who is about to play the role of a quasi-prophetic hero and at the same time founding father of the new civilizational formation in China. It was only in the last stage of the Chinese revolution when the reconstruction forces won the upper hand. They attempted at first to break through during the T'ai P'ing revolution (1850-1868) but with a temporary success only. T'ai P'ing's remained too much orientated towards the traditional pattern of Chinese revolutionary programmes. The European influence was superficial and consisted more in some religious concepts and intentions to industrialise than in the complex European attitude to life. On the other hand, the main course of Chinese revolution since 1911 until 1960 was dominated by the tendency towards reception of an alien civilization, at first of the West European (Newtonian-Cartesian) and later of the East European (Marxist-Leninist) civilization. However, it seems that this more receptive solution did not correspond to the inherent disposition of the Chinese society, and that the reconstruction — although in the first instance answering the challenge of the machine age produced and spread all over the world by the impact of Europeanism - had to be undertaken with more respect to the endogeneous tradition.

A similar problem is faced by the Indian society. However, here the charismatic leader, Mahatma Ghandi, is already dead. Unlike Mao Tsetung, Ghandi did not seem to go far enough in bringing about the reconstruction of his society nearer to the needs of his people confronted with the challenge of the contemporary world. Although the population growth by far surpassed the growth of output produced by the traditional means, Ghandi aimed at reshaping the Indian society according to the pre-industrial pattern. In the struggle for political independence he was uniquely able to bring about the time-honoured idea of non-violence (ahimsa) to its utmost practical efficiency and moral greatness. Although his contestable sainthood could make of him a great prophet, it remains to be seen whether among his followers some founding fathers will emerge who will be able to» implement his heritage to practical, viable conclusions. Until now it seems that the Indian leaders who exercise the greatest influence on the course of events are inclined more to proceed on lines of a receptive solution. This was especially the case of Nehru and is also of Mrs. Indira Gandhi. Gandhi's spiritual followers, as Vinoba Bhave and others, do not seem to have an appeal strong enough to overcome the general trend towards Europeanization and to steer the Indian society towards the reconstruction solution as envisaged by their great teacher. The main struggle, apparently, is taking place among different lines of reception — Western (Newtonian-Cartesian), Eastern (Marxist-Leninist) and Far Eastern (Maoist).

J.G.B.: What do you think of Nasser and the Arab world? Not charismatic?

Dr. K.: Possibly, but I am not quite sure of it. The combination of Arab Nationalism and Islamic Socialism which are the main tenets of his programme seems to be rather a synthesis than an original, genuine contribution to the civilizational reconstruction. Perhaps it is the sign that in the Islamic world the tendency towards reception still prevails. This can be observed also in the other parts of the Middle East. Nationalism combined with different intensity of West and East European influence can have also a disintegrating effect on the civilizational unity of the Levant, a unity which the late Islamic civilization only has brought about. I think that stronger reconstruction elements were present in the career of All Muhammad Bab in the middle of the 19th century. He attempted to combine a reformed Islamic religion with European democratic equalitarian and modernising spirit. But he failed. Since then the religious reconstruction was less stressed in the Levant. The interest was concentrated predominantly on the reception of political and economic institutions. Sometimes it was even connected with the spread of worldly attitudes at large. As the most conspicuous example may be quoted the Kemalist Turkey and, of course, the Islamic communities within the Soviet Union. The main differences between individual Islamic states consists rather in the politico-economic orientation than in the relative strength of ethnic or religious self-consciousness.

J.G.B.: That is the politico-economic view. But when you spoke of Gandhi and Mao you were speaking of the civilizational factor.

Dr. K.: Yes, these are, in my opinion, in addition to Lenin, the only attempts to initiate a complete social reconstruction, both on socio-cultural and politico-economic lines. Lenin, Gandhi and Mao had not an eclectic approach which prevails among the reformers in other parts of the world. This enabled those who were successful (Lenin and Mao) to instigate not only a new politico-economic formation but — what is from the point of view of societal integration more important — a new ideation type. This comprises the evaluation base providing the necessary orientation for practical decisions in all spheres of societal life. The success of this reconstruction was, of course, conditioned by the ingenious combination of new attitudes with old traditions.

The impact of the ideation type to the economic life has been often under-estimated. Only recently the difficulties hampering the economic advancement of developing countries have brought to the light again this forgotten parameter of social structure. This is, for instance, amply demonstrated by Gunnar Myrdal's *Asian Drama, An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*.

The conspicuous difference in successes or failures of capitalist and socialist economic order respectively cannot be explained with reference to intrinsic values of these formations alone. Whether a free entrepreneurship operating within the more or less free market or a state entrepreneurship operating according to the more or less binding plan fits better to a particular country depends wholly on the particular circumstances in this country, on its propensities to work, to consume, to save, to take on an entrepreneurial risk and to abide at the same time by the rules of proper conduct.

When there is no entrepreneurial spirit, no scope for capital accumulation for necessary investment, the only way to bring about what the economists call 'take off' is the state initiative combined with central planning. Neither Peter the Great in Russia, nor Salazar in Portugal, were able, in spite of their good intentions and power concentrated in their hands, to give rise to an accelerated economic growth of their respective countries on the capitalist lines. Even Salazar, a convinced adherent of liberal economy, was obliged to embark on state enterprise when he wanted to enlarge Portuguese industry. On the other hand, one cannot imagine how Great Britain and the other European countries could manage to embark on both industrial revolution, which started 200 years ago, and so-called technical revolution which started just recently, without a certain scope for entrepreneurial freedom and operation of market forces.

But nothing is more erroneous than to infer that what succeeded in Western Europe and, on a still larger scale, in North America, has to succeed in all other parts of the world. Of all the Asiatic countries, only Japan and Israel have shown that attitude to the economic issues which can best bring results within the

framework of market economy and free enterprise. Otherwise in Asia the case is strongly in favour of statism and central, direct planning. On the other hand, the experience of several countries in central Europe with this type of economy is not encouraging. Despite the great rate of growth, neither satisfaction of consumer nor the balance of input in the work done and output in goods and services produced, develop favourably. The case is similar with the respective merits of democracy and authoritarian rule, or to put it the other way round, of different power bases and different degrees of power constellation. Where a certain level of economic standard and education is attained and when it is combined with sufficient self-restraint in social behaviour, there is a strong case for pluralistic and representative rule with a laocratic base of power. Where these pre-conditions are not fulfilled, all attempts to impose a rule on these lines are doomed to failure. On the other hand, when a supremational or even unitary constellation of power, combined with a bularchic or autocratic supreme holder of power, is imposed on a nation which is conditioned for pluralistic and representative regime, this nation will naturally strive to relax the limitations put on the political and cultural, and possibly also economic, action of their individual members.

This all bears witness to the fact that the pros and cons in political and economic systems are not a matter of these systems themselves but that they must be judged in view of other components of social life, i.e. with respect to mental attitudes which reflect the mode of thinking and evaluating of the society concerned. As I have indicated earlier, a certain manner of thinking and evaluating forms a constitutive element of individual socio-cultural formations (civilizations). From it the hierarchy of values is derived. The ranging of economic values in this hierarchy, the stress laid on individual freedom or on the devotion to the collectivity respectively, all this forms the most important pre-condition of the basic orientation of the politico-economic formation in a particular case.

Therefore, those who would like to change the political and economic system must take into account also the possible change of the mode of thinking and evaluating; this kind of change, of course, is much more difficult. It can be achieved only gradually with the help of prolonged psychological propaganda and re-education which both cannot completely ignore the traditional proclivities. Only those reformers and prophets who did understand and respect this were successful.

Human creativity may well go beyond the established patterns of life but if it should be socially effective, it must not ignore the basic attitudes of the community in question, and if these should be altered, it cannot be achieved; but gradually only, in accordance with the possible speed of socio-psychological mutation which is virtually the natural rhythm of social life.

Of course, it must be also realised that only a spontaneous integration can be successful. Toynbee rightly pointed out that this can be achieved rather by imitation than coercion. Naturally, no society can exist without a certain amount of coercion. The question, however, is how far it is used and whether it is the main means to keep the society together.

Discussion

J.G.B.: How does one fit this context to the concept of natural law? It seems that the legislation, the jurisprudence, are related to the power structure, as in Roman law. It is a form of the exercise of power although they had certainly concepts of natural right. For example, our repugnance to taking human life and cruelty, which in other cultures, like the Iroquois or Aztec cultures, were regarded as falling outside of natural rights. Natural right is directly connected with the ideation; it is one of the basic elements of the culture as a culture. But how far can one say that there is an independent process, an independent form in which natural rights are exercised? How is the individual able to assert his rights within a society? For example, a restriction must be placed upon the power structure itself. Even in an absolute monarchy there are certain recognized restrictions of a moral character.

Dr. K.: This is a very important point. In all civilizations, even the most autocratic, rule was, in the long run, limited by certain basic concepts, by something which was higher than the emperor or king's will. In Pharaonic Egypt, and similarly in China, it was the idea of cosmic order, as part of which the main laws governing mankind were also envisaged. The social order had to be in harmony with cosmic order and the ruler had to behave accordingly. It was the concept of Ma'at in Egypt and the concept of Tao in China. As a result of this the Chinese Emperor was bound by the historical precedents and his learned advisers had to inform him on the examples given by his predecessors. If the Emperor did not behave properly (the proof of it was, for instance, bad harvests, diseases or disturbances) it was a sign that the harmony between the cosmic and social order was disturbed and the Emperor lost the mandatary of heaven. The people (i.e. practically the political elite) had the right to revolt and bring about a new dynasty. (However, the literati in China did not develop any procedural rules as to how this overthrow of dynasty should take place, as was, for instance, conceived by the Magna Carta in this country. Therefore, it practically gave free opportunity to any usurper.)

Similarly, Indian and Muslim rulers had to observe the prescripts of religious law. These were - in Indian case — laid down in very elaborate manuals (dharmashastra), dating from remote antiquity and accumulating during the centuries. Islamic law, on the other hand, was a product of intellectual ingenuity which managed to develop from the casuistic utterances of Qur'an and of Muhammad's sayings viable legal systems.

J.G.B.: Is our natural law not similar to Tao? Is not this also a concept of a higher harmony which overrides the human law? Tao was the concept of the sky. The ruler has to reconcile sky and earth, there are certain sky laws, which I would call Great Spirit concepts.

Dr. K.: Really there is an analogy, but I think still more with the Egyptian concept of Ma'at. This concept seemed originally to unite indiscriminately the social and cosmic aspects. However, in due course, the idea of moral obligation grew away. Morality was conceived as practical doctrine, essentially utilitarian, which man was supposed to learn. This was apparently the first concept of natural law in history.

J.G.B.: And in the present-day world, how do you see this situation?

Dr. K.: We have accepted the idea of natural rights, which means that there are some ethic principles which should not be circumvented by actual legal order of individual estates.

J.G.B.: This is legalised, but what you are speaking of is a kind of moral imperative which doesn't require to be legalised.

Dr. K.: Its functioning depends upon the consensus within the society, upon the state of integration and disintegration.

J.G.B.: But what is behind this?

Dr. K.: Behind this is either a transcendental belief or a utilitarian concept. We are now in this respect at a loss. Enlightenment was inclined to favour utilitarian concepts. To abide by moral laws was a matter of reason, as with the ancient Egyptians. However, as I said earlier, utilitarian morality may under certain circumstances be less binding than morality rooted in religious beliefs, or similar transcendental conviction.

J.G.B.: My question is whether, when you codify the principles of natural law, you transfer it from the ideational to the political and economic, or whether it continues to belong to the ideational. Is the codification a removal of it from the value system, or the beginning of the removal?

Dr. K.: I think that moral permeates all the levels or planes of societal life; even if we can conceive moral principles as a constitutive part of respective socio-cultural formations, these very principles influence the orientation of politico-economic formations, also. The law provides the level or junction between these two planes.

J.G.B.: My question is really this: whether codification, as, for example, when the Rights of Man were codified in the United Nations Charter or in any other codification of natural rights, does not this lead to an almost immediate regression and almost immediate loss of something in the content by having been given

a fixed form? The people begin to rely upon the code and no longer upon the moral attitude. Is it possibly true that the work in the 18th century with the Encyclopaedists and Voltaire and Rousseau, that the effect of trying to make morality explicit removed the imperative, the moral sense of obligation? In becoming an external obligation it ceased to be an internal obligation. When the attempt to set up moral codes for the nations of the world was made explicit in the United Nations Charter, this outward form seems to have removed the inner obligation to act morally and people began to rely on the form as an excuse. Has not this cycle repeated itself many times?

Dr. K.: This may be true, but I cannot imagine another way of proceeding. To make moral precepts effective, one must codify them, and even this might not be sufficient. It might even be necessary to address moral postulates not only to individuals but to social institutions also. To give an example, it is not sufficient to proclaim equal rights for education. It is necessary to guarantee free access to it through an adequate system of grants and other material facilities. Social insurance is another example of bringing the moral principle to practical implementation through adequate institution. I think that such an institutionalization of moral precepts represents the most important positive step in the moral development. However, I understand Mr. Bennett's fear that codifications and institutionalization of moral postulates may make man's conscience less sensitive and demobilize his moral feeling. Man might become accustomed to rely on public institutions without thinking on his own contribution and endeavour. Nevertheless, even so, I think it is a lesser evil than to leave the poor and sick, exploited and humiliated, to the mercy of those few who will and are able to help.

I think we have attained the stage when the moral code cannot simply be preached but needs to be effectively implemented by social action. Chartists in this country were the heroes of this concept and what made this country better since those days has been achieved, in my opinion, mainly along the lines which they have indicated.

So we return to the old Chinese wisdom. When the man is not good enough in himself the law might be evoked to make him behave as if he would be so.

AN ATTEMPT TO FORECAST THE FUTURE

J. G. Bennett : We now have to try to set out beyond the story of the Present Moment to explore into the future with the help of the model which our discussions have provided. My own contribution to the model began at an early stage in the identification — I hope more or less correctly - of streams of culture which originated in some transcendental source, which took the form of demiurgic intervention in human life. This interaction resulted first of all in the four basic beliefs of man. The belief in a creative power, the belief in a spirit power, the belief in a saviour power and the belief in a mother power. These four forms of belief have been combined in different ways in the basic creeds of man-kind and they have, in their turn, led to corresponding cultural structures or mental attitudes that have affected the visible life of man in his response to the needs and urges of his body and psyche.


It is quite clear from the study of history that man's basic beliefs affect his behavioural attitudes; but there are other factors that are independent of beliefs. There are primarily the climatic factors which make the conditions of existence different in the tropical regions from what they are in the extreme north, and from what they are in the temperate regions. These, in their turn, have a profound influence on the modes of existence and so influence man's ways of thinking. One cannot expect the same kind of activity from people living under quite different climatic conditions, and with that one cannot expect the same modes of thought. Therefore there are at least two groups of complicating factors; one is the kinds of beliefs that people hold, and the other is the environmental conditions under which they live.

Dr. Krejčí has made the distinction, which I find extremely valuable, between the political-economic structuring of society and the ideational integration of society. That is to say, there are factors which give the form to a society and other factors which give it content. One can ascribe the former to the value system and the latter to the environmental influences. I am going to propose a model to help us in analysing these various elements in human societies. The material environment is the entire system with which the human body is in a state of transflux equilibrium. There is also the mind, by which I mean the seat of our experiencings and as such can be distinguished from the body. And I am going to speak of the spiritual environment, which includes the value systems that man accepts, feeling that they do not come from himself, and therefore can be called environmental. The solid lines represent a flow of influences, or actions, that originate in the material environment and the broken lines represent a flow that comes from the spiritual environment. With this simple model, I shall try to discuss our problem. Let us start with the arrow on the lower left side representing the senses. The entire action of the material environment upon man comes through his senses; he has no other contact with it. The connection between the body and the mind I am going to designate as urges. We have all kinds of urges coming from the actual needs of the body, its habits, its acquired artificial needs—all come through a series of urges which influence our experiencings. The organization of this side of the situation, which is going to include a regulation of the urges and the satisfaction of requirements, corresponds to the politico-economic system. On the right hand side, the mind acts on the body by means of instruments. The left half of the diagram is the cultural system, which also includes cultural elements, that is to say, the activities of man associated with his beliefs. In general, all these have the quality of direction. Man has to give effect to his value-system by means of behaviour — behaviour being first of all in the bodily instruments, how he acts, how he speaks, and so on — all this is the primary instrumental system, and all his developed techniques are an extension of this instrumental side. The way in which man uses all this depends upon his value-system, upon his mental states.

Now, if we are going to accept that there is also an element transcendental to man, then we shall say that the ideals are not something which arise out of the urges, but initiate a kind of counter-current. We observe certain ideals that man accepts as being not of his own volition, but as something that is an ideal or set of ideals that is given him. At different times he gives different forms to the ideal system. In general, whatever they may be, they form an integrated whole in so far as they are shared by people, and generally there is a social need for sharing. Therefore we observe a movement such that man's ideals determine the kind of direction that is given to his behaviour and his actions.

The completion of the politico-economic model is very important for the theme that I am trying to develop. If there is some action in this direction, it cannot be an action of control because, by hypothesis, this is transcendental to man. It cannot be an action of influencing and forming. Therefore I say that one must call it service.

Summarizing this extremely simplified model of the human situation, we have the external, material environment and the internal spiritual environment; we have the body with its instruments and its senses which makes it responsive to the-material environment and able to act upon it, and the mind which is able to appreciate ideals and convert them into directives. And also that there is the regulation of the urges in order to convert them into a service to the ideal. This ideal need not be a religious one, at least in any theological sense, because one can have the kind of ideal which can become for a community a dominant ideal and which people find themselves bound to serve. A society is then regulated in its politico-economic structure to enable this service to be given by all its members. If, on the other hand, we look at the other extreme of a theocratic society, where the ideal is regarded as a divine decree which man has to obey, then again the politico-economic structure is devised so as to enable this response to the divine decree to be organized.



For example, we see this in the intention of Charlemagne in setting up the Carolingian power in order to enable the Church to become operative in society, through a politico-economic structure. The same thing happened at the beginning of the Ottoman Empire in the 15th century when the purpose before the fall of Constantinople was certainly that the politico-economic power should serve simply as an instrument of the divine purpose, which was then to be held to be the establishment of an ideal theocratic society. In other words, the model is itself sufficiently general to enable us to represent on the one hand materialistic

communism which aims at carrying out the processes of the dialectic which will lead to an ideal society of the future, or on the other hand theocratic autocracy aiming at establishing the Kingdom of God here and now. The purely theocratic system allows no room for human choice but only for obedience, and the purely materialistic one also allows no room for human freedom, also only for obedience. Between these we have various liberal systems; liberal systems of belief in which man is held to have some independent contribution to make to the achievement of the ideal. The ideal itself may be that of human freedom regarded as an end in itself as distinct from the ideal of a perfect society. This again results, in one extreme case, in an existential philosophy, and certain notions as to the kind of free politico-economic system that is going to allow this counterflow eventually to serve the purpose which is the complete free self-expression of the individual.

I think that the model is in itself sufficiently general to accommodate any system of beliefs and any structuring of society. The main point about this is that I accept Dr. Krejčí's conclusion that there is neither an a priori reason why the two sides of the model should be geared to one another or have an identical rhythm of flourishing and decay. I think one can also say that it is possible to accommodate, with a given ideational system, a variety of politico-economic structures, each of which appear, at the time, to satisfy the requirements of this ideal system. Therefore you do not get a one-to-one correspondence between politico-economic systems and cultural systems, because the one is presumed to be a movement from a single basic concept of what is the ideal that man accepts, or the ideal system that man accepts, and it afterwards may take various forms when it comes into activity. But there can also be a series of converging paths which may eventually merge into one; or may fail to hit the target and produce results that are quite contrary to what was the avowed or even sincere intention of those who initiated them. The reason for this is that it is necessary to get a cross-harmony between the two streams represented. The link that I call directives refers to the ethic that the individual accepts in his own behaviour-pattern. Now this may not at all correspond to the regulating system that is imposed on him in order to organise his handling of the urges that come from the soma. This leads to the conflict between morality and conscience, if we take it there is such a thing as conscience, an authentic awareness by man of his relationship to the ideal and a sensitivity that will influence his behaviour according to his ideals. This may be quite different in its operation from the regulation of behaviour. This is why I asked earlier for clarification about the distinction between a regulating system which belongs to the politico-economic structure and a directive system which belongs to the cultural system. If we institutionalize, if we can work the directive system into a set of prescriptions and prescribe according to our natural or supernatural feelings of what is right—such as a feeling of what is right in our behaviour towards our fellow men—when we code this, then we actually are transferring to the left side something which needs to remain on the right. The result of this is that if there is not a balance between the codification of notions of right and wrong behaviour and the spontaneous inner recognition of what is just and what is unjust — if we accept that one can make this distinction — then this impoverishes this line and the result of this is that there is no longer any clear reason why one's instruments should be used in any particular way. This cycle breaks down if there is an attempt to short-circuit it here by converting the inner direction into a codification of external practice. I am putting this forward now simply as a convenient descriptive method.

Now let us see how we stand in relation to this. We are now in the last third of the 20th century and we must look ahead to the next hundred years. There are problems on both sides of this picture. There are problems of a politico-economic kind. They are obvious; the problems connected with the danger of a world War; the problems connected with the population explosion, the food crisis; the problems connected with pollution and wastage of natural resources. All of those, as you can see, are somehow connected with this question of our relationship with our environment.

We have to consider these in the light of the very important point that Dr. Krejčí made that there is a kind of basic unpredictability and lack of normative principle in the analysis of the politico-economy.

This I describe in terms of the concept of hazard. Hazard is not just an accident of inadequate human organization or lack of sufficient knowledge, but is inherent in material systems, all of which are subject to uncertainty. This uncertainty is on one side necessary because without this, there could be no progress and no change. If at any moment the relation of man to his material environment and to 'his sense experiences, were to cease to have uncertain and unpredictable elements; we should crystallise into a fixed structure which would be incapable of being changed, either for better or for worse. This is quite contrary to our experience and I think quite repugnant to us also as human beings.

The question is whether the same kind of hazard arises in the other direction, of our response to the ideal. I am sure you will agree that there is also hazard here: but the hazard in this case concerns communication rather than the interplay of events. Let me take as an assumption that there is a purpose in human existence and that this purpose is slowly working itself out over the ages. We can suppose that if we knew this purpose we should willingly serve it because it would be no benefit to us to kick against the pricks. Obviously we do not know the situation. We may dimly divine that there is some direction in social evolution of human life on the earth. Mankind is moving towards something that has at least certain properties like greater integration, greater harmony and greater mutual understanding. But we cannot possibly be sure about this because inherently there is no means of verifying it. One of the essential elements in a communication system, that is, the possibility of verifying the communication, is here lacking. We require some kind of independent verification — I am making a slight digression here because it will illustrate what I mean by this. Let us suppose that there is some such pattern of which there is some consciousness somewhere, as I myself believe, but that the majority of people are unable to be aware of this. Then they need some kind of link with it. This is the prophetic concept, to which Dr. Krejčí referred. The role of a prophet is not to invent an ingenious solution of human problems out of his own mind, but to interpret a vision. He is an interpreter, a channel of communication, and he accepts this mission and behaves as such. Either one believes that his communication is a valid one from higher sources, or one does not; but one cannot call him a prophet unless that is how he understands his mission. If he is not a visionary he may be a reformer; but a reformer plays an entirely different role from a prophet. The reformers are usually those who, using their common sense, their feeling for human rights and love of their fellow men recognise some defects or injustices in the system in which they are living and in the light of their own experience try to get others to act. A prophet is not like this, and the notion I am putting forward is that the prophetic role is inherent in the concept of the transition from the ideal to the ordinary human mind.

Ordinary people may be aware of an ideal that has been revealed, but it has been revealed to them from outside. Their understanding of ideals, their attitudes, their mental processes, have been derived from an environment. This comes from the spiritual environment, the culture and civilisation of their time, but it has entered into the human environment, in what Dr. Krejčí calls the heroic stage, through heroes, through prophets or interpreters who have been the instrumental means by which a system of ideals or values has been set up. From this there has been the development of a new cycle of civilization. It is very interesting and, to my mind an extremely important point—and I hope that when we have the chance of reading Dr. Krejčí's work as a whole it will be established in such a way that it will enter human thinking on the subject — that there should be a rhythm, a cycle, a recognizable regularity in this, but not in the politico- economic sphere. Because if this is true, it is evidence that one is purposive and the other is unguided. This will be an extremely important contribution towards the reforming of ideas for the next period of human life, and therefore I sincerely hope that the Work will become better known and will make the impact that it deserves. It has always been my own conviction that there is this distinction between a purposive, intentional entry of value-systems into human life as distinct from an uncertain, tentative response to material influences that reach man through his environment by way of his body and his mind.

We have to accept the basic fact that we cannot liberate ourselves from our dependence upon sense perception. Everything we know, all our actions and reactions depend upon this strange and unreliable

channel of communication that connects us with the external world. But there is another strange and also uncertain channel of communication, and that is the one that connects our minds with the ideal or spiritual world. The two operate quite differently. Every one of us, every human being, is concerned in communication between the material environment and the body; but, in general, people have been dependent upon intermediaries to set up for them a kind of substitute spiritual environment in a form of the value system of the civilization to which they belong. I call it the value system, a substitute because it reaches us through the sensory channel; we have to be told, to hear, to see and observe things, we watch the example of other people. With this a kind of image of the ideal is formed and people have to live by this image, being incapable of a direct perception of the spiritual reality. It seems very probable that the evolution of man is in the direction of an increasing and more general ability to have direct perceptions of the spiritual world; and that each of the great changes in the human process has been a change in the direction of the spreading, over a greater proportion of the human race, of the direct ability to perceive. I think that some such change is happening at the present time and this change is the chief reason for the general malaise. People feel that they ought to have a direct perception and not rely upon a second-hand or substitute value system; but they have not achieved it yet. Mankind is a long way from having this power universally developed. And yet there is a genuine need for it, to which I shall come back, having first set up this notion of the two kinds of hazard. One is the kind of uncertainty that accompanies all material processes because of the simple fact that it is never possible to actualize all that it potential in the material situation and therefore, whatever happens, there always has to be something lost, or something missing from any action that involves material transformation. The other is the hazard of communication, the uncertainties that all of us have and that mankind has at all times, and even the great prophets have had at moments, during interludes between the feeling of direct perception, as to what the scene reveals to them and the feeling of being completely cut off from the Source. In other words, the uncertainty of communication seems to be a universal phenomenon, although it is different for different people. Just as the hazard of material transformation is a universal phenomenon, but obviously different for different kinds of processes.

Now let us look again at the situation that we have here in front of us. We have certain very severe problems that can cause great anxiety. Not one of these problems connected with our relationship with the material environment is technically insoluble. It is clearly technically feasible to destroy all weapons of war, so that there is no technical problem in not having war. It is easy to stabilise the world population—we have already means of control and Within the next twenty years undoubtedly the means of control will be such that there will be no technical problem at all in stabilising the world population at any desirable figure. The desired figure presumably will be one in which the World population can be adequately fed with the food-supplies that can become available without excessive destruction of the biosphere and pollution of the atmosphere. It is probable that the world population that we shall have at the end in about 1990, which is about four billion, will be one that the world could comfortably feed with the technology that will then be available. Developments in plant genetics in the last few years have demonstrated that the production of grains and animal protein in the developing countries can be doubled. Even now food production is increasing more rapidly than the population. The problems of pollution are not technical; it is possible to handle waste in such a way as not to cause pollution; it is possible to conserve natural resources without excessive depletion of most important reserves of fuel, metals and vegetable materials. The economic problems of the world, such as distribution, inequality of the developed and developing nations, these again are not technical but human problems. There is no technical difficulty in equalising the production and distribution of resources and artefacts of all kinds.

All this must be clear in our minds, because then we shall be able to face the fact that all these problems are, in their very essence, both in their arising, and in the practicability of their solution, psychological. They arise from the mind of man rather than from his body. The body of man is certainly very greedy, and it

makes demands. One of its most awkward demands is that for sexual intercourse which, in the average man, by far exceeds the requirements of maintaining the population. Even this problem is connected with our own mental attitude. Like all the others, of over-population, of maldistribution of wealth and so on and the cessation of war, it could all be resolved if there were the will to do it. Now, it is quite clear to us all that there is not the will to do it, and there will not be, in the foreseeable future. There is no chance that people will willingly make the necessary sacrifices to enable these problems to be solved unless they are faced with such critical dangers that they will be forced by sheer terror to accept some kind of politico-economic restraint upon the urges that basically arise from the greed of our bodies.

We appear to be near the solution of one of the problems; that is, the prevention of war for no other reason than that people are too much afraid of the consequences. Few people are so naive as to suppose that human goodness, or morality, or sense of duty or love of kind have played any significant part in maintaining the balance of power by which war has been averted for the last twenty years and is very likely to be averted in the future. This is nothing else than a stronger bodily urge, that is, the actual fear of being destroyed oneself instead of satisfying the urge to destroy others.

Let us make an assumption which must be accompanied by the provision that it is an uncertain one. It is hazardous because accidents may occur that upset all calculations. But let us make the assumption that in the course of the next thirty years these major somatic problems, problems connected with our bodily demands, bodily greed, will be solved. What will remain? Shall we find ourselves in front of an utopia and happy and stable human society? This is extremely unlikely because of the nature of the human mind. There has never been any indication that the human mind is able to be satisfied by what satisfies the body. We have a very remarkable evidence of this in the history of this country over the last two hundred years, that is, the time from the first poor laws to the full establishment of the welfare state, to which Dr. Krejčí referred today. The desperate bodily needs and bodily injustices of the beginnings of the industrial revolution were mainly due to the failure of the politico-economic system to adapt itself to the changes that occurred through the arising of the new technology. People set themselves to struggle against injustice and it was a very exciting struggle. When I was a boy, 60 years ago, this was something that mattered to people enough to absorb the mental energies of many of the most active minds of that time. In one lifetime a great deal has been achieved. The difference between the present politico-economic structure of this country and what it was two hundred years ago, is very great; but there is no evidence at all that this has been accompanied by an increase of harmony, by any sense of completed achievement.

The contrast between material achievement and psychological failure is due to a factor which I now must introduce into our discussion. This factor consists in the ambivalent character of the human mind. I shall describe this by saying that we have in our minds a sheep and a wolf. The sheep is that part of the mind which is essentially lazy and is satisfied to be stimulated from outside. This lazy part of the mind is the one which is naturally in control when the body is under severe pressure. The mind is then satisfied to be occupied with the immediate needs of the body, as a sheep is concerned solely with browsing and food collection and the satisfaction of its bodily needs. The wolf is an entirely different animal; the wolf has to hunt in order to be satisfied; its food must be hunted and the hunting is an essential part of its life activity. This is characteristic of the other part of the human mind. This sounds perhaps as if one is using a rather 'harsh metaphor; but one can look upon a wolf or a tiger as a noble beast because, not being a carrion-eater, of its need to run down its prey before it can be satisfied with its food. Let us look at this side of our mind. The wolf in us is our curiosity, our need to know, and perhaps it is the seat of our need to create that I spoke about earlier. It is characteristic of human nature that we have this side of our mind, so that when the sheep is satisfied, then the wolf in us begins to howl. It works in such a way that, as soon as something is seen as a necessity of the mind, as the pursuit of social justice was seen to be a necessity in Victorian England, then the creative and curious minds turned their attention towards the social problems of man. When this awakening of the mind to the need to create a new kind of society was once common, then the

pursuit went on, and it went on for more than a century. The result has been a certain profound social change. For a certain time there was a sense of achievement; but now, once again, there is an awakening. The same thing is happening in other countries. The example of Sweden is one of the most striking because in Sweden there is a more perfect politico-economic system than we have, greater stability, and I think greater social justice. Possibly about as great as has ever been achieved in human history. And yet, the degree of dissatisfaction of the mind in Sweden is probably greater than almost in any other country. The same thing is happening in the United States. There is an enormous material achievement that justifies the confidence that the material problems of which I have spoken will be solved. It is commonly said that they will be accomplished before the end of this century. And yet there is a highly disturbed state of mind, which becomes more acute from year to year.

Now we tend to look — because we do not understand the working of the mind sufficiently — upon these states of disturbance as pathological, as if something had gone wrong, because people who have every reason to be satisfied but are not satisfied. We conclude that something must be wrong with them. This is a totally wrong diagnosis. This dissatisfaction is an awakening of that part of the mind which needs a challenge and which cannot be satisfied with having fodder shovelled into its feeding trough. It follows from this that, even if we do succeed in solving all our material problems, the main hazard will still be with us. In my opinion it is reasonably probable that man will solve the technical problems; but this will not result either in stability or in a satisfying condition for the world. It will bring entirely new problems, problems that will be connected mainly with the failure of the right-hand, that is the value oriented side of our model. We may succeed in establishing a satisfactory relationship with the material environment, in supplying the needs of the body, even in setting up a workable politico-economic system in the sense of having a unified world economy which will secure reasonable equality to all the peoples of the world. If there were a unified world economy, probably the political hazards would not be of very great importance.

My contention is that, even if -all these conditions were satisfied, man would remain in an extremely tense condition. I said 'even if', but I should perhaps put it the other way round: the more these conditions are satisfied, the greater will be the tension and the danger of a break-down of the whole system; because there will be, in fact, no longer any reason why people should exercise their power of decision in one way rather than in another. This of course is not just guess-work, because we can see today that this kind of question is already being asked very widely: "Why should I learn something? Why should I train? Why should I work? Why should I accept any form of constraint or organization? Who is to answer me what principle justifies any of these things? If you tell me that if I don't work I shall starve, I know it is not true, because I know I shall not starve, as someone will feed me. If you say to me that if I do not work there will be a war, I shall say, what nonsense, if none of us work there will be no weapons and therefore no reason for having a war."

It must be obvious that the questions of the mind are not answerable in terms of the politico-economic structure. Men have tried to set up answers without involving ideas of God or the soul. There has been a sincere and serious search for answers during the last hundred and thirty years, since the revolutions of 1847. It is interesting to note that the present idealists are seeking for some new value-system to which man would give consent and which he would accept as having been revealed to him. This search has been in progress for some time, as distinct from reforms, which went on earlier than this. If we take the Far East to start with, there was the Tai P'ing movement in China, which really was an attempt to provide a new system of ideals with the breakdown of the Manchu ideals. There was the Brahmo Samaj movement in India, which attempted to replace the breakdown in confidence in the caste system. There was the Babist movement in Islam, with its attempt to replace the rigidity of the Muslim moral code by something more acceptable to people. There was the communist manifesto and Comte's Positivism, which were attempts to replace the Christian ethic by a solid humanitarian ethic directed towards the future. There were also various other-worldly but not religious conceptions; the spiritualist movement, for instance, which tried to

set up an acceptable ideal, based upon the conviction that there was a life after death. Spiritualists have hoped that this itself would form an ideal system on which directives could be based. There was the existentialist movement, starting with Kierkegaard and others which set up the basic idea that man is the source of his own ideals and must accept to live by them; with the corollary that man must be sufficiently radical in his acceptance of his responsibility. Finally, and perhaps the most important of all, came the belief that science itself could provide a substitute for revelation.

All these movements originating in every part of the world were attempts to find some sort of ideal system which could be a substitute for the breakdown of religious systems of belief. We should note that the search for humanist solutions followed a period of reform and renewal that was not confined to Christendom. Early in the 19th century, for example, the Wahabis attempted to find means of going back to primitive Islam. This was followed by a general crisis throughout the Islamic world. There were crises in Hinduism, in Buddhism, and there were also the Japanese and the Chinese crises. The whole way through, there has been a search for something which could be a substitute for the dualistic morality of salvation and damnation which was inherent in megalanthropic religion. The rejection of dualism characterizes this searching period when great numbers of people turned away from religion in the hope that service to mankind could provide a solution of the problem.

Now we have to face the really terrible realisation that this search has failed. I think that this is perhaps the most devastating — not tragical — realisation of our time, and it is by no means generally accepted because of the vast amount of injustice that still remains in the world.

We see the necessity of dealing with such material problems that confront the World as the grossly unjust imbalance between the developed and the undeveloped nations and the difficulties that are arising out of man's inability to regulate his sex life. And we think that we must keep our attention on such problems before we think of something else. But the truth is that there is not time for that because man has been overtaken by the revolt against the established systems.

To understand this we may look back to the example of Antonine Rome. Under the Antonine Emperors Rome enjoyed a stability which, from our modern point of view, looks terribly unjust and unsatisfying because of the dreadful social injustice it tolerated; but it appeared to enlightened Romans that they had found a permanent system. Little did they realise that within two or three generations their society would disintegrate. At that time, there was also preparing the advent of the Christian religion, which was able, just about in time, to save the total collapse of western civilization. Dr. Krejčí referred to the reforms of saints Benedict and Gregory only a few centuries later; but these had to be prepared beforehand. Therefore, if we are to look forward to the future, we have to see what kind of new ideals can really satisfy people and create the beginnings of a new Epoch and may be in course of preparation out of sight today.

It is probably true that all these movements to which I have referred are a sort of half-blind stretching out towards something. Some were syncretistic movements like the Brahma Samaj and Bahaism, which sought to combine Christian, Muslim and Hindu ethics. The assumption seems to be that there is so much truth in the different cultures that if only we could combine them all together we should get still more truth. But in practice, by combining you only dilute, or you even nullify. The failure of the Brahma Samaj in India, of Bahaism in Iran, of the Tai Ping in China, the failure of the communist manifesto; are all evidence that new wine cannot be put into old bottles. The attempt to see the solution of the problem in purely humanistic terms had something to it. Obviously, we all of us must see that something important happened about 1848, and the fact that it has been misunderstood and that nothing corresponding to the ideals that were expressed has in fact been realised, must not make us overlook that there was a reaching out towards a new set of values which would combine the sense of the importance of man with the sense of some transcendental purpose. To put this purpose solely into the future, to say that we are working towards an ideal society which will be arrived at by an inexorable dialectic process, has already been proved to be unrealistic and contrary to history. Just as the Hegelian dialectic even more quickly proved itself to be

unworkable as an explanation of the historical process. But this does not mean that what was being sought for was not important. The conviction that there must be some value system in which all people can share is important, and we have to ask ourselves the question: What is the new value system, the Master Idea of the New Epoch, going to be?

In my opinion it is this: people can share in the conviction that human life on the earth has in fact a purpose, that there is truly a direction in human life. This is a comparatively new idea; we are now so accustomed to the idea of progress that we do not find it easy to remember that two hundred years ago the idea of progress was not part of man's mental furniture. The idea of progress was the work of men like Voltaire and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Perhaps this was the first stirring of the new value system. For a man like Rousseau it was not progress of a purely materialistic kind, it was associated with the idea of a progress connected with some transcendental purpose. The entry of the notion of evolution, combined with that of the dialectic, seemed to point towards non-purposive progress. People have held on to this with great tenacity for the last hundred years because it seemed to be that a non-theological doctrine of evolution was the only escape from the superstitions of an earlier age. There was the wish, exemplified in Auguste Comte, to produce a non-theological system for man that would, at the same time establish an acceptable morality.

The progress of biological and physical sciences, and advance of our historical knowledge and our better understanding of human psychology, have combined to make it necessary to accept a transcendental element in the notion of progress. We must accept that human progress is in response to a purpose which we exist to serve. We should be trying to understand this purpose and we should also accept something which would mean a return to the very early Zoroastrian concept, of the purpose itself being hazardous. We should recognize a very deep uncertainty as to whether the purpose could be fulfilled, and with this recognize also the necessity for man to co-operate with it.

This is why I have accepted the notion of cosmic or universal hazard. This seems to be the only way of removing one fundamental difficulty, which I have not yet referred to but which I think everybody is acutely aware of. That is the contradiction in the notion of a transcendental purpose. If it is associated with the notion of divine omnipotence, the achievement of the cosmic purpose must be guaranteed and it follows that man has no part or contribution to make in it except to stand and wait. The Christian version that man is made 'to love and worship God' has proved to be unacceptable to the human mind as it has come to realize its own extraordinary capacity for discovery and creation. Apart from this are the problems of evil and suffering and of the monstrous burden of injustice which seems to be totally incompatible with belief in a loving and all-powerful God. The most important step we can make is to discard once and for all the notion of divine omnipotence. Once we are free from this artificial notion, a new set of ideas begins to be possible. We can accept that, although there is a very important purpose and although this purpose itself is progressively revealed to mankind by prophets and sages, there is nothing inevitable about its fulfilment. We can see it as involved in a two-fold hazard; the hazard connected with inscrutability, the impossibility of knowing this purpose sufficiently to co-operate well with it, and also the hazard connected with the nature of material events, which means that there is always an uncertainty in the completion of any directed process. Nature has taken this second kind of uncertainty into account in her proliferation of means.

If we look back to what I said about the human mind in its predatory aspect, its curiosity and need to create, then we can see that the scheme begins to have some sense in it. Man is constructed in such a way that he has an extreme thirst and desire to know the purpose of his existence. His mind is not satisfied unless it can hunt its own prey. For this, he has to have a glimpse of the goal; something which will attract him" and set him out on the hunt. This smell of the prey is what is given us by prophets and sages. If we look at it in this Way we can see that the time is approaching when it will be necessary that people should be given some hint that there is a way out of our dilemma. We must be motivated by the conviction that the search itself is the fulfilment of our personal destiny, and also a way out for the world. The doctrine of

universal hazard gives a rationale for concerted human effort other than the achievement of the static existence of the sheep with adequate food. This necessity is, in my opinion, going to grow more and more acute as the sheep comes to be better fed. So long as the sheep was hungry — this is the peculiar way in which our minds work — then the wolf remains asleep and the needs of the sheep, the needs of the body, in other words, are able to occupy the energies and the activities of man. When the sheep is eating comfortably, then the wolf awakens. This is seen historically. There have been short periods of history when, at least for certain communities, there has been a satisfactory politico-economic situation — let us say in Medicean Tuscany or Periclean Athens — and at those times the wolf awakens; the enormous appetite, the irresistible appetite of the Athenian élite, of the Florentine élite, for aesthetic experience, for new knowledge, was the direct consequence of material achievement. We are today in the same situation, and nothing corresponding is really being offered. We are being offered sheep-food for the mind instead of wolf-food. The mind of man is being offered an enormous amount of hay and straw in the form of all sorts of passive entertainments which do not require any hunting skill in order to be satisfied. Man sits in front of the television, he listens to the radio, he turns on his gramophone, he reads his newspapers, all of this — as far as the mind is concerned — is passive food, no hunting is required; no challenge is made in it. Only a rare few people read in order to meet a challenge; most people read merely in order to become passive. Few people look at the television or listen to the radio with the intention of responding actively to any challenge that may be offered. Those who have the necessary cultural development may seek for a challenge; and then it is noticeable that they cannot be satisfied with what they see and hear unless they can discuss them with some friend. There is a real interest in seeking for mental activity. People write to the newspapers because they feel they want somehow to make their contribution felt. People are dissatisfied with the information they are given about the fate of the world, they want to probe, they want to go and find out for themselves. In every part of the world there is evidence of this: especially in those countries where curiosity is discouraged. One of the most interesting examples is to be seen in mass entertainments. 'There is a very interesting difference between football and cricket as spectacles. The nature of cricket is that it is so slow that between each ball bowled you can turn to your neighbour and criticize the bowler or the batsman, and thus your mind is able to enjoy a more active response. Football is so fast that there is no time for this and therefore all the energy engendered in watching football turns into violent behaviour, violent demonstrations of one kind or another. If this is a fair psychological illustration of the difference between the two sports, it indicates very well what I mean. You would expect people to be satisfied with a very exciting spectacle involving the highest possible physical skills seen in football matches; and yet, they are not satisfied. They need to demonstrate violently. These may seem to be trivial matters; but they are symptoms of very real situations. The common factor is the dissatisfaction of the mind of man with passive mental food. This dissatisfaction is shown in entertainment, in educational systems, in our reactions to what we read in the papers. Not all minds go beyond the sheep state. One does, of course, see human sheep going about with a transistor radio close to their ears, taking in rank straw for food.

If we turn now to look more seriously about the future, it appears that it will be very necessary for man to be brought to concern with the deeper human problems. This will require an act of faith, and the basic act of faith is that the basic human problems have a transcendental solution. But the transcendental solution is not of the remote kind that was accepted by our forebears; to be sought in another world that rights the disasters of this. Other Worldliness no longer satisfies us, because the human mind has seen that there is something wrong with the promise of a static satisfaction in the future and, having become aware of this, there is no going back, there is no rest for man at this point.

We may ask how it is going to be possible for people to become concerned with such transcendental questions as why man exists on the earth, what is the meaning of birth and death, whether one mode of living on the earth serves a purpose that is different from another mode of living. These questions seem to be too abstract. And indeed they are too abstract for the great majority of people, although in essence they

intimately concern every one of us. We take it for granted that these questions are either insoluble or that they belong to someone else, not to us, as in the past these were the questions that belonged to the priests or the wise men, the philosophers. We still have this habitual tendency to think that there are questions we cannot think about. This tendency has also been maintained by the scientific myth, that the deeper reality can be understood only by people with a highly specialised training. The general feeling today is against the kind of work that Dr. Krejčí and I are interested in, and that is, study of the total human situation. Even a great man like Arnold Toynbee, who made an enormous effort to introduce the total view in a delightfully acceptable way, has not made the impact on people that his work deserves because his outlook has been against the general climate of thought that has prevailed until very recently.

The situation is changing because people are gradually becoming accustomed to more active mentation, more active search into the problems that surround them. For this, means have to be found by which the kind of dialogue that was possible — let us say for Socrates and Alcibiades — should now be able to be possible for far greater numbers of people. As most of you know, this is one of the technical questions that our Institute is interested in. We have been trying to solve it by the techniques we are working on. I am not suggesting that this is the solution of all human problems, but it indicates the kind of way in which things will have to be approached. That is to say that we shall have to introduce, or re-introduce, the give and take of the search of man for the solution of his deeper problems. But this can be done, as I said before, only if there is some smell of the prey, some hint of the possible way out. That, in my opinion, will come in the notion of directed evolution; that is the conviction that the evolution of life on the earth is directed towards a certain purpose, and that the search for that purpose and the co-operation with that purpose is, not only the most important thing for mankind and its leaders, but also the most satisfying for the man in the street.

If this is to be done it requires the co-operation of many kinds of people; it requires the co-operation of the poets and the dramatists, of the artists, as well as of the scientists and of the people who are able to help to form public opinion, but perhaps most of all it requires the co-operation of the educationalists who have very little idea of either what they want to teach or how they are to teach it.

So far, I have referred only to the immediate future — say the next thirty years: but we must match the sweep of our survey of the past with an equally bold excursion into the future. According to the scheme I outlined at the first session, the Megalanthropic Epoch ended in the last century and we have entered a new cycle. If this is right, we must look for the new value-system, the Master Idea of the coming Epoch. The so-called science of futurology bases its predictions upon the interpretation of visible trends in the politico-economic sphere and usually attaches special importance to the probable achievements of science and technology in the next hundred years. It is easy to predict that we shall prolong human life, control the genetic pattern, travel in space to remote parts of the universe, reduce human labour to a minimum. Some bold spirits look forward to the achievement of terrestrial immortality: that is the indefinite prolongation of human life and the breeding of a race of supermen with all the attributes and none of the defects of genius.

Gloomier possibilities are, of course, not disregarded: universal pollution, the destruction of life and social and moral disintegration all have their prophets. One characteristic of our time is often noted: the explosive speed with which changes are taking place. Population, knowledge, new inventions, the size of organizations are all growing with exponential acceleration. One result is that, for the first time in human history, the material environment in which a man of the industrialized countries is born ceases to exist and is replaced by a totally different environment during his lifetime. Before the end of the century, the total transformation of the environment may occur within ten or twenty years. If the acceleration were to continue, the rate of change would be almost instantaneous by the year A.D. 2040. This would be equivalent to the 'end of the world' and calculations of the precise date have been made by serious American futurologists.

All these predictions and calculations tend to disregard the one unchanging element: and that is the nature of man. There is no evidence that human nature has changed since the Ice Ages. According to the hypothesis I put forward in the first session, the last great change in human nature occurred 25,000-30,000 years ago when man became creative and we have been living with the consequences of this prodigious event. Man remains as egoistic, aggressive and unreasonable as ever. The behavioural changes that have occurred in the last thousand years are due to the conditioning influence of moral systems of religion and philosophy enhanced by the effect of closer knit societies, improved communications and the demands of technology. These behavioural changes are skin deep, as the events of the present century have only too vividly demonstrated.

The technical problems I referred to earlier can be solved by the exercise of human creativity. The psychological problems could in theory be solved by conditioning processes making use of what we have learned about human suggestibility. 'Brain-washing' is an application of the scientific method that relies upon insight into the chemistry of the blood and the mechanism of the human nervous system. It may totally efface the natural man and convert him into a will-less automaton: but it still does not change human nature. The obvious objection to universal conditioning — that no one is fit to assume the responsibility for turning his fellow men into automata — betrays the underlying dilemma. Man as he is now and has been for millennia is unfit to exercise the powers that his creativity has won for him. The wolf in his mind will not be satisfied with innocuous food. Men cannot and will not meet one another with a commitment to agree even at the cost of personal and group sacrifices. And yet the progress of technology makes agreement a sine qua non of survival.

I can see no escape from the dilemma in human terms alone. Religion, philosophy, behavioural and social science as we know them today are helpless in the face of man's intractable nature. In spite of this grim conclusion, I remain optimistic because I believe that man is not alone. The more closely I examine the course of events, the more convinced do I become of the reality of the Demiurgic intervention. I am sure that the world would not have escaped atomic war without unseen help: but the time is approaching when this help will require human co-operation. We must learn to communicate with the Demiurgic Intelligences so that a great new step forward can be made with their help. The conclusion that the time has come when man must co-operate consciously with the evolutionary process is not new. Julian Huxley and other great biologists have affirmed it; but they have used the word 'co-operation' in a very restricted sense. We say that man must learn to 'co-operate' with nature; but do not thereby ascribe intelligence to nature. Herein lies the fundamental error. It is we men who are lacking in Intelligence: not the powers of nature. We are creative, but not very intelligent and we are dreadfully lacking in the will to co-operate. Another step forward must now be made in the evolution of the human mind. The last step forward was the endowment of creativity, the next will be the achievement of the ability to love. Love is a word so misused that I hesitate to pronounce it: but without love mankind will perish. Love is incompatible with egoism and man will have to learn to sacrifice self-love to achieve objective love. This is a task totally beyond the power of man as he is today. It is a task that goes beyond the power of the Demiurgic Intelligence. And yet I believe that the task will be undertaken and that it may be successfully accomplished.

One consequence of the change in human nature that must occur is the emergence of a new relationship to time. I referred earlier to the accelerating rate of change in the human environment. One life-span is no longer sufficient to stand apart from the world process and take decisions on the required scale. For this reason, I believe that a new social consciousness will develop which will enable human awareness of the 'present moment' to expand from years to decades or even centuries. The individual will cease to be the unit of society and will be replaced by stable groups enjoying a common value-system and purpose. Such groups will be able to co-operate with Demiurgic Intelligence in ways that we cannot even imagine. They will not be narrowly human in their outlook; but accept responsibility for other forms of life. A new three tier social structure will emerge with Demiurgic Intelligences as the source of leadership and decision

making, men as creative workers for the benefit of all that exists on the earth — perhaps even the solar system — and all forms of life as the sources of energy and new experiences.

I have referred to the coming age as the Synergic Epoch to emphasize the co-operative group character towards which human society must move and also to remind us that our co-operation must be upwards and downwards as well as upon the human level. The dominating theme of the Epoch will be communication. Men will, in the next thirty years, become aware that mankind must agree or perish and this will give birth to a new value system that will evolve not by the rejection of the past; but by the recognition that individualistic morality will not work and must be converted to synergic morality. Mankind may find it necessary to sacrifice some of the powers conferred by science and technology: as we are already finding it necessary to sacrifice the power of destruction conferred by nuclear weapons. The emphasis will shift from the supply of bodily appetites to the satisfaction of our mental needs. This will not bring the millennium, for human nature will remain intractable: but we may hazard a forecast that genetic changes will occur in such a manner as to enable mankind to develop group consciousness. Our present clumsy instruments of communication will be superseded by the evolution of new capacities for perception and insight. The merely intellectual powers, that have for two and a half millennia been regarded as crowning glory of man, will lose their glamour. Science and technology will be relegated to their proper role as instruments of organization and humanity will turn to other and greater tasks than the 'mastery of nature'.

These are possibilities which may not be realized: but if we do not pursue them the future of mankind is not to be envied. We are faced with global hazard; but we are also faced with the promise of a new heaven and a new earth.

Dr. Krejčí: I am deeply impressed by the concluding talk of Mr. Bennett. His diagnosis goes far beyond the realm of positive science. Just because of this it combines the globality of approach with the boldness of vision which may be an adequate way of grasping the staggering complexity of the contemporary issues in the development of mankind. There is a strong prophetic vein in what Mr. Bennett has told us and this feature permeates all his work which has been literally embodied in his Dramatic Universe. Even if I cannot accept everything of his analysis, I cannot deny that his approach is not only extremely interesting but also stimulating; stimulating for those who want to overcome the inhibitions resulting from the compartmentalization and technocentric orientation of thought which is dangerously approaching the frame of mind according to which all that cannot be either expressed in technical terms of a highly specialized science or which cannot be put into the computer is not worthy of intellectual interest. I wholly agree with Mr. Bennett that just these unmeasurable, incalculable problems of human life cutting across the barriers of individual sciences deserve greater attention of our brain and heart. Only in realising this, can man start to undertake the badly-needed shift in his creative capacity, shift from the greater command of nature and also of his fellow men to the greater command of himself, and this with the aim of perfecting himself. In doing so, man cannot, as Mr. Bennett rightly pointed out, rely only on the divine omnipotence. This idea has been put forward also by the great theologian and martyr of our century, Bonhoeffer.

However, as both rightly point out, man has his creative capacity which enables him (in his best instances), to transcend the realm of what is given, and to bring him over the 'structured parameters' of his time and space. It is just this capacity of man which is at the same time a part of his transcendental endeavour, an endeavour which has so often been conceived as a participation in a higher scope of spirituality. Here there may be seen for man a source of hope, of stimulating conviction that man is not alone, and that both his capacity to create and morally evaluate are derived from and are aiming at a higher order than is his own, existing so far.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

J. G. BENNETT

Born 1897. Formerly Director General of the British Coal Utilization Research Association and Director of Research at Powell Duffryn Ltd. Author of scientific papers on coal and fuel technology and mathematical physics. Books published include *The Crisis in Human Affairs*, *The Dramatic Universe*, *Witness*, *A Spiritual Psychology*, *Energies: Material, Vital and Cosmic*. At present Director of Research at the Institute for the Comparative Study of History, Philosophy and the Sciences, also Chairman of Structural Communication Systems Ltd.

DR. JAROSLAV Krejčí

Born 1916. Doctorate from Charles University, Prague. Worked in Czechoslovak economic institutions and taught economics at the Technological University in Prague. During an enforced break in his professional and academic career he turned his attention to- the broader field of sociology. Then became a research worker of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. After having continued his research at the Universities of Vienna and of Lancaster, he is, in the coming Academic year, lecturing in Comparative Cultural Analysis at the latter University. Dr. Krejčí's publications have been, until now, mostly in Czech.